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Foreword
This FSR, the sixth in the series, is set in an environment of global and domestic macroeconomic instability and uncertainty. The unconventional tools, which central banks and governments used effectively at the beginning of the crisis, have lost some of their edge and effectiveness. The space for fiscal and monetary actions is 
getting squeezed. Some unintended consequences of the unconventional measures have started manifesting, and 
the timing and pace of exit from these policies could bring on fresh risks and destabilize the system. Confidence 
in the financial sector remains low, uncertainty persists and investment climate globally is yet to revive. Europe 
and Japan are technically in recession. Growth in the US is slow, and if the “fiscal cliff” problem is not resolved 
effectively and in good time, the adverse macroeconomic impact on the US economy would be large and abrupt, with 
ramifications for the entire world. China is looking poised to grow reasonably well, but the euphoria over BRICS as 
a growth engine has been dented.
Economic growth in India has moderated in recent quarters, buffeted by global headwinds and domestic 
policy uncertainties. Growth, however, needs to accelerate if the momentum of poverty reduction, employment 
generation and pay off from the demographic dividend is to be accelerated.
The Reserve Bank has been managing the balance between its multiple objectives of price stability, financial 
stability and sovereign debt management - the holy trinity - under conditions of persistent inflationary pressures, 
slowing growth, widening current account deficit and a depreciating exchange rate.
The deteriorating asset quality of the banking sector has been engaging the attention of the Bank even 
though stress tests reveal that the system is still resilient to severe shocks. But one has to be aware that as Julie 
Dickson1 says,” A shock is a shock because the unexpected happens – the system does not behave the way you 
think it might”. Thus, stress tests cannot capture the entire dynamics of distress. The FSR has therefore, been using 
a multiplicity of tools and techniques to make an assessment of the shocks to the system.
The recent financial crisis has taught us some very important lessons. The general disenchantment with 
‘casino banking’ in certain developed economies underscored the dangers of over-financialization of the real 
economy. Stephen G Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi in their recent paper on ‘Reassessing the impact of Finance on 
Growth state’, “we estimate that for private credit extended by banks, the turning point is closer to 90% of GDP - 
somewhat lower than for total credit. Many countries are close to or beyond this level, suggesting that more credit 
will not translate into higher trend growth. For example, in Portugal, private credit by banks was 160% of GDP at the 
onset of the financial crisis. The corresponding figure for the UK was 180% of GDP and even reached 200% of GDP 
in Denmark. By contrast, a country like India, where bank credit is less than 50% of GDP, can still reap significant 
benefits from further financial deepening in terms of increasing productivity growth.”
Over the past 60 years, we have seen several episodes of economic growth in different parts of the world. One 
clear lesson of this experience is that growth is sustainable only if it is inclusive. Governments around the world are 
therefore anxious that even as they pursue economic growth, they must make that growth process inclusive. There 
are many ways of understanding inclusive growth: the way I understand it is that inclusive growth is a process 
where the poor contribute to growth and the poor benefit from growth. A growth process that increases inequity 
lacks durability, and indeed even legitimacy, eventually threatening economic and social stability. Given the strong 
linkage between stability and inclusion, this FSR covers the initiatives by various financial sector regulators towards 
financial inclusion and literacy and the progress achieved.
Dr. D. Subbarao
December 28, 2012
1  Julie Dickson is the current Superintendent of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Canada.

Contents
Page No.
Foreword
List of Select Abbreviations i-ii
Overview   1
Chapter I : Macrofinancial Risks - An Assessment 4
      Global Growth 5
      International Financial Markets 6
      Prolonged Accommodative Policies – Downside Risks 7
      Domestic Growth 8
      Systemic Liquidity Index 8
      Fiscal Consolidation 9
      External Sector Vulnerabilities 9
      Gold Imports 11
      Financial Savings 11
      Credit Cycles in the Indian Economy 13
      Capital Market Issuers - Composition 14
      Corporate Sector 16
      Systemic Risk Survey 18
Chapter II : Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience 20
      Risks to the Banking Sector 20
      Distress Dependencies and Inter-connectedness 21
        Banking Stability Measures (BSMs) 21
        Network Analysis 23
      Soundness and Resilience 29
      Pension System in India 47
Chapter III : Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure 48
      Regulatory Infrastructure 48
      Payment and Settlement Systems 59
      Financial Stability and Development Council 64
      Product Innovations in India 64
      Regulatory Initiatives for Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability 65
Annex : Methodologies 71
Financial Stability Report December 2012  
LIST OF BOXES
1.1 Household Physical and Financial Savings in India 12
1.2 Greater Credit Expansion Warranted as a Countercyclical Tailwind 14
2.1 Restructuring of Advances 31
2.2 Variable Rate Deposits 38
3.1 Extraterritorial Implication of Regulations 50
3.2 Challenges in Relying on Internal Models for Calculation of Capital Charge 51
3.3 Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2012 54
3.4 Strengthening Regulation of the Shadow Banking System 56
3.5 Challenges in Migrating to Central Clearing 62
LIST OF CHARTS
1.1 Macro Stability Map and Financial Markets Stability Map 4
1.2 GDP Growth in Advanced Economies 5
1.3 GDP Growth in EDEs 5
1.4 10 yr-Sovereign Bond Yield 6
1.5 Growth in Loans to the Private Sector in the Euro Area 6
1.6 Movement in Equity Indices of Advanced Economies 6
1.7 Movement in Equity Indices of EDEs 7
1.8 Commodity Price Indices 8
1.9 The Systemic Liquidity Index 8
1.10 Y-o-Y Growth in Indian Exports and Imports 9
1.11 Financing of India’s Current Account Deficit 9
1.12 1-Month Implied Volatilities of Various Currencies against the US dollar 10
1.13 Saving and Investment Rates in India 11
1.14 Household Savings 12
1.15 Movement in Prices of Household Assets 12
1.16 Bank Credit and House Prices 13
1.17 Credit Cycle and GDP Growth 14
1.18 Composition of the Sources of Credit to the Commercial Sector 14
1.19 Sector-wise Share in Resource Mobilisation 15
1.20 Share of Categories of Issues in Resource Mobilisation 15
Page No.
 Contents
1.21 Movement in Indian Equity Indices 16
1.22 DII and FII Net Inflows into Indian Equity Markets 16
1.23 Change in Perception over the past six months 19
2.1 Banking Stability Indicator and its Components 20
2.2 Banking Stability Map 21
2.3 Movements of JPoD and BSI 21
2.4 Movement of Toxicity Index of Select Banks 22
2.5 Movement of Vulnerability Index of Select Banks 22
2.6 Systemic Inter-linkages among Select Banks: Cascade Effect 22
2.7 Size of the Interbank Market 23
2.8 Network of the Banking System – September 2012 23
2.9 Network of the Financial System – June 2012 23
2.10 Contagion Impact of the Failure of Two Large Borrower Banks in the Inner Core of the Banking 
System
24
2.11 Loss of Capital of the Banking System due to the Failure of Top 10 Connected Banks 24
2.12 Loss of Capital of the Banking System due to the Failure of Five Most Connected Banks at Different 
Levels of LGD
25
2.13 Loss of Capital of the Banking System due to the Failure of Top 10 Connected Banks under 
Different Distress Conditions
26
2.14 Flowchart Representing the Propagation of a Liquidity Contagion11 27
2.15 Liquidity Contagion due to the Failure of a Large Lender Bank 27
2.16 SCBs’ Lending to Non-bank Financial Entities 28
2.17 SCBs’ Borrowing from Non-bank Financial Entities 28
2.18 Exposure of Banks to NBFCs as a percentage of Capital Funds 28
2.19 Exposure of Insurance Companies to SCBs as per cent of Policy Holders’ Liabilities 28
2.20 Borrowing of Banks from AMCs as per cent of their Total Capital 29
2.21 Growth Rate in Advances of Bank Groups 29
2.22 CRAR - Bank-groups 29
2.23 Growth in Risk Weighted Assets - Bank Groups 30
2.24 Gross NPA Ratio 30
2.25 Growth in Gross NPAs 30
2.26 Trends in Slippages 30
Page No.
Financial Stability Report December 2012  
2.27 Restructured Standard Advances to Gross Total Advances 32
2.28 Trend in number and value of cases under CDR 32
2.29 Industry-wise break-up of value under CDR - June 2012 32
2.30 Exposure to Power Sector 32
2.31 Asset Quality and Provision Coverage : Impact of Restructuring 33
2.32 Asset Quality and Provision Coverage : Cross Country Comparision 33
2.33 Projection of System Level CRAR of SCBs 35
2.34 Projection of Bank-group wise GNPA ratio 35
2.35 Projection of Bank-group wise CRAR 35
2.36 Share of Top 20 Individual Borrowers in Total Advances 36
2.37 Bulk Deposits to Liabilities ratio vis-a-vis excess SLR: Size-wise Distribution – September 2012 37
2.38 International Liabilities of Indian Banks 39
2.39 Foreign Claims of Indian Banks 39
2.40 Notional Principal Outstanding in Derivatives Market 40
2.41 Share of Interbank Segment in Total Derivatives Transactions – September 2012 40
2.42 Contagion Loss as a percentage of Capital Funds – September 2012 41
2.43 MTM in Customer Segment as ratio of Capital Funds – September 2012 41
2.44 Impact of Application of Shocks as on March 31, 2012 and September 30, 2012 41
2.45 Change in Net MTM as ratio of Capital Funds of Banks – September 2012 42
2.46 Growth rate in EBPT, PAT, Interest Income and Interest Expenses 42
2.47 Growth rate (Y-o-Y) in some select items of incomes - All SCBs 42
2.48 Provisioning Coverage Ratio - SCBs 42
2.49 Impact of NPA Shocks on Capital Position: SUCBs – September 2012 44
2.50 Liquidity Risk: ALM Mismatch - SUCBs – September 2012 44
2.51 Trends in Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio 44
2.52 Trends in Gross NPA Ratio 45
2.53 Trends in Return on Assets 45
2.54 Sources and Uses of Funds – As on June 30, 2012 45
2.55 Trends in Advances to Real Estate Sector 46
2.56 Trends in Exposure to Capital Market 46
2.57 Trends in Select Sources of Funds - IFCs 46
Page No.
 Contents
3.1 Operational Risk Weighted Exposures of the Banking system 52
3.2 Amount Involved in Outstanding Cases of Frauds 52
3.3 Intra Group Exposures in case of One Large Financial Conglomerate 53
3.4 Intra Group Exposures as a Percentage of Capital Funds of the Bank in the Group 53
3.5 Share of Branches and Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks to Total Assets – as on end-2008 54
3.6 Size of Other Financial Intermediaries 57
3.7 Average Annual Growth of Other Financial Intermediaries Sector Pre- and Post-Crisis 58
3.8 Percentage Distribution of Settlement Systems (in value) 59
3.9 Percentage Distribution of Settlement Systems (in volume) 59
3.10 Forex Market Volatility and Margin (Initial and Volatility Margins) collected by CCIL 60
3.11 Forex Market Volatility and Change in Initial Margins collected by CCIL 60
3.12 Settlement Statistic for Cash Market in BSE and NSE 61
3.13 Settlement Statistics for Equity Derivatives Market of NSE 61
3.14 Settlement Statistics for Equity Derivatives Market of BSE 61
3.15 Insurance Penetration in Select Countries 68
3.16 Insurance Density in Select Countries 68
3.17 Action Plan for NSFE 70
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 External Sector Vulnerability Indicators 10
1.2 Aggregated Ratios for 12 Select Companies from 8 Corporate Groups 17
1.3 Major Risk Groups identified in Systemic Risk Survey: October 2012 18
1.4 Various Risks identified in Systemic Risk Survey: October 2012 18
1.5 Perception on occurrence of high impact events and their impact on Indian financial system 19
2.1 Share in the Interbank Market 23
2.2 Impact of Distress Conditions on Contagion Loss 26
2.3 Impact on Availability of Systemic Liquidity due to the Failure of a Large Lender Bank 27
2.4 Stress Tests - Credit Risk: Gross Credit – September 2012 34
2.5 Macroeconomic Scenario Assumptions 34
2.6 Projection of System Level GNPA Ratios of SCBs 34
2.7 Projected Sectoral NPA 35
Page No.
Financial Stability Report December 2012  
2.8 Banks' Exposure to their Top 20 Individual Borrowers 36
2.9 Liquidity Ratios 36
2.10 Liquidity Risk: SCBs – September 2012 38
2.11 Interest Rate Risk – Trading and Banking Books – September 2012 39
2.12 Relative Size of the Derivatives Market in India –March 2012 40
2.13 Performance Parameters of RRBs 43
2.14 Select Financial Soundness Indicators of SUCBs 43
3.1 Premium under Life Sector: Bancassurance Vs Other Channels 58
3.2 Premium under Non Life Sector: Bancassurance Vs Other Channels 59
3.3 Exposure of NSCCL and BSE to Banks 60
3.4 Financial Inclusion Initiatives 67
3.5 Progress under FIP for the period March 2010 to September 2012 67
Page No.
 Contents
List of Select Abbreviations
i
Financial Stability Report December 2012  
ALM Asset Liability Management
ALCO Asset Liability Management Committee
AMA Advanced Measurement Approach
AMCs Asset Management Companies
ATMs Automated Teller Machines
BC Business Correspondent
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BSDA Basic Services Demat Account
BSE Bombay Stock Exchange
BSI Banking Stability Index
BSM Banking Stability Measure
BSMD Banking System’s Portfolio Multivariate 
Density
CAD Current Account Deficit
CCIL Clearing Corporation of India Limited
CCP Central Counterparty
CD Certificates of Deposit; Credit to Deposit
CDR Corporate Debt Restructuring
CDS Credit Default Swap
CET1 Common Equity Tier 1
CME Capital Market Exposure
CPI Consumer Price Index
CRAR Capital to Risk-weighted Assets Ratio
CRR Cash Reserve Ratio
CSO Central Statistical Organisation
CTD Cheapest-To-Deliver
DICGC Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee 
Corporation
DIIs Domestic Institutional Investors
DMA Direct Market Access
DPs Depository Participants
D-SIBs Domestic Systemically Important Banks
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Tax
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest, Tax, 
Depreciation and Amortisation
EBPT Earnings Before Provisions and Taxes
EBT Electronic Benefit Transfer
ECB European Central Bank, External 
Commercial Borrowing
EDEs Emerging and Developing Economies
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority
ELSS Equity Linked Savings Schemes
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FATCA Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
FB Foreign Banks
FCs Financial Conglomerates
FFIs Foreign Financial Institutions
FII Foreign Institutional Investor
FIPs Financial Inclusion Plans
FPO Follow on Public Offer
FRA Forward Rate Agreement
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSDC Financial Stability and Development 
Council
FSR Financial Stability Report
GDCF Gross Domestic Capital Formation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDS Gross Domestic Savings
GFD Gross Fiscal Deficit
GFSR Global Financial Stability Report
GNPA Gross Non-Performing Advance
GOI Government of India
G-SIFIs Global Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions
HFT High Frequency Trading
HLA Higher Loss Absorbency
IA Investor Association
Ind AS Indian Accounting Standards
IASB International Accounting Standards 
Board
ICR Interest Coverage Ratio
ICT Information and Communication 
Technology
IFCs Infrastructure Financing Companies
IFRS International Financial Reporting 
Standard
 List of Select Abbreviations
ii
IMA Internal Models Approach
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOSCO International Organisation of Securities 
Commission
IPO Initial Public Offer
IRB Internal Rating Based
IRDA Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority
IRS Interest Rate Swap
ITEs Intra-Group Transactions and Exposures
JPoD Joint Probability of Distress
KYC Know Your Customer
LGD Loss Given Default
MCA Ministry of Corporate Affairs
MFs Mutual Funds
MGNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Gurantee Act
MI Micro Insurance
MMMFs Money Market Mutual Funds
MSMED Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development
MTM Mark-to-Market
NAV Net Asset Value
NBFCs Non-Banking Financial Companies
NBFC-D Non-Banking Financial Company – 
Deposit taking
NBFC-ND-SI Non-Banking Financial Company-Non 
Deposit taking-Systemically Important
NDTL Net Demand and Time Liabilities
NFFEs Non-Financial Foreign Entities
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NHB National Housing Bank
NIM Net Interest Margin
NPA Non-Performing Advance
NPB New Private Bank
NPS New Pension System
NSCCL National Securities Clearing Corporation 
Limited
NSFE National Strategy for Financial Education
NSE National Stock Exchange
OFIs Other Financial Intermediaries
OPB Old Private Bank
ORSA Own Risk and Solvency Assessment
OSS Off-Site Surveillance
OTC Over The Counter
PAT Profit After Tax
PCR Provision Coverage Ratio
PFRDA Pension Fund Regulatory and 
Development Authority
PMI Purchasing Managers Index
PoD Probabilities of Distress
PSBs Public Sector Banks
PRA Prudential Regulation Authority
QFIs Qualified Foreign Investors
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RoA Return on Assets
RRB Regional Rural Bank
RWA Risk-Weighted Asset
SCBs Scheduled Commercial Banks
SEBI Securities and Exchange Board of India
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SGF Settlement Guarantee Fund
SLI Systemic Liquidity Index
SLR Statutory Liquidity Ratio
SUCB Scheduled Urban Co-operative Bank
TCE Total Credit Exposure
TER Total Expense Ratio
TI Toxicity Index
TRs Trade Repositories
TSA The Standard Approach
VaR Value at Risk
VAR Vector Autoregression
VI Vulnerability Index
WPI Wholesale Price Index
WOS Wholly Owned Subsidiary
WG Working Group
Y-o-Y Year-on-Year
1Financial Stability Report December 2012  
Overview
Macrofinancial Risks
Global
The outlook for global growth continues to be grim. 
Global growth forecasts have been lowered by major 
global agencies. Much of the Euro Area and Japan are 
experiencing negative growth while growth in the US is 
still low. The continuance of the Euro Area Sovereign 
Debt Crisis and uncertainty over the US fiscal cliff are 
major downside risks to global growth and financial 
stability. Efforts to deal with the crisis are underway in 
Europe. For Emerging and Developing Economies 
(EDEs), the threat of spillovers remains significant in 
view of the depressed outlook for global trade and 
volatile capital flows. Although inflation pressures 
appear to be moderating, elevated food and commodity 
prices remain contingent risks, especially for economies 
facing domestic supply constraints. A major risk to the 
outlook stems from political economy considerations 
that could impede, delay or erode resolute policy action 
and the consequence could be deepened financial 
stress and heightened risk aversion.
Domestic
The overall macroeconomic risks in the Indian financial 
system seem to have increased since the publication of 
the previous Financial Stability Report (FSR) in June 
2012. Decline in domestic growth coupled with 
relatively high inflation, fall in domestic savings, 
particularly household financial savings, fall in 
investment demand and moderation in consumption 
have increased the risks to macroeconomic stability. In 
addition, high current account deficit, stressed fiscal 
situation, increasing leverage and falling profitability 
of the corporate sector have emerged as pertinent 
issues for macroeconomic stability.
Fiscal Assessment
The central government’s gross fiscal deficit (GFD) up 
to October 2012 constituted about 72 per cent of the 
budgeted amount for the whole year as against 74 per 
cent during the corresponding period of previous year. 
There could be some shortfall in tax and non tax 
revenue of the government during the current year on 
account of economic slowdown. Also there could be 
some overshooting of government expenditure.
External Sector
Stress on the external front remains elevated. Although, 
as compared to the previous quarter, the current 
account deficit to GDP ratio has fallen, it still remains 
high. Gold imports continue to account for a large part 
of the CAD. Other external sector vulnerability 
indicators also show increased stress. Volatile capital 
flows could make CAD financing a challenge.
Financial Markets
Risks in the Indian financial markets fell marginally in 
the period under review. The liquidity deficit in the 
financial system increased in Q3 of 2012-13 after 
having eased during Q2 of 2012-13. Long and short 
term treasury yields remained largely range bound. 
The primary market in equities which was relatively 
subdued during early part of the year showed some 
signs of revival in the recent period. Sentiments in the 
secondary market have improved on increased FII 
inflows. However, a significant portion of the capital 
market issues were concentrated in bonds of banks 
and financial institutions, reducing their 
disintermediation function. There could potentially be 
an outflow from the equity market if the US fiscal cliff 
risk materalises stoking risk aversion.
Households
The household sector has traditionally been a stabilising 
factor in the Indian economy. However, there are signs 
of increasing stress in this sector with a fall in 
household financial savings; households have been 
shifting away from financial assets into physical assets 
and valuables such as gold.
Corporate Sector
The corporate sector has also been showing signs of 
increased stress. Ability of corporates to service 
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borrowing with present level of profits has fallen since 
2009-10 and it is currently below the levels of 2008-09. 
Leverage of coporates exposed to the infrastructure 
sector has increased. Until recently, the primary equity 
market was dormant and this could, among other 
factors, have led to increasing leverage of the corporate 
sector.
Systemic Risk Survey
Systemic risk survey indicates that global issues such 
as the fall in global growth and sovereign risk/contagion 
are perceived to be prominent risks for the financial 
system. On the domestic front, increasing fiscal deficit 
and deterioration in growth outlook have emerged as 
important risk factors.
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
Banking Sector Risks
The risks to the banking sector have been increasing in 
recent years. Tight liquidity, deteriorating asset quality 
and reducing soundness are the major contributors to 
the decline in stability of the banking system. However, 
a marginal improvement in the banking stability 
indicator during the last two quarters is primarily 
because of better liquidity conditions.
Banking Stability Measures
The probability of distress of the entire banking system 
seems to have reversed its upward trend and registered 
a marginal decline in the recent period. Various 
indicators of distress dependencies in the banking 
system reveal that there has been no significant change 
in the risk over the last few quarters.
Network Analysis
The analysis of the network of the Indian financial 
system finds that the inter linkages in the system are 
strong. Interconnectedness in the financial system in 
India arises from both funding dependencies and 
direct credit exposures especially among banks, on the 
one hand, and insurance companies, mutual funds and 
non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), on the 
other. An assessment of the impact of the liquidity 
contagion in the Indian banking system has been 
attempted in this issue of the FSR. There has been no 
major shift in the pattern of interconnectedness or 
contagion risks in the system in the recent periods.
Scheduled Commercial Banks
Capital Adequacy and Asset Quality
The overall capital adequacy ratio has deteriorated 
since March 2012 though it remained well above the 
regulatory minimum. The decline in CRAR was more 
pronounced for the public sector banks. In addition, 
asset quality of banks has seen considerable 
deterioration during the half year ended September 
2012.
Restructuring of Advances
Restructuring of loans, particularly of big ticket loans 
under the corporate debt restructuring (CDR) 
mechanism, has recently come under closer scrutiny 
due to the steep rise in the number and value of such 
advances. Of late, the growth in restructured advanced 
has outpaced the growth in gross advances of the 
banking system.
Profitability
Profitability of the banking sector has increased in the 
recent past, partly, due to a fall in growth of interest 
expenditure relative to interest income. The profit 
after tax has grown at 36.8 per cent at end September 
2012, reaching close to the growth rate of 37.4 per cent 
observed in the period before the global financial crisis.
Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
Implementation of Global Reforms
The global regulatory reform initiatives launched in 
wake of the global financial crisis are at various stages 
of implementation, where consistency across 
jurisdictions becomes critical to ensuring that 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage do not emerge. 
Basel III Implementation
Final guidelines for Basel III implementation have been 
issued in India. Banks in India are relatively well placed 
for migration to the new capital regime. However, the 
recent deterioration in asset quality as well as proposed 
changes in provisioning norms could pose challenges 
for banks. 
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Advanced Approaches under Basel II
Use of complex models for capital calculations pose 
challenges even as several banks are gearing up to 
migrate to advanced approaches under Basel II. 
Associated validation and accredition processes will 
assume criticality in ensuring that complex modeling 
is not used to optimistically calculate risk weights 
resulting in dilution of capital or other regulatory 
requirements.
Banking Frauds
Losses incurred by banks in India due to frauds are on 
the increase. These trends, as well as several high 
profile cases of frauds in banks globally, have focused 
attention on the importance of operational risk capital. 
In the Indian context, however, there are formidable 
challenges in measuring the extent of operational 
risks given the lack of historical data on operational 
loss events.
Shadow Banking
The emergent policy framework for the shadow 
banking system aims to mitigate potential systemic 
risks across the globe while recognising the useful 
economic role played by them. The non-banking 
financial system in India is within a regulatory 
perimeter but there are some gaps in terms of 
regulatory coverage and data availability, which are 
being looked into jointly by all regulators.
Financial Market Infrastructure
The country’s financial market infrastructure has 
been functioning smoothly. Potential risks posed by 
procyclicality of margin movements in the CCIL 
settlements and various equity exchanges, and 
exposures of equity market central counterparties 
(CCPs) to the settlement banks will need to be 
monitored. There are challenges in migrating all OTC 
derivative transactions to central clearing given lack of 
standardisation, sufficient liquidity and readily 
available pricing information in some products/
markets. In India, a trade repository for OTC derivative 
products has been launched. Guaranteed clearing of 
foreign exchange forward transactions in the US$ /INR 
segment has been mandated.
Financial Inclusion
Globally, the triad of Financial Inclusion, Financial 
Literacy and Consumer Protection has been recognized 
as intertwining threads in pursuit of financial stability. 
In India, the financial sector regulators have been 
working towards furthering financial inclusion and 
improving financial literacy through concerted efforts, 
which are featured in this issue of FSR.
The Financial Stability Report December 2012 includes 
inputs from GOI, SEBI, IRDA and PFRDA. 
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Chapter I
Macrofinancial Risks - An Assessment
Globally, growth risks seem to have risen and could offset the positive effects of enhanced liquidity. Although, liquidity 
infusions by major central banks have contributed to some stability in global fi nancial markets these do not seem to 
be a substitute for structural solutions. Further, fi scal stress and sovereign debt problems continue to be major risks to 
market stability and with commodity prices still at elevated levels, risks of liquidity-driven price increases also remain 
signifi cant. A major risk to the outlook stems from political economy considerations which could impede, delay or erode 
resolute policy actions and the consequence could be deepened  fi nancial stress and heightened risk aversion. Amidst 
this global slowdown and uncertainty, the Indian economy remains sluggish, held down by slowing investment, 
weakening consumption and declining exports. The loss of growth momentum which started in 2011-12, extended 
in the current year with growth remaining below the trend, however, infl ation continued to remain above the Reserve 
Bank’s comfort zone. On the external front, the current account defi cit (CAD) remains above the comfort level and 
the Indian rupee witnessed depreciation pressure. Another worrying development has been the reduction in the share 
of fi nancial assets in household savings as households’ preference for physical assets and valuables like gold seem to be 
rising, which is also adding to the pressure on the CAD. Thus, lower growth, elevated infl ation, high fi scal and 
current account defi cits remain potential risks to fi nancial stability. Global perceptions of India’s ability to tide over 
the current economic weakening could hinge on its ability to effectively follow the roadmap for fi scal consolidation. 
This would vacate fi nancial space for India’s private sector which is competing with the government to attract a 
greater share of the falling household savings. There are also early signs of corporate leverage rising among the several 
industrial groups with large exposure to infrastructure sectors like power. Further, many companies have large foreign 
currency denominated overseas borrowings with unhedged exposures at a time when volatility in exchange rates 
remains elevated. These pose signifi cant risks to the stability of the corporate sector. However, fi nancial market conditions 
improved marginally in the period under assessment.
1.1 The overall macroeconomic risk to the Indian 
financial system seems to have increased since the 
publication of the previous Financial Stability Report 
(FSR) in June 2012. The global, fiscal and corporate sector 
risks have registered visible increases. The risks 
emanating from the household sector - which in the 
Indian context is a stabilising force – have increased 
marginally. The risks from domestic growth, inflation 
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and external sector also remained elevated (Chart 1.1.i). 
Stability of the financial markets which was measured 
based on four segments of the market, namely, foreign 
exchange market, equity market, debt market and 
banking sector funding, show marginal softening of risks 
in all the segments compared to the previous FSR 
(Chart 1.1.ii).
Global Growth
1.2 Economic growth remained sluggish around the 
world.  The global economy grew slower during 2012 
(upto September 2012) than previously anticipated 
(Chart 1.2 and Chart 1.3). The Euro area slipped into a 
technical recession in Q3 2012 with Spain, Italy and 
Portugal experiencing protracted recession. Slower than 
expected economic growth in the US has led to 
continuation of unconventional policy measures by the 
Federal Reserve. Failure to resolve the issues on debt 
ceiling and fiscal cliff could hamper economic decisions 
by corporates and households which in turn could slow 
growth further. Growth in Japan was estimated to be (-) 
3.5 per cent, on an annualized basis, in Q3 2012. Growth 
in the Emerging and Developing Economies (EDEs) 
during Q2 2012 was also lower than in the previous 
quarters. Although inflation pressures appear to be 
moderating, elevated food and commodity prices remain 
contingent risks to economies facing domestic supply 
constraints.
Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis
1.3 Global financial markets have been supported 
by announcements about European banking and fiscal 
integration. Investor confidence, however, remains 
susceptible to bouts of stress as there does not appear 
to be a definitive strategy to resolve the Eurozone crisis. 
Financial markets face risks from further deterioration 
of world growth prospects. While some measures have 
been taken to strengthen banks and sovereigns, the 
threat of negative feedback loops between sovereigns 
and banks remains a worry. European investors and 
banks in general are reducing exposures of foreign 
assets (within Europe) on fears of a country’s exit from 
the euro or of large banking failures. 
1.4 International regulations, particularly in the 
area of central counterparty arrangements in various 
market segments, and Basel-III liquidity requirements 
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have increased the demand for high quality collateral. 
The previous FSRs have discussed the trend towards 
greater collateralisation of transactions among banks 
and those with customers. Prolonged periods of 
economic slowdown in the advanced economies are 
likely to put further pressure on their already strained 
fiscal positions. The perception of safety of some of the 
European sovereigns has been dented and this reduces 
the available pool of high quality risk free government 
securities for use as collateral. This development thus 
could have negative consequences for the smooth 
functioning of financial markets. 
1.5 Yields on 10 year sovereign bonds have fallen 
to record lows for core Euro Area countries and 
increased in the peripheral countries (Chart 1.4). This 
has resulted in marked increase in spreads of stressed 
sovereign bonds over German Bunds. The yields have 
fallen after the series of measures announced by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in the recent past. 
1.6 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
estimates that assets of 58 large European banks have 
fallen by about US $ 600 billion during Q3 2011 - Q2 
2012. This has had implications for credit growth 
in the Euro Area with the peripheral nations being 
most affected. Although stabilising measures by ECB 
have slowed the de-leveraging process, credit to the 
private sector still remains weak as a large part of the 
ECB liquidity is being parked in the overnight deposit 
facility even though the interest rate on those deposits 
is zero (Chart 1.5).
International Financial Markets
1.7 Unconventional policy measures undertaken 
in some advanced economies have supported global 
equity markets during the year. After a period of 
subdued sentiments, optimism returned to global 
equity markets after the ECB President announced that 
the ECB was ready to use all possible means to save 
the Euro and the announcement of Outright Monetary 
Transactions (Chart 1.6 and Chart 1.7). However, 
fiscal cliff concerns have weighed on the bourses and 
the escalation of violence in the Gaza strip has also 
dampened sentiment. 
1.8 Bond yields for some developed economies have 
remained subdued due to safe haven flows and are 
close to historical lows. Investors across the world have 
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increased their holding of government paper. Besides, 
flight to safety has also increased concentration risk in 
sovereign paper. 
Prolonged Accommodative Policies-Downside Risks
1.9 Advanced economy central banks have adopted 
accommodative monetary policies in response to the 
Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Area Sovereign 
Debt Crisis. This has been seen as necessary to halt the 
deflationary spiral and to stimulate growth in these 
economies and consequently promote growth globally. 
Some of these policies have been unconventional as the 
lower bound of interest rates had been reached at the 
early stages of the crisis. Balance sheet size of central 
banks around the world has expanded stoking fears 
of high inflation in the future. In addition, concerns 
over the prolonged use of unconventional policies have 
emerged especially in emerging economies.
1.10 Low yields for an extended time period tend 
to drive investors towards riskier assets in search of 
higher yields. Excess liquidity created by these policies 
has also fuelled volatile capital flows into emerging 
market economies. Such flows tend to be driven more 
by short term factors accentuating the risk-on-risk-off 
trends in financial markets. Low rates also reduce the 
opportunity cost of capital and hence the incentive of 
financial firms to monitor borrowers’ financial health 
and ability to pay back debt. 
1.11 Prolonged accommodative policies create a large 
demand for high quality financial assets. The pool of 
assets that central banks can hold is large but not infinite. 
Market for these securities could become illiquid if 
central banks hold a major portion of these securities 
and trading among private players falls leading to an 
increase in liquidity premiums1. In such a scenario, 
the very purpose of the accommodative policy is called 
to question. The increased demand could also create 
mis-pricing of the assets. Besides, lower bond yields 
could reduce fiscal prudence on part of the sovereigns 
allowing them to borrow more at lower rates.
1.12 Profitability of central banks could also be 
affected due to mark-to-market losses when interest 
1 Bernanke, B (2012), “Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis”, remarks at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium on August 
31, 2012, Jackson Hole, Wyoming
rates rise. This could undermine the credibility of the 
central bank and affect financial stability. The exit 
strategy will have to be carefully calibrated by central 
banks and their credibility will be impacted severely 
if mistiming or wrong strategies stoke inflation 
expectations or raise rates too quickly.
Commodity Prices
1.13 Commodity prices, as measured by the movement 
in the IMF’s Primary Commodity Price Indices, have 
remained range- bound, after peaking in March 2012. 
The food price index trended sharply upwards during 
July-August 2012 and has edged down since September 
2012. The softening in Q4 of 2012 was in view of a 
slowdown in euro area, Japan and emerging economies 
like Brazil, China and India. If this trend persists, 
inflationary pressures arising from commodity prices 
could be lower. However, quantitative easing being 
pursued by advanced economies poses some upside 
risks to global commodity prices (Chart 1.8). 
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Domestic Growth
1.14 A number of domestic and external factors have 
caused a significant deceleration in economic growth 
in India during the last few quarters. GDP growth 
remained low at 5.3 per cent during Q2 2012. On 
the domestic front, structural impediments such as 
fall in domestic savings, persistently high inflation, 
regulatory and environmental issues resulting in a fall 
in investment demand and moderation in consumption 
spending have contributed to the fall in growth. All 
these factors seem to have brought down the potential 
growth rate to about 7 per cent.
1.15 Rise in industrial activity in October 2012 is 
attributed largely to base effect and festival demand. 
However, the significant rise in capital goods and 
the moderate increase in order book volumes are 
indications of a modest firming up of activity in Q3 
of 2012-13. The Services Purchasing Managers Index 
(PMI) indicates a positive sentiment while the increase 
in rabi sowing coverage suggests improving prospects 
for agricultural growth. Even though inflation has 
softened in the recent period, the risks persist. On 
the external front, a weakening global economy has 
exacerbated the domestic slowdown.
Systemic Liquidity Index
1.16 There was a significant easing of the liquidity 
deficit in the banking system in Q2 of 2012-13, and the 
liquidity deficit mostly remained within the Reserve 
Bank’s comfort zone of one per cent of Net Demand 
and Time Liabilities (NDTL) during this period. 
However, the liquidity conditions have tightened in Q3 
of 2012-13 so far primarily on account of persistence 
of high government balances and the widening wedge 
between deposit and credit growth. The Reserve Bank’s 
open market operation (purchase of government 
securities) added primary liquidity and contained 
the liquidity deficit. The Systemic Liquidity Index 
(SLI) which is based on a multiple indicator approach 
and aims to capture the overall funding scenario in 
the financial system viz., the banking, non-banking 
financial, the corporate sectors and liquidity in foreign 
exchange market shows that the liquidity conditions 
have tightened marginally in Q3 of 2012-13 (Chart 1.9). 
Long and short term treasury yields remained largely 
range bound.
Chart 1.9: The Systemic Liquidity Index
Note: The SLI below zero denotes comfortable level of liquidity conditions 
in the system, whereas a level above zero implies tight liquidity 
conditions.
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
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Fiscal Consolidation
1.17  The central government’s gross fiscal deficit 
(GFD) up to October 2012 constituted about 72 per cent 
of the budgeted amount for the whole year as against 
74 per cent during the corresponding period of previous 
year. However, there is likely to be some shortfall in 
revenue collections (tax and non-tax) during the current 
year due to slowdown in economic growth. At the same 
time, there is a possibility of some overshooting of the 
non-planned budgeted expenditure, especially due to 
additional allocation for various subsidies (fuel, food 
and fertilizer). The central government has already 
brought out first supplementary demands for grants 
involving net cash outgo of about `310 billion, a major 
part of which (`285 billion) is for petroleum subsidies. 
A revised fiscal deficit of 5.3 per cent was announced by 
the Finance Minister for the year. That can be achieved 
only through pruning down of expenditure and greater 
effort in revenue mobilization.
External Sector Vulnerabilities
1.18 Slowdown in global growth has reduced demand 
for Indian exports. On the other hand, imports have 
tended to slow to a lesser extent as the major portion is 
relatively inelastic (oil imports; Chart 1.10). This could 
exacerbate the current account deficit. In the face of 
general risk aversion, financing the CAD has become 
a challenge (Chart 1.11). The benefit of a depreciating 
currency has been muted due to weak external demand 
which could worsen on materialisation of US fiscal 
cliff.
1.19 The level of foreign exchange reserves impacts 
the financial stability through the confidence channel. 
Sharp deterioration in level of reserves could adversely 
impact the sentiment of the overseas investors. Further, 
given the fact that India is a current account deficit 
country, with adverse developments in international 
financial markets the domestic foreign exchange 
markets can be severely impacted if the macroeconomic 
fundamentals are not very strong. 
1.20 Adequacy of reserves has emerged as an 
important parameter in gauging the ability of a country 
to absorb external shocks. With the changing profile 
of capital flows, the traditional approach of assessing 
reserve adequacy in terms of import cover has been 
Chart 1.10: Y-o-Y Growth in Indian Exports and Imports
Source: RBI
Chart 1.11: Financing of India’s Current Account Deficit
Source: RBI
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broadened to include a number of parameters which 
take into account the size, composition and risk profiles 
of various types of capital flows as well as the types of 
external shocks to which the economy is vulnerable. 
Although the CAD fell to 3.9 per cent of GDP in Q1 
2012-13 from 4.5 per cent during Q4 2011-12, it is 
still high. External sector sustainability indicators 
have deteriorated in the recent past (Table 1.1). The 
indicators relating to the foreign exchange reserves 
point to a declining position. The absolute level of the 
reserves is, however, considered to be reasonable. 
1.21 Against the backdrop of volatile flows, several 
measures have been taken to augment capital flows 
into India. A new investor class, Qualified Foreign 
Investors (QFIs), to include non-resident individuals 
has been permitted to invest in Indian equities, 
corporate bonds and mutual funds. The relaxations in 
debt inflows have been made to include a larger set of 
eligible sectors with the focus on attracting long term 
sources, particularly, real money investors. Permitted 
limits under ECBs have been enhanced and rationalised 
within prudential limits particularly for corporates 
having natural hedges to repay the ECBs from out of 
their foreign exchange earnings.   
1.22 A series of economic reforms announced 
recently by the central government appears to have had 
a positive impact and boosted sentiments. Moody’s has 
confirmed a stable outlook for India. However, other 
rating agencies like Fitch have warned that India’s 
rating could be lowered if fiscal situation does not 
improve.
Un-hedged Exposure of Corporates
1.23 Excessive volatility in the exchange rate makes 
it difficult for economic agents to make optimal inter-
temporal decisions.  The economic agents, therefore, 
need to properly understand and measure the nature 
of currency risk embedded in their business and 
use appropriate derivative instruments to hedge 
their currency risks. Reserve Bank, over the years 
has expanded the menu of derivative instruments, 
both OTC as well as exchange traded ones which has 
provided greater flexibility to the market participants 
in managing their currency risk2.
Table 1.1: External Sector Vulnerability Indicators
(Ratios in per cent)
Indicator End-Mar 
2011
End-Mar 
2012
End-Jun 
2012
Ratio of Total Debt to GDP 17.8 20.0 21.7
Ratio of Reserves to Total Debt 99.6 85.2 82.9
Ratio of Short-term Debt to Reserves 21.3 26.6 27.8
Reserves Cover of Imports (in months) 9.6 7.1 7.0
Reserves Cover of Imports and Debt Service 
Payments (in months)
9.1 6.8 6.6
External Debt (US$ billion) 305.9 345.7 349.5
Ratio of volatile capital flows to Reserves 67.3 79.9 81.3
Note: Volatile capital flows here are defined so as to include cumulative portfolio 
inflows and short-term debt.
Source: RBI
2 Padmanabhan. G (2012), ‘‘Managing Currency Risk in the New Normal’’, special address at the Iforex Leaders Summit, Mumbai on July 28, 2012, Mumbai.
1.24 Unhedged foreign exchange exposure of 
corporates is a source of risk to them as well as to 
the financing banks and the financial system. Large 
unhedged forex exposures have resulted in accounts 
becoming Non-performing Assets (NPAs) in some 
cases. Banks were, therefore, advised in February 
2012 that they should rigorously evaluate the risks 
arising out of unhedged foreign currency exposure 
of the corporates and price them in the credit risk 
premium while extending fund-based and non fund-
based credit facilities. From the information submitted 
by banks, it is observed that a significant portion of 
foreign exchange exposures remained unhedged in the 
recent period. This is especially disquieting given that 
the exchange rate volatility has been higher in India 
in comparison to other emerging market currencies as 
well as those of advanced economies (Chart 1.12). 
Chart 1.12: 1-Month Implied Volatilities of Various Currencies 
against the US dollar
Source: Bloomberg
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Gold Imports
1.25 The FSR for June 2012 referred to rising imports 
of gold. Gold imports have continued to be high and 
have accounted for, on an average, over two-thirds 
of the CAD during the last three years. While India’s 
share in international trade is less than 2 per cent and 
that in world GDP is less than 6 per cent in Purchasing 
Power Parity terms, it accounts for a quarter of world 
demand for gold. 
1.26 Earlier this year, the government duties on the 
import of gold were hiked. This measure, inter alia, 
appears to have significantly dampened demand for 
gold in the June 2012 quarter. However, demand in the 
September 2012 quarter picked up significantly and 
was higher than the average of last 5 years (September 
2007 to June 2012)3. The Reserve Bank reiterated its 
guideline prohibiting banks from lending for purchase 
of gold4. With rising domestic prices, recycling of 
existing stock of gold has received a fillip. While 
domestic supply of gold from recycling has doubled 
in September 2012 quarter compared to September 
2011 quarter, it remains less than a seventh of total 
supply5. Gold linked financial products, which are 
not backed fully in physical form can help reduce its 
imports6. Inflation indexed bonds could also be one of 
the options to offer investors a hedge against inflation 
and dissuade them from gold investments 7. 
Financial Savings
1.27 Investment in the Indian economy is largely 
financed by domestic savings. Saving and investment 
rates have been relatively high during the 2000s. Of 
late the gap between investment and saving rates has 
widened (Chart 1.13). Since 2008-09, savings rate has 
declined, led by a sharp fall in public sector savings, 
which has not been offset by increase in private 
savings. The household sector saving, which continues 
3 Source : World Gold Council
4 http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=7695&Mode=0
5 Source : World Gold Council
6 Gokarn, Subir (2012), “India’s Gold Problem: Finding Solution through Financial Products”, speech at BANCON, on 25th November, 2012, Pune
7 Mohanty, Deepak (2012), “Perspectives on India’s Balance of Payments”, speech at the School of Management, KIIT University on December 07, 2012, 
Bhubaneswar.
to account for a substantial portion of the domestic 
saving, witnessed a decline in 2010-11 mainly due 
to the decline in financial saving.  The decline in 
household financial saving rate has persisted in 
2011-12 (Box 1.1).
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO)
Chart 1.13: Saving and Investment Rates in India
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Concerns have been raised over the fall in financial savings of 
households in the recent past. Financial savings of the 
household sector declined to a two decade low of 7.8 per cent 
of GDP in 2011-12 from 9.3 per cent in 2010-11 and 12.2 per 
cent in 2009-10 (Chart 1.14.i). Even in absolute terms, financial 
savings fell from ` 7.9 trillion in 2009-10 to ` 6.9 trillion in 2011-
12. This has happened despite nominal GDP (at market prices) 
rising by more than 15 per cent during the period. Admittedly, 
households have been shifting away from financial assets into 
physical assets and valuables such as gold as evidenced by 
increase in gold imports (Chart 1.14.ii).
Box 1.1: Household Physical and Financial Savings in India
8  Residential House Prices have been proxied by the NHB Residex
9  Real rates fall further when adjusted against CPI which has been ruling higher than WPI.
A number of possibilities could explain the fall in financial 
savings. Inflation has been high during the past few years. 
Consequently, real return on financial assets has been very 
low. Households seem to have shifted their savings from assets 
earning low real rates to assets perceived as inflation-proof. 
There has thus been a substitution towards non-financial 
assets like real estate and gold; the real returns on which 
have been relatively high (Chart 1.15). Chart 1.15.i depicts 
the movement in gold prices, BSE Sensex, residential house 
prices8 and wholesale price index (WPI)9. Gold prices have 
increased the most in comparison with other assets and are 
(Contd....)
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significantly above the movement in WPI as at end September 
2012. Residential house prices have also beaten the upward 
movement in WPI. The movement in the BSE Sensex was only 
slightly higher than the WPI during June 2008 and September 
2012. On a year-on-year basis, gold offered the highest returns 
among asset classes for majority of the years after the global 
financial crisis (Chart 1.15.ii). The price of gold carries an 
‘uncertainty premium’ arising from risk aversion among 
investors in recent years. This has caused an above normal 
return that is not sustainable in the long term. Since Indian 
households hold a significant quantity of it, they face the risk 
of a correction in gold prices.
In addition to the higher real returns on gold and residential 
housing, other factors could be impacting the fall in financial 
savings and an increase in physical savings and valuables in 
household savings. Relatively easy availability of bank credit 
for housing and the commensurate rapid increase in bank 
credit during the early and mid 2000s has provided a fillip to 
house prices (Chart 1.16.i). House prices and bank credit to the 
housing sector support these trends (Chart 1.16.ii).10
Gold is easily accessible. It is a store of value, has no credit risk 
and is relatively liquid thereby incentivising many households 
to buy gold. Fall in financial savings has implications for capital 
formation as it channelises savings towards unproductive 
holding of gold. If gold supplants financial savings as a primary 
form of savings, it has stability implications for the financial 
sector.
(....Concld.)
10 Changes depict Y-o-Y growth at December end.
Credit Cycles in the Indian Economy
1.28 Given the importance of credit in boosting 
growth, there is a need for  concerted policy action 
such that credit availability to the productive sectors 
of the economy is maintained/enhanced (Box 1.2).
1.29 The current slowdown in bank credit is also 
highlighted by the fact that its share in the total 
credit flow to the commercial sector has fallen. There 
appears to be a substitution of bank credit with non-
bank domestic sources like Commercial Paper and 
foreign sources like External Commercial Borrowings 
and FDI.
1.30 Immediately after the global financial crisis, US 
and European commercial banks deleveraged their 
balance sheet. Subsequently, the pursuit of 
accommodative monetary policies by advanced 
economies seems to have favoured capital flows back 
to emerging economies like India. The initial decrease 
followed by an increase in the proportion of foreign 
credit in the total flow of funds to the commercial 
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sector in India reflects these developments 
(Chart 1.18).
Capital Market Issuers - Composition
1.31 The mutual funds faced redemptions pushing 
the net resource mobilisation to the negative zone 
in 2011-12. Except for the gold exchange traded 
funds, balanced schemes and equity schemes other 
than Equity Linked Savings Schemes (ELSS), all other 
schemes faced sizable redemptions. The year was 
dominated by the non-convertible debenture issues 
of the public financial and infrastructure institutions. 
Proportion of long term funds raised by banks and 
financial institutions increased in 2011-12 to 73.5 
The expansion phase of the credit growth cycle of the Indian 
banking system (scheduled commercial banks) started in 2002-
03 and showed strong credit growth till 2005-0611. With the 
contraction phase setting in from 2007-08, the present phase of 
credit growth cycle seems to be heading towards a trough. At 
the current juncture, Credit to GDP Ratio Gap (the deviation of 
Non-Food GDP Ratio from its trend line, derived by the Hodrick-
Prescott Filter) is negative (Chart 1.17). The multi-year low of 
Box 1.2: Greater Credit Expansion Warranted as a Countercyclical Tailwind
the Credit to GDP Ratio Gap shows that the flow of credit to the 
commercial sector has been significantly lower than compared 
to its long term trend. This phenomenon therefore, calls for an 
increase in credit to counter the sharp downturn in the Indian 
economy. However, attention must be paid to the rising NPAs. 
Contrary to IMF’s advice12, the flow of credit to the productive 
sectors of the economy needs to be increased. The recent 
reductions in the statutory ratios have also augmented the 
resources available for lending.
11 Credit Cycle is the cyclical component of real non-food credit growth, derived by Unobserved Component method (UCM) and Business Cycle is the 
cyclical component of real non-agriculture GDP growth, derived by UCM.
12 The GFSR Market Update July 2012 noted that relative to other EMEs, large economies such as Brazil, China and India have benefited from strong 
credit growth in recent years, and are at the late stages of the credit cycle. Expanding credit significantly at the current juncture would heighten asset 
quality concerns and potentially undermine GDP growth and financial stability in the years ahead.
Note: $ refers to April-October 5, 2012
Source: RBI
Chart 1.18: Composition of the Source of Credit to the 
Commercial Sector
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per cent from 25.5 per cent in 2010-11 (Chart 1.19). 
Together with non-bank firms, the financial sector’s 
proportion of resources raised stood at 89.4 per cent in 
2011-12 from 28.8 per cent in 2010-11. Financial sector’s 
share in total number of issues increased from 23 per 
cent to 42 per cent during the period. This suggests 
that the capital market conditions are not enabling 
effective disintermediation in the financial system. 
Bank and non-bank firms, therefore, have to assume 
a larger role in resource allocation in the economy. For 
2012-13 (April to November), however, the proportion 
of amount raised and number of issuances by the 
financial sector has dropped to 33 per cent and 29 per 
cent respectively. 
Primary Market in Equities
1.32 Primary market in equities remained subdued 
during 2011-12 on account of weak macroeconomic 
environment. Investment growth slackened with 
resource mobilisation by companies through Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) and Follow-on Public Offerings 
(FPOs) being substantially lower in 2011-12 when 
compared to the previous years (Chart 1.20). Negative 
returns from the previously listed IPOs and range 
bound equity markets dampened investor response 
for primary market issues. Issuers too refrained from 
resource mobilisation as the signs of slowdown in global 
and domestic economy became evident. While the 
amount raised through IPOs and FPOs was substantially 
lower during 2011-12 compared to previous years, the 
number and amount mobilised through public debt 
issues outstripped those of the earlier years. The 
recent activity witnessed in the IPO market for equities 
in 2012-13 is a welcome development, as long periods 
of weakness in primary capital markets can accentuate 
the trend of growing leverage in corporate sector
(para 1.39).
Secondary Market in Equities
1.33 The Indian equity markets were volatile during 
2012 and witnessed substantial FII inflows during 
2012 (Chart 1.21). During 2012 (up to November 
2012) domestic institutional investors (DIIs)13 were 
net sellers while FIIs were net buyers in the equity 
markets (Chart 1.22). Behaviour of FIIs hinges critically 
on many domestic and external factors. Any adverse 
Chart 1.20: Share of Categories of Issues in Resource Mobilisation 
Note: $ refers to April-November
Source: SEBI
Note: $ refers to April-October
Source: SEBI
Chart 1.19: Sector-wise Share in Resource Mobilisation
13  DIIs includes Bank, DFIs, Insurance Companies, New Pension Scheme and MFs
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developments in the Euro area or on the unraveling 
of the US fiscal cliff issue could potentially lead to a 
sudden reversal of FII inflows from the Indian equity 
markets leading to a substantial correction in the 
indices. Domestic equity indices have rallied despite 
overall economic weakness on account of investor 
optimism about the renewed pace of reform measures 
announced by the government. 
Erroneous Trades on Stock Exchanges
1.34 The previous Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) 
have highlighted the benefits and possible risk 
implications of adoption of various technological 
advancements viz. introduction of Direct Market 
Access (DMA), facilitating Algorithmic Trading and High 
Frequency Trading (HFT) in Indian securities market. 
However, not all trading disruptions can be attributed to 
HFT or algorithmic trading.  There was a recent trading 
disruption at NSE on October 05, 2012 on account of 
erroneous order entry wherein non-algorithmic orders 
were entered for an erroneous quantity. This resulted 
in execution of trades at multiple price points across 
the entire order book, thereby causing the circuit filter 
to be triggered. 
1.35 In cognizance of the disruptive effects of such 
trades, a number of measures have been put in place 
which include an upfront real-time risk management 
system for all exchange-based trading in the Indian 
securities market. The trading members are mandated 
to keep liquid assets with the clearing corporation and 
all margin obligations are deducted from the available 
liquid assets on a real-time basis.  Further, it has been 
recently mandated that the terminals of the stock 
broker that are disabled upon exhaustion of collaterals 
shall be enabled only manually by the stock exchange, 
in accordance with its risk management procedures. In 
addition, other measures in relation to circuit breakers 
have been taken.
Corporate Sector
1.36 Performance of the corporate sector is of 
importance to financial stability, especially, given 
its link to overall economic growth in general, and 
its effect on bank asset quality in particular. Timely 
identification of risks emanating from this sector 
assists in designing measures to reduce the stress. An 
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analysis of the corporate sector shows that Profit Margin 
[EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation 
and Amortisation) to Sales] and return on assets [EBIT 
(Earnings Before Interest, Tax) to Total Net Assets] have 
recovered from the levels observed during the financial 
crisis in 2008-09 and indicate marginal improvement in 
2011-12 as compared with 2010-11.14 Total borrowing 
as percentage of equity has gradually declined over 
the years. The liquidity (measured by current assets 
to current liabilities ratio) at aggregate level remained 
stable in the range between 1.1 and 1.3. However, the 
Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) which reflects the ability 
of corporates to service borrowing with present level of 
profits has fallen since 2009-10 and is currently below 
the levels of 2008-09. 
1.37 Interest expenditure (as percentage of sales) at 
aggregate level fell significantly since 2001-02 to its 
lowest level of 2.3 per cent by 2005-06 and 2006-07. 
It has increased thereafter and has been at around 3 
per cent of sales during 2008-09 to 2010-11. In 2011-
12, however, the interest expenditure rose to 3.6, the 
highest level in the last nine years. Companies in the 
real estate sector had the highest interest burden in the 
last four years. Besides, interest burden in transport, 
storage and communications, construction, textiles, 
apparel and iron and steel industries are higher than 
in previous years and are increasing. Interest expense 
as percentage of total expenditure has also displayed 
similar trend and level in last 11 years. Leverage 
is higher for the industries such as iron and steel, 
construction, textiles, food products & beverages and 
apparel. Also, the borrowing to sales ratio indicates 
that profit margin of these industries will be most hurt 
in case of further increase in borrowing or interest rate. 
The distribution of companies as per their sales-size 
shows that the ICR has deteriorated in all companies 
but this deterioration has been more in the companies 
with lower sales. Further, leverage of companies in 
all size-groups, with a few exceptions, has generally 
improved. This improvement in leverage was more in 
the small sized companies in the terms of sales than 
the larger ones.
14  Based on results of 2530 companies during 2011-12
15  Large corporate groups with high exposure to infrastructure, particularly power were chosen for the purpose of the internal study.
16  Interest Coverage Ratio =  EBITi / Interesti; i=1, 2 ……12 (Companies)
17  Debt to EBITDA Ratio  =  Debti / EBITDAi; i=1,2….....12 (Companies)
18  Debt to Equity Ratio =  Debti / Equityi; i=1,2 …...12 (Companies)
1.38 The ability to service borrowing (measured 
by EBIT to interest paid ratio) is not uniform across 
industries. In the manufacturing sector, during 2011-
12 the ratio has fallen to the lowest level in last eight 
years indicating worsening of debt serviceability. The 
situation is similar in case of service sector also. In case 
of the transport, storage and communications industry, 
the ratio has continuously declined since 2006-07 and 
has fallen below one in 2011-12 indicating inability of 
this industry to cover the interest payment with EBIT. 
Effective interest cost (measured by interest expenses 
as percentage of average outstanding borrowing), was 
observed to have moved up in 2010-11. Industries 
paying higher effective interest cost are machineries 
– both electrical and non-electrical, food products and 
beverages, construction and textiles.
Corporate Leverage
1.39 The leverage for the corporate sector as a whole 
has declined over the past 11 years. An in-house 
analysis of 12 holding companies (where accounts 
of all subsidiaries carrying out various projects of 
the corporate group is consolidated) belonging to 
8 large corporate groups15 with high exposure to 
infrastructure sector was carried out. Eight out of 12 
companies witnessed compound annual growth rate 
of over 30 per cent in debt over 2007-08- to 2011-
12. For all these 12 companies taken together, the 
interest coverage has gone down, whereas their debt to
EBITDA and debt to equity ratios have gone up during 
the last four years (Table 1.2). These corporates seem to 
be more vulnerable as compared to their counterparts 
in the same industry.
Table 1.2: Aggregated Ratios for 12 Select Companies from
8 Corporate Groups
(Per cent)
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Interest Coverage16 2.91 2.76 2.43 1.70
Debt to EBITDA17 6.96 7.32 7.24 9.46
Debt to Equity18 1.21 1.23 1.38 1.89
Source: ACE Equity
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Systemic Risk Survey
1.40 The Systemic Risk Survey has been a useful 
tool to gauge the stability of the financial system 
from the perspective of all stake holders. The Survey 
was initiated by the Reserve Bank in October 2011 to 
capture the views of market participants and other 
stakeholders on the aggregate risks facing the financial 
system. The present Survey was conducted in October 
2012.
1.41 The current survey indicates that global risk 
is the most important factor affecting the financial 
system. Among the global risks, the declining global 
growth, sovereign risk/contagion and global inflation/
commodity prices are prominent factors. Within the 
macro-economic risks, deterioration of the domestic 
outlook and increasing current account deficit are 
major highlights. The foreign exchange risk has also 
been highlighted. In the previous survey conducted in 
April 2012, market volatility was perceived as the most 
important risk facing the financial system. This was 
followed by asset quality, global and fiscal risks (Tables 
1.3 and 1.4).
1.42 The respondents feel that there is a large 
probability of a high impact event occurring in the 
global financial system in the period ahead.  On the 
high impact event occurring in the Indian financial 
system, the chances are medium. The stakeholders 
had medium level of confidence in the stability of 
Table 1.3: Major Risk Groups identified in Systemic Risk Survey 
October 2012
A. Global Risks 
B. Macro-economic Risks 
C. Market Risks 
D. Institutional Risks 
E. General Risks 
Very high High Medium Low Very low
Change in risk since last survey
  
Increase Decrease Same
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Survey – October 2012
Table 1.4:  Various Risks identified in Systemic Risk Survey 
October 2012
A
. 
G
lo
ba
l R
is
ks
Global slow down
Sovereign Risk / Contagion
Funding Risk (External Borrowings)
Global Inflation / Commodity Price Risk (including crude 
oil prices)
B.
 
M
ac
ro
-e
co
no
m
ic
 R
is
ks
Deterioration in domestic economic outlook
Domestic Inflation
Current Account Deficit
Capital inflows/ outflows (Reversal of FIIs, Slow down in 
FDI)
Sovereign rating downgrade
Fiscal Risk (High Fiscal deficit)
Corporate Sector Risk (High Leverage/ Low Profitability)
Lack / Slow pace of Infrastructure development
Real Estate Prices
Political Risk
C
. 
M
ar
ke
t 
Ri
sk
s Foreign Exchange Rate Risk
Equity Price Volatility
Funding Risk / Liquidity Risk/ Interest Rate Risk
D
. 
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
Ri
sk
s
Regulatory Risk
Asset quality deterioration
Additional capital requirements of banks
Low credit off-take
E.
 
G
en
er
al
 
Ri
sk
s Terrorism
Natural disaster
Social unrest (Increasing inequality)
Very high High Medium Low Very low
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Survey – October 2012
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the global financial system. The view was that if the 
instability in the global financial system escalates in 
the next six months, it would affect the stability of 
the Indian economy (Table 1.5). However, the survey 
Table 1.5: Perception on occurrence of high impact events and their 
impact on Indian financial system
A : High impact event occurring in the global financial system in the 
period ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
B : High impact event occurring in the global financial system in the 
period ahead (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
C : High impact event occurring in the Indian financial system in 
the period ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
D : High impact event occurring in the Indian financial system in 
the period ahead (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
E : Confidence in the stability of the global financial system as a 
whole
F : Expectation that instability in the global financial system, if it 
escalates in the next six months, would affect the stability of the 
Indian economy
G : Confidence in the stability of the Indian financial system
Note:
Risks
A - D Very high High Medium Low Very low
E &G No 
confidence
Not very 
confident
Fairly confi-
dent
Very 
confident
Complete 
confidence
F Affect 
significantly
Affect to a 
large extent
Affect some-
what
Affect to 
a limited 
extent
No impact
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Survey – October 2012
Note: A : High impact event occurring in the global financial system in the period 
ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
 B : High impact event occurring in the global financial system in the period 
ahead (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
 C : High impact event occurring in the Indian financial system in the period 
ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
 D : High impact event occurring in the Indian financial system in the period 
ahead (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
 E : Confidence in the stability of the global financial system as a whole
 F : Confidence in the stability of the Indian financial system
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Survey – October 2012
Chart 1.23: Change in Perception over the past six months
indicates that the participants had high confidence in 
the stability of the Indian financial system. Further, this 
perception has remained mostly unchanged during the 
past half-year (Chart 1.23).
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Chapter II
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
Commercial banks in India are well regulated. The Indian banking system has several inherent strengths, the most 
important being that the banks are well capitalised both in terms of quantity and quality of capital. Their funding 
structure is stable as they are largely reliant on domestic retail deposits. Their assets are well diversifi ed and leverage 
is low. Despite these strengths, the Indian banking system faces certain headwinds. A slowing economy has raised the 
extent of delinquencies in a short period of time. However, profi tability has been sustained in recent quarters. Deposit 
growth has lagged credit expansion for several quarters now and the composition of outside liabilities has been shifting 
toward big ticket short term deposits from corporate and high net worth individuals, exposing the banks to liquidity 
stress as it increases reliance on wholesale sources of funds. However, the resilience of the banking system to credit, 
interest rate, equity and foreign exchange shocks remain satisfactory. 
The fi nancial performance of non-banking fi nancial companies and urban cooperative banks has been improving 
over the years and their leverage as well as maturity mismatches are being monitored. The inter-linkages among 
these diverse sectors of the fi nancial system are strong implying that the interconnectedness of the domestic fi nancial 
system will have to be closely monitored. 
Risks to the Banking Sector 
2.1 The risks to banking sector have been increasing 
in recent years. The Banking Stability Indicator1 
(Chart 2.1) suggests a continued deterioration in the 
stability of the banking sector since 2010 with the 
aggregate risks remaining at an elevated level during the 
year. An analysis of the components contributing to 
banking stability show that tight liquidity, deteriorating 
asset quality and reducing soundness are the major 
contributors to the decline in stability of the banking 
system. However, a marginal improvement in the 
indicator during the last two quarters is observed 
primarily because of better liquidity condition, due to 
regulatory prescriptions and enhanced profitability 
ratios, arising out of  lower provisioning coverage 
(discussed in para 2.71).
2.2 The Banking Stability Map, which reflects the 
relative changes in the vulnerabilities since the previous 
FSR, further reveals that the asset quality and soundness 
indicators have deteriorated vis-à-vis their position in 
March 2012, while the liquidity indicators show some 
improvement as at the end of September 2012, the 
1  Methodology is described in the Annex.
Chart 2.1: Banking Stability Indicator and its Components
Note: Increase in indicator value shows lower stability
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
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profitability indicators in the current quarter, though 
better than March 2012, show marginal deterioration as 
compare to June 2012 (Chart 2.2).
Distress Dependencies and Inter-connectedness - 
An Analysis
Banking Stability Measures (BSMs)
2.3 The FSR has been publishing the Banking Stability 
Measures since June 2011. These measures take into 
account distress dependence among the banks in a 
system, thereby providing a set of tools to measure 
(i) common distress of the banks in a system, (ii) distress 
between specific banks, and (iii) distress in the system 
associated with a specific bank. These distress 
dependencies are modelled by conceptualising the 
financial system as a portfolio of a specific group of 
banks (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009). In particular, the 
Banking System’s Portfolio Multivariate Density 
(BSMD)2, which characterises both the individual and 
joint asset value movements of the portfolio of banks, 
is estimated from Probabilities of Distress (PoDs)3 of the 
banks4, observed empirically based on 99 per cent Value 
at Risk (VaR) of daily banks’ equity price return. The 
BSMD embeds the banks’ distress inter-dependence 
structure that captures linear and non-linear distress 
dependencies among the banks in the system and its 
changes at different times of the economic cycle. During 
times of distress, the financial position of banks worsens 
concurrently through direct or indirect links with the 
economy and markets on account of fall in asset values, 
interbank lending and information asymmetries. The 
banking stability measures show early signs of easing 
in distress-dependencies among banks.
Common distress in the system: JPoD and BSI
2.4 The probability of distress of the entire banking 
system, as measured by Joint Probability of Distress 
(JPoD) seems to have reversed its upward trend and 
registered a marginal decline in the recent period (since 
November 2012). The Banking Stability Index (BSI), 
Chart 2.2: Banking Stability Map
Note: Away from the centre signifies increase in risk
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.3: Movements of JPoD and BSI
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
2 Details are in FSR-June 2011.
3  This methodology also offers great flexibility for implementation, since the PoDs of individual bank represent the input variables, which can be 
estimated using alternative approaches. The PoDs for banks were estimated from their equity return distributions. Under this approach, first, banks’ 
historical distributions of equity returns are estimated. Then, the probability of returns falling under the historical worse 1 per cent of the cases (99 
VaR) is quantified. Therefore, the PoD of a specific bank represents the probability that the bank’s equity return would fall in the tail region (historical 
one percentile).
4   For the study 15 major banks have been selected for which equity price data are available. These represent about 60 per cent of total assets of scheduled 
commercial banks.
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which measures the expected number of banks which 
could become distressed given that at least one bank 
becomes distressed also registered a similar movement 
of JPoD (Chart 2.3). 
Distress between specific banks: Toxicity and 
Vulnerability Indices
2.5 The distress between specific banks is measured 
by Toxicity and Vulnerability Indices. The Toxicity Index 
(TI) is the average probability that a bank under distress 
may cause distress to another bank in the system. 
Toxicity of banks, which was rising since beginning of 
2010, has shown some decline since October 2012. At 
present, the TI of the selected banks is hovering around 
0.25 (Chart 2.4).
2.6 Vulnerability Index (VI), which quantifies the 
average probability of a bank being in distress given 
distress in the other banks in the system, was high 
during the recent financial crisis. The highest probability 
was about 0.9 per cent during the crisis, which declined 
significantly to close to zero. During the recent period, 
the VI of the selected banks is hovering around 0.15 
(Chart 2.5). 
Distress in the system associated with a specific bank: 
Cascade Effect
2.7 The probability that at least one bank becomes 
distressed, given that a specific bank becomes distressed, 
characterises the likelihood that one or more banks, in 
the system become distressed. This measure quantifies 
the potential ‘cascade’ effects in the system given 
distress in a specific bank, which reflects the systemic 
importance of a specific bank. Though these conditional 
probabilities do not imply causation; these can provide 
important insights into systemic inter-linkages among 
the banks comprising the system. The cascade 
probabilities show that the Indian banking system is 
highly interlinked and had a high distress dependency 
during the financial crisis period. The effect came was 
down in 2010, but shows an increasing trend since 
beginning of 2011 (Chart 2.6).
Chart 2.4: Movement of Toxicity Index of Select Banks
Chart 2.5: Movement of Vulnerability Index of Select Banks
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.6: Systemic Inter-linkages among Select Banks: 
Cascade Effect
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
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Network Analysis
2.8 The tools of network analysis are used to assess 
the interconnectedness in the financial sector and the 
contagion risks arising from the failure of one or more 
financial institutions5. The analysis finds that the inter 
linkages in the Indian financial system are strong. In 
the event of failure of a financial institution, risks are 
posed to other financial institutions which have 
exposures to the failing institutions. Entities which have 
lent to the failing institution face solvency risks while 
entities which have borrowed from the failing institution 
face liquidity risks. The greater the degree of 
interconnectedness in the financial system, higher is 
the risk of contagion posed by a failing financial 
institution. These risks are being monitored on a 
quarterly basis and have not changed significantly over 
the last two years. 
2.9 The Indian interbank market has grown 
consistently over the last two years (Chart 2.7). The 
public sector banks continue to have the largest share 
in this market (Table 2.1). 
2.10 The network of the banking system continued to 
display a distinct tiered structure. Three to four banks 
have consistently featured in the inner core over the 
last two years (September 2010 to September 2012), of 
which, two banks are large net borrowers. The network 
of the entire financial system also remained tiered 
(Charts 2.8 and 2.9).
Table 2.1: Share in the Interbank Market6 (%)
Sep 2011 Sep 2012
Public Sector Banks 53.3 55.9
Old Private Banks 5.4 2.9
New Private Banks 17.8 15.5
Foreign Banks 23.5 25.7
Source: RBI
Chart 2.7: Size of the Interbank Market
Source: RBI
Chart 2.8: Network of the Banking System – September 2012
Source: RBI
Chart 2.9: Network of the Financial System – June 2012
Source: RBI, SEBI, IRDA
5 The network analysis has been conducted based on data in respect of bilateral fund based and non-fund based exposures between banks, asset 
management companies, insurance companies, NBFCs, financial institutions and urban cooperative banks. The transactions where the settlement takes 
place through a central counterparty have not been reckoned. The Network model used in the analysis has been developed by Professor Sheri Markose 
(University of Essex) and Dr. Simone Giansante (Bath University) in collaboration with the Financial Stability Unit, Reserve Bank of India.
6 Market share is computed as (Lending plus borrowing)/(total lending + total borrowing)
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Risks of Contagion 
2.11 The previous paragraph referred to two large 
borrower banks which have remained in the inner core 
of the network of the banking system consistently over 
the last two years. An assessment of the contagion 
impact of the simultaneous failure of these banks 
indicate that they would trigger the failure of nine other 
banks and result in a loss of over 18 per cent of the Tier 
1 capital of the banking system (Chart 2.10). 
2.12 An analysis of the potential contagion loss which 
could be caused by the ten most connected banks on 
different dates between September 2010 and September 
2012 showed that the maximum loss caused by the 
failure of any one of the above banks ranged between 7 
per cent and 17 per cent of the total Tier 1 capital funds 
of the banking system. The analysis further showed that 
the bank causing the maximum contagion loss remained 
the same over the period. The average loss to the Tier 1 
capital funds of the banking system caused by the failure 
of any one of the 10 banks ranged from about 4 per cent 
to over 7 per cent with a peak loss of 7.3 per cent in 
December 2010. These trends indicate that the 
interconnectedness of the banking system of the country 
will need to be continuously monitored (Chart 2.11).
Contagion risks for different levels of loss given 
default 9 
2.13 The contagion analysis conducted so far (in 
previous paragraphs and in earlier FSRs) has taken into 
consideration netted bilateral exposures between banks. 
Ideally, such analysis should consider gross exposures 
multiplied by the loss given default (LGD) which will 
give the exact amount of the loss incurred by a creditor 
bank due to the failure of the debtor bank. LGDs vary 
between 100 per cent (equivalent to a zero recovery rate 
for the creditor) and 0 per cent (in the event that an 
exposure is fully collateralised and there is no loss to 
the creditor).
Chart 2.10: Contagion Impact of the Failure of Two Large Borrower 
Banks in the Inner Core of the Banking System7
Chart 2.11: Loss of Capital of the Banking System due to the Failure 
of Top 10 Connected Banks8
Source: RBI
Note: Each line in the chart represents the percentage loss of Tier 1 capital 
of the banking system due to the failure of a particular bank
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
7  Distress conditions are based on the capital adequacy ratio of banks. The colour coding used in the contagion chart is as follows;
 Black: Trigger and distressed institutions.
 Institutions which are affected but not distressed: 
 (i) Green: Institutions which are affected by the failure of the trigger/distressed institution but which are able to absorb the shock.
 (ii) Yellow: Banks which are affected by the failure of the trigger/distressed banks and whose capital adequacy falls below 9 per cent but 
which do not become distressed, hence do not spread further contagion.
8   For the purpose of this analysis, the 10 banks with the highest eigenvector centrality (i.e. banks which are most connected) as on September 30, 2012 
have been considered. Refer Box 5.1 in the Financial Stability Report, June 2012 for the eigenvector measure of centrality.
9   LGD is defined as a bank’s economic loss upon the default of a debtor/borrower.
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2.14 However, information about recovery rates and 
associated LGDs are not readily available. LGD depends, 
among others, on the type and amount of collateral as 
well as the type of borrower and the expected proceeds 
from the work out (e.g. proceeds from sale of collateral/
securities) of the assets. Also, LGD is exposure specific 
i.e., different exposures to the same borrower may have 
different LGDs. In the Indian context, the information 
gaps are further accentuated by the fact that bankruptcy 
laws are not clear and because there have been no major 
instances of bank failures to provide empirical guidance 
on potential LGDs. 
2.15 An assessment of contagion losses caused by the 
five most connected banks (as on September 30, 2012) 
for different levels of LGDs indicates that below a certain 
threshold (60 per cent), contagion losses are very low. 
Beyond that threshold, however, contagion losses 
increase sharply (Chart 2.12).
2.16 Guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank for the 
implementation of the internal rating based (IRB) 
approaches for calculation of capital charge for credit 
risk10 indicate an LGD of 65 per cent and 75 per cent for 
unsecured and non-recognised collateralised exposures, 
respectively, (based on their seniority) for banks 
migrating to the foundation IRB approach. Banks which 
seek to migrate to the advanced IRB approach will need 
to provide their own estimates of LGDs. As banks migrate 
to the IRB approaches, assessment of LGDs can be 
expected to improve leading to more precise assessment 
of contagion risks.
Impact of distress conditions in the banking system 
on contagion risks
2.17 The contagion impact of the failure of a bank is 
likely to be magnified if the failure takes place in a 
situation of generalised distress or shock to the banking 
system. To assess the impact of distress conditions on 
contagion risks, four different shocks relating to interest 
rate and foreign exchange risks were considered (the 
shocks used are the same as those used for stress testing 
the derivatives portfolio of banks, as described in paras 
2.67 and 2.68).  
Chart 2.12: Loss of Capital of the Banking System due to the Failure 
of Five Most Connected Banks at Different Levels of LGD
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
10 http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6887&Mode=0
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2.18 The sensitivity analysis was conducted for both 
the balance sheet and the derivatives portfolio of banks. 
The impact of the market movements on capital was 
factored in before assessing the contagion loss. The 
exercise revealed that movements in the US$/INR 
exchange rate in both directions increased contagion 
losses. In case of interest rate shocks, a reduction in 
interest rate did not have any impact on contagion 
losses. The impact on contagion loss was maximum in 
case of a sharp increase in interest rates (Table 2.2 and 
Chart 2.13). 
Liquidity contagion using network analysis
2.19 The financial crisis highlighted the importance 
of sound liquidity risk management by banks and other 
financial institutions and the need to address systemic 
liquidity risk. It highlighted the fact that failure of one 
or more institutions could result in multiple institutions 
facing simultaneous difficulties in rolling over their 
short-term debts or in obtaining new short-term funding. 
The network model can be used to capture the contagion 
risks posed to the liquidity of the banking system in case 
of failure of a large lender.
2.20 Failure of a bank affects both its lenders and 
borrowers leading to solvency risk, on the one hand, 
and liquidity risk, on the other. Liquidity risk is posed 
to the banks who have borrowed funds from the failing 
bank as these banks will need to replace the funds 
borrowed. 
2.21 A bank will typically maintain liquidity buffers to 
tide over emergencies. These buffers comprise excess 
CRR and SLR securities. The bank can also access un-
availed standing facilities extended to it by the central 
bank. If these funds are not sufficient, the bank may be 
able to call in short term lending to its counterparties. 
In the eventuality that the bank’s liquidity buffers and 
callable assets are not sufficient to meet the liquidity 
shock caused by the failing bank, the bank itself may 
have to be liquidated. If the borrower bank is forced to 
call back its short term lending, the bank may itself 
transmit a liquidity shock to its borrowers, who will, in 
turn, need to find alternative funding sources. This 
iterative process continues till no further loans need to 
Table 2.2: Impact of Distress Conditions on Contagion Loss
Scenario Percentage loss in capital of the banking system 
due to the failure of the top ten connected banks 
Average Loss (%) Maximum Loss (%)
Baseline 5.0 11.7
INR depreciates 7.2 15.3
INR appreciates 6.4 11.9
Interest Rate Increase 79.7 88.5
Interest Rate Decrease 5.0 11.7
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.13: Loss of Capital of the Banking System due to the Failure 
of Top 10 Connected Banks under Different Distress Conditions
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
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be called back and hence no shock is transmitted. This 
process is illustrated in the Chart 2.14.
2.22 An assessment of the impact of the liquidity 
contagion in the Indian banking system indicates that 
the failure of the large lenders in the system could have 
a significant downstream impact on the availability of 
liquidity in the system and could also cause a few other 
banks to be, in turn, liquidated (Table 2.3). The impact 
is alleviated to some extent if banks are in a position to 
call in short term interbank loans. 
2.23 The liquidity contagion caused by the failure of 
the largest lender bank in the system as on June 30, 2012 
is represented in a stylised chart (Chart 2.15). The black 
triangle in the centre represents the lender bank which 
is liquidated for some exogenous reason. Banks which 
have borrowed from the liquidated bank will need to 
replace these borrowings. In some cases, the liquidity 
buffers of the banks are sufficient to absorb the liquidity 
shock (banks represented by green triangles). In some 
other cases, banks survive by using their buffers and 
calling in short term inter-bank loans (banks represented 
by orange triangles). These banks will, however, also 
propagate the liquidity shock in the process of calling 
in loans. For some banks, the buffers and short term 
inter-bank loans will not be sufficient to replace the 
funds borrowed from the trigger bank. These banks will, 
in turn, be liquidated (banks represented by black 
triangles) and will restart the next round of liquidity 
contagion. The contagion stops when no further banks 
are liquidated. 
Linkages between Banking and Non-Banking Sectors 
2.24 As is the case globally, the financial system in 
India is also interconnected. Both funding dependencies 
and direct credit exposures exist between banks, on the 
one hand, and insurance companies, mutual funds and 
non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), on the other. 
While the banking sector is a net lender to the NBFC 
sector, it is a net borrower vis-à-vis the insurance 
companies and asset management companies (AMCs) 
(Charts 2.16 and 2.17).
Chart 2.14: Flowchart Representing the Propagation of a 
Liquidity Contagion11
11  The analysis is conducted on gross exposures between banks. The exposures include the fund based and derivative exposures. The assumption used 
is that when a bank is liquidated, the funds lent by the bank are called in on a gross basis, whereas when a bank calls in a short term loan without 
being liquidated, the loan is called in on a net basis (on the assumption that the counterparty is likely to first reduce its short term lending against the 
same counterparty).
Table 2.3: Impact on Availability of Systemic Liquidity due to the 
Failure of a Large Lender Bank 
(Per cent)
Impact
Bank 1 82
Bank 2 42
Bank 3 36
Bank 4 31
Bank 5 33
Note: The impact of availability of systemic liquidity is measured as a percentage 
of the total liquidity buffers of all SCBs as on given date
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.15: Liquidity Contagion due to the Failure of a 
Large Lender Bank
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
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2.25 The average banking sector exposure to NBFCs as 
a percentage of capital funds stood at 18 per cent as at 
end June 2012. However, the exposures were significant 
in the case of a few banks with the exposure of 5 banks 
(comprising 8.7 per cent of banking sector assets) to 
NBFCs being in excess of 50 per cent of their capital 
funds (Chart 2.18).
2.26 Insurance Companies are also interconnected 
with the banking system as major lenders to banks which 
means that insurance companies could be adversely 
affected in case of any major distress in the banking 
sector (Chart 2.19).
2.27 The NBFC sector was significantly dependant on 
the banking system for their funding needs12. For the 
selected sample, on an average, borrowings from SCBs 
comprised over 100 per cent of the capital funds for the 
NBFC sector. The dependency was higher in case of a 
few companies for which the ratio was in excess of 200 
per cent. 
2.28 Some outlier banks were significantly dependent 
on mutual funds for their funding needs though for the 
banking sector on an average, borrowings from mutual 
funds constituted only about 20 per cent of their capital 
funds. However, as discussed in the previous FSR, the 
borrowing of banks from mutual funds was primarily 
short term which could leave the banks with a potential 
liquidity risk in case of any stress in the mutual fund 
industry (Chart 2.20).
Chart 2.17: SCBs’ Borrowing from Non-bank Financial Entities
Chart 2.18: Exposure of Banks to NBFCs as a percentage of 
Capital Funds
Chart 2.16: SCBs’ Lending to Non-bank Financial Entities
Source: RBI Staff Calculations Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.19: Exposure of Insurance Companies to SCBs as  per cent of 
Policy Holders’ Liabilities
Source: IRDA
12  The analysis is based on a sample size of around 30 large NBFCs
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Soundness and Resilience 
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
Balance Sheet Size and Structure
2.29 Total bank credit grew at 15.9 per cent, while total 
deposits growth was 14.3 per cent as at end September 
2012 (Y-o-Y). Despite faster credit growth relative to 
deposit expansion, the Credit-Deposit (C-D) ratio has 
declined to 74.4 per cent as at end September 2012 from 
76.0 per cent as at end March 2012. The incremental 
C-D ratio has also declined during the half year since 
March 2012, indicating the trend that banks have 
deployed a greater share of incremental deposits in 
investments and other assets.
2.30 The steepest fall in growth rate of gross advances 
(y-o-y) as at end-September 2012 from the previous 
quarter was for the foreign banks; from 17.3 per cent to 
6.5 per cent, followed by old private sector banks from 
23.1 per cent to 18.6 per cent. There was moderate fall 
in the growth rate of advances for the public sector banks 
to 15.0 per cent, while the new private sector banks had 
a slight increase in the growth rate of advances at 22.7 
per cent (Chart 2.21). 
Capital to risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR)
2.31 The overall capital adequacy ratio (CRAR) has 
deteriorated since March 2012 though it remained well 
above the regulatory minimum. The decline in CRAR 
was observed to be more pronounced for the public 
sector banks (Chart 2.22). The growth in risk weighted 
assets of the foreign banks was lower over the period 
under reference, partly explaining the improvement in 
their CRAR position (Chart 2.23). 
Credit risk
Asset Quality
2.32 The asset quality of banks has seen considerable 
deterioration during the half year ended September 
2012. Gross non-performing advances (GNPA) ratio for 
all banks rose sharply to 3.6 per cent as at end September 
2012 from 2.9 per cent as at end March 2012. Net NPA 
ratio stood at 1.7 per cent as at end September 2012, as 
against 1.2 per cent as at end March 2012. Among the 
Chart 2.20: Borrowing of Banks from AMCs as per cent of their 
Total Capital
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.21: Growth Rate in Advances of Bank Groups
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.22: CRAR - Bank-groups
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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bank groups, the public sector banks witnessed a high 
degree of deterioration in asset quality (Chart 2.24). 
2.33 The growth rate of GNPAs at 45.7 per cent (y-o-y) 
as at end September 2012 outpaced that of gross 
advances during same period, highlighting the rising 
concerns on asset quality (Chart 2.25).   
2.34 The concerns on asset quality are also underscored 
by the increasing trend in the slippage ratio as well as 
ratio of slippages to actual recoveries (excluding up-
gradations). Except for foreign banks, these ratios 
increased for all bank groups since March 2011. However, 
slippage to recovery ratio for all the bank groups 
improved marginally during the quarter ended 
September 2012 (Chart 2.26 (i) and (ii)). With the growth 
Chart 2.24: Gross NPA RatioChart 2.23: Growth in Risk Weighted Assets - Bank Groups
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.25: Growth in Gross NPAs
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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rate in GNPAs continuing to tread well above the credit 
growth and movements in slippages remaining upward, 
the profitability of banks may come under pressure in 
the coming quarters.
Restructuring of advances
2.35 Restructuring of loans (Box 2.1), particularly of 
big ticket loans under the corporate debt restructuring 
(CDR) mechanism, has recently come under closer 
scrutiny due to the steep rise in the number and value 
of such advances  (Chart 2.27 and 2.28). 
2.36 Between March 2009 and March 2012, while total 
gross advances of the banking system grew by less than 
20 per cent (compound annual growth rate), the 
restructured standard advances grew by over 40 per cent. 
The proportion of restructured standard advances to 
gross total advances increased from 3.5 per cent in March 
Restructuring is an accepted practice worldwide through which 
lenders nurture problematic, but viable borrowal accounts. It is 
a legitimate strategy adopted by lenders and borrowers 
especially during times of distress to preserve the economic 
value of the viable loan accounts. Restructuring has been 
followed in India for many years and the guidelines in this 
regard have evolved over a period taking into account 
international best practices, status of development of financial 
markets and changing economic conditions. The extant 
restructuring guidelines cover three broad categories (i) large 
corporate advances with multiple/consortium banking under 
Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR), (ii) SME Debt restructuring 
mechanism and (iii) Restructuring of other advances.  This 
system has fulfilled its objective to a large extent. These 
guidelines on restructuring have evolved in the context of 
international experience.  
It is a fact that restructuring of advances across the banking 
sector has increased during the current financial year as also 
during the last financial year. This is a matter of concern.
As regards restructuring under CDR mechanism, this has also 
been in line with increase in non-CDR restructuring. According 
to data furnished by CDR Cell, there has been a spurt in the 
number of cases referred to CDR Cell from the year 2011-12 
onwards. As against 49 cases involving `226.2 billion referred 
during 2010-11, 87 cases involving `678.9 billion were referred 
during 2011-12. During the period April - August of the current 
year, there are 59 cases involving `306.4 billion being referred 
to CDR. The reasons for rise in restructuring may be attributed 
to the effects of global recession coupled with internal factors 
like domestic slow down, which have played a significant role 
in the deterioration in asset quality.  
Aggressive lending by banks in the past, banks not exercising 
oversight on diversification into non-core areas by companies, 
banks not enforcing discipline on companies regarding 
unhedged forex exposures and delay in disbursements are areas 
on which banks ought to exercise much better control. Delay 
in administrative clearances is an equally important reason for 
pressure on asset quality which needs correction. The spurt in 
restructuring of advances is a matter of concern, though it may 
not have systemic dimension. The Reserve Bank is closely 
monitoring the position. Some course correction at the level of 
all stake holders may definitely improve the situation. 
With a view to reviewing existing guidelines on restructuring 
of advances and suggest revisions taking into account the best 
Box 2.1: Restructuring of Advances
international practices and accounting standards, the Reserve 
Bank had constituted a Working Group (WG) under the 
chairmanship of Shri B. Mahapatra, Executive Director, Reserve 
Bank of India. The WG has examined the issues and its major 
recommendations can be summarised as below:
 The regulatory forbearance available on asset classification 
on restructuring presently needs to be withdrawn after two 
years. 
 During the interregnum, provision on standard restructured 
accounts which get the asset classification benefit on 
restructuring be increased from the present 2 per cent to 5 
per cent, in a phased manner in case of existing accounts 
(stock) and immediately in case of newly restructured 
accounts (flow).
 In view of the importance of infrastructure sector, asset 
classification benefit on restructuring may however be 
allowed for a longer period in cases where restructuring is 
due to change in date of commencement of commercial 
operation of infrastructure projects.
 A cap of, say 10 per cent, to be prescribed on amount of 
restructured debt which can be converted into preference/
equity shares.
 RBI may prescribe the broad benchmarks for viability 
parameters based on those used by CDR Cell; and banks 
may adopt them with suitable adjustments, if any, for 
specific sectors.
 Compulsory promoters stake in the restructured accounts 
to be increased by way of higher sacrifice and personal 
guarantee.
 Right of recompense may be made mandatory in all cases.
 Disclosure requirements to be made comprehensive but to 
exclude standard restructured accounts which have shown 
consistent satisfactory performance.
Second Quarter Review of Monetary Policy 2012-13 on October 
30, 2012 has announced an increase in the provision for 
restructured standard accounts from the existing 2.0 per cent 
to 2.75 per cent in line with a major recommendation of the 
WG. It has also been announced that draft guidelines on the 
subject taking into account the recommendations of the WG as 
also the comments received in this regard will be issued by 
end-January 2013.
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2011 to 4.7 per cent in March 2012. This has further 
increased to 5.9 per cent as at the end of September 
2012. 
2.37 Some industrial sectors like iron & steel, 
infrastructure and textile experienced a much greater 
degree of restructuring of advances in the recent period 
(chart 2.29).
Credit Risk to Power Sector
2.38 The risks faced by banks in lending to the power 
sector were highlighted in the previous FSR. Pressure 
on asset quality in the power sector has worsened since 
then. Impairments have risen in the preceding year 
ending September 2012 (Chart 2.30(i)). Instances of 
Chart 2.27: Restructured Standard Advances to Gross Total Advances
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.28: Trend in number and value of cases under CDR
Source: CDR cell
Chart 2.29: Industry-wise break-up of value under CDR - June 2012
Source: CDR cell
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restructuring too have registered a steep increase in the 
recent quarters. The large exposure to this sector 
remains an area of concern for banks (Charts 2.30(ii)).
Assessment of Provision Coverage
2.39 An analysis of provision coverage of SCBs was 
attempted in the context of recent spurt in the NPAs. 
The impairment levels in Indian banks compare 
favourably with those of global banks. However, the 
13  Methodologies are given in the Annex.
14  Enhanced Provision norm- std assets 1%, sub-std assets 30%, doubtful & loss assets 100% assumed.
provision coverage ratio is relatively lower and has also 
shown a declining trend in recent quarters. In view of 
this, it may be advisable for banks to increase their 
provisioning levels (Chart 2.31 and Chart 2.32)
Credit Risk- Stress Testing using Sensitivity Analysis
2.40 Sensitivity analysis or single factor stress tests13 
were conducted on the banking system’s credit portfolios 
using different scenarios14. The results show that the 
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15  Focus of macro-stress tests is credit risk. This is captured through NPA/slippage ratios. Details are given in the Annex.
16  These stress scenarios are stringent and conservative assessments under hypothetical-severely adverse economic conditions and should not be 
interpreted as forecasts or expected outcomes.
Table 2.4: Stress Tests - Credit Risk: Gross Credit – September 2012
 (Per cent)
System Level
CRAR Core CRAR (Tier I) NPA Ratio
Baseline:
All Banks 13.6 10.0 3.6
Select 60 Banks 13.5 9.8 3.6
Stress Scenarios:
Shock 1 12.0 8.3 5.4
Shock 2 11.2 7.4 7.1
Shock1 : NPAs increase by 50%
Shock2 : NPAs increase by 100%
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations.
Table 2.5: Macroeconomic Scenario Assumptions16
(Per cent)
FY Baseline Medium Stress* Severe Stress*
20
12
-1
3
GDP Growth 5.8 5.2 3.5
WPI Inflation 7.7 9.5 11.5
Short-term Interest Rate 8.0 9.1 10.5
Exports to GDP Ratio 15.7 14.2 12.7
Gross Fiscal Deficit 5.3 5.8 6.3
20
13
-1
4
GDP Growth 6.9 4.7 2.6
WPI Inflation 6.7 9.4 12.0
Short-term Interest Rate 7.4 9.3 11.1
Exports to GDP Ratio 16.0 14.0 12.0
Gross Fiscal Deficit 4.8 6.2 7.5
Note *: For Financial year 2012-13, the average numbers for the selected macro-
variables under medium and severe stress is based on the December 2012 
& March 2013 quarters only.
Table 2.6: Projection of System Level GNPA Ratios of SCBs 
(Per cent of total advances)
Scenario Sep-12
(Actual)
Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-13 Mar-14
Multivariate Logit 
Regression
Multivariate Regression
Baseline
3.6
3.9 4.4 3.8 4.1
Medium Risk 4.0 5.3 3.9 5.1
Severe Risk 4.0 6.4 4.0 6.1
VAR Quantile Regression
Baseline
3.6
3.8 4.4 4.0 4.4
Medium Risk 3.9 6.0 4.4 6.0
Severe Risk 4.0 7.6 4.8 7.6
Note: The GNPAs derived based on VAR and quantile regression, especially for 
severe shock scenario, are relatively higher. This is because, VAR methodology 
takes into account feedback impact of credit quality to macro variables and 
interaction effects leading to higher impact. Whereas, in the case of quantile 
regression, which deals with the tail risks; the credit quality of the banks, at 
present, is already under stress and further shocks to macro variables impact 
the NPA more.
banking system would be resilient to various stress 
scenarios (Table 2.4). 
Macro Stress Test - Credit Risk 
2.41 In order to test the resilience of the Indian 
banking system against macroeconomic shocks, a series 
of macro stress tests at system, bank-group and sectoral 
level were performed using  times series econometric 
tools15. 
2.42 The macro stress tests encompass a series of risk 
scenarios incorporating a baseline and two adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios representing medium and 
severe risk (Table 2.5). The adverse scenarios were 
derived based on up to 1 standard deviation for medium 
risk and 1.25 to 2.0 standard deviation for severe risk 
(10 years historical data). 
System Level Credit Risk
2.43 The macro stress test suggests that, if the current 
adverse macroeconomic condition persists, the system 
level GNPA ratios could rise from 3.6 per cent as at the 
end of September 2012 to 4.0 per cent by end March 
2013 and 4.4 per cent by end March 2014. The GNPA 
ratio could go up to 4.8 per cent and 7.6 per cent under 
the severe risk scenario in the respective periods. Under 
the severe stress scenario, the system level CRAR of SCBs 
could decline to 10.9 per cent by March 2014, which is 
still above the regulatory requirement of 9 per cent 
(Table 2.6 and Chart 2.33).
Bank Group Level Credit Risk
2.44 Among the four bank-groups, namely, public 
sector banks (PSB), old private banks (OPB), new private 
banks(NPB) and foreign banks(FB), PSBs  might continue 
to register highest GNPA ratio. Under baseline scenario, 
the GNPA ratio of PSBs may rise to 4.3 per cent by March 
2013 from 4.0 per cent of September 2012. Whereas, 
GNPA ratios of OPB, NPB and FB may rise to 2.6 per cent, 
2.7 per cent and 3.2 per cent by March 2013 from the 
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2.2 per cent, 2.1 per cent and 2.9 per cent of September 
2012, respectively (Chart 2.34).
2.45 Among the bank-groups, PSBs are expected to 
register lowest CRAR followed by the old private sector 
banks. Under severe stress scenario, the CRAR of PSBs 
may decline to 11.4 per cent and 9.9 per cent by March 
2013 and March 2014, respectively, which is still above 
than the regulatory requirement of 9 per cent 
(Chart 2.35).
Sectoral Credit Risk
2.46 Macro stress test of sectoral credit risk revealed 
that among the selected seven sectors, Agriculture is 
expected register highest NPA at 5.8 per cent by March 
2013, followed by Engineering, Iron & Steel and 
Construction. However, the adverse macroeconomic 
shocks seem to have maximum impact on Engineering 
and Iron & Steel (Table 2.7).
Concentration Risk 
2.47 Banks’ total credit (funded plus non-funded) 
exposures (TCE) to individual large borrowers (top 20) 
shows that the concentration of exposure reduced both 
in terms of per cent of capital fund as well as gross 
advances. While the TCE as per cent of capital fund 
declined from 186.9 per cent at end Mar-10 to 167.4 per 
cent by end Jun-12, the TCE as percent of gross advances 
Chart 2.33: Projection of System Level CRAR of SCBs 
Note: The CRAR has been derived from the average GNPA of the four 
models used above.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.34: Projection of Bank-group wise GNPA ratio 
(Based on Multivariate Panel Regression)
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.35: Projection of Bank-group wise CRAR
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Table 2.7: Projected Sectoral NPA 
(Per cent of total advances)
Sector Sep-12
(Actual)
Mar-13 Mar-14
Baseline Medium 
Risk
Severe 
Risk
Baseline Medium 
Risk
Severe 
Risk
Agriculture 5.2 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.5 6.9 7.3
Construction 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.7 4.1
Cement 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.4 3.9 4.6
Infrastructure 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.9
Iron and Steel 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.7 4.7 5.8 7.0
Engineering 3.5 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.3 5.4 6.6
Automobiles 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.6
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and RBI Staff Calculations
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declined from 32.8 to 27.8 per cent during the same 
period (Table 2.8).
2.48 Share of banks’ funded exposure to their top 20 
individual borrowers in banks’ total gross advances 
declined from 22.0 per cent as at end March 2010 to 18.5 
per cent by end June 2012, at system level (Chart 2.36). 
In respect of banks groups, the concentration has been 
quite high for foreign banks, which may be because of 
their limited customer/borrower base. Further, the 
concentration declined in the case of NPBs during the 
1st quarter of FY2012-13. 
2.49 The stress tests on concentration risk of SCBs 
show that the impact under various stress scenarios are 
not significant. The share of top three borrowers to the 
total credit is about 8.0 per cent (at system level). There 
is a regulatory cap imposed on banks on their credit 
exposures to individual and group borrowers.  The 
exposure ceiling limit is 15 percent of capital funds in 
case of a single borrower and 40 percent of capital funds 
in the case of a borrower group. The reduction in CRAR 
under the assumed scenario of default of top three 
individual borrowers would be 240 basis points and the 
system should be able to withstand this default. 
However, at individual level, a few banks with high 
concentration might be seriously impacted under 
stressed conditions. 
Liquidity Risk
2.50 The liquidity position of banks has improved over 
the last six months, reflecting the effect of the reduction 
in the CRR and SLR. The ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets has increased from 28.9 per cent as at end March 
2012 to 30.1 per cent at end September 2012. 
2.51 A detailed analysis of the ‘quality’ of liquidity is 
captured by the liquidity ratios (Table 2.9). The ratio of 
volatile liabilities to earning assets, (with both numerator 
and denominator adjusted for temporary assets) 
measures the extent to which banks’ basic earning assets 
are funded by less stable sources of funds. This ratio 
was 40.9 per cent as on September 2010 and has steadily 
increased to 43.9 percent as at end September 2012, 
which points towards banks increasingly resorting to 
short term bulk deposits . 
2.52 The ratio of loans including mandatory cash 
reserves and statutory liquidity investments to total 
Table 2.8: Banks’ Exposure to their Top 20 Individual Borrowers
(Per cent)
Bank Group Total Credit Exposure (TCE)
Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Jun-12
TCE as % of Capital Fund
PSBs 201.4 185.4 175.4 178.7
OPBs 191.5 189.8 191.5 194.0
NPBs 149.3 150.0 138.4 110.9
FBs 178.2 179.8 196.7 206.3
All SCBs 186.9 177.3 170.4 167.4
TCE as % of Gross Advances
PSBs 28.7 25.8 24.2 24.6
OPBs 28.4 27.2 25.6 25.8
NPBs 43.6 40.1 36.5 28.5
FBs 70.7 69.4 73.8 74.2
All SCBs 32.8 30.0 28.5 27.8
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.36: Share of Top 20 Individual Borrowers in Total Advances
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Table 2.9: Liquidity Ratios 
(Per cent)
Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12
(Volatile Liabilities - Temporary Assets) / 
(Earning Assets - Temporary Assets) 
40.9 42.0 43.9
Core Deposits / Total Assets 51.0 49.5 51.2
(Loans + Mandatory CRR + Mandatory 
SLR + Fixed Assets )/ Total Assets 
82.4 59.5 60.6
[Loans + Mandatory CRR + Mandatory 
SLR + Fixed Assets ] / Core Deposits 
1.6 1.2 1.2
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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assets has decreased from 82.4 per cent in September 
2010 to around 60 percent over the period of last two 
years, partly reflecting the decrease in statutory reserve 
ratios over the period of last two years. The decreased 
ratio although reflecting the slowdown in credit growth 
also indicates that ‘illiquidity’ embedded in the balance 
sheet has come down. The ratio in terms of core deposits 
has moved from 1.6 in September 2010 to 1.2 as at 
September 2012 indicating a decrease in purchased 
liquidity.
Bulk Deposits 
2.53 Retail deposits (Current Account, Savings and 
Term deposits) are inherently more stable as they are 
diversified and less prone to premature withdrawal. A 
few public sector banks continued to display a high 
degree of reliance on ‘bulk’ deposits (i.e. deposits of ` 10 
million and above for the analysis). In some cases the 
bulk deposits constituted more than 50 per cent of the 
total liabilities as at end September 2012. Excess SLR 
securities holdings constitute a bulwark against runs on 
banks relying on such wholesale sources of funds. 
Position in respect of bulk deposits and the mitigant in 
the form of excess SLR holdings is presented in 
Chart 2.37. 
2.54 According to bank group classification, the 
proportion of the bulk deposits in total deposits 
remained high for foreign banks, though there has been 
slight decline in the last six months. The proportion of 
the bulk deposits in total deposits has shown signs of 
stabilising after increasing in last few quarters for the 
public sector banks. Since term deposits can be 
withdrawn prematurely17, such bulk deposits remain 
prone to withdrawal and/ or non-rollover, posing 
liquidity risks to the banks relying  on such deposits. 
While a higher proportion of bulk deposits and 
borrowings in total liabilities of banks make them 
vulnerable to liquidity shocks, the proportion of their 
investments in liquid government securities acts as a 
mitigating factor. 
2.55 Deposit growth of banks has been lagging loan 
growth for several quarters. This exposes the banks to 
17 Premature withdrawal of deposits is permitted by banks in India with some penalty in the form of reduced effective interest rates
Chart 2.37: Bulk Deposits to Liabilities ratio vis-a-vis excess SLR: 
Size-wise Distribution – September 2012
Note: Size of the bubble corresponds to the amount of liabilities
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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RBI allowed commercial banks to fix their own interest rates on 
domestic term deposits of various maturities with the prior 
approval of their respective Board of Directors/Asset Liability 
Management Committee (ALCO), effective October 22, 1997. 
The Annual Monetary and Credit Policy for the year 2002-03 
had noted the following:  “The average cost of deposits for major 
banks continues to be relatively high. Further, a substantial 
portion of deposits is in the form of long-term deposits at fixed 
interest rates. Thus, flexibility available to banks to reduce 
interest rates in the short-run, without adversely affecting their 
return on assets, is limited.” The Policy document, accordingly, 
favoured introduction of flexible interest rate deposits with 
reset at six-monthly intervals where the interest rate could be 
higher or lower vis-à-vis the fixed rate deposit for similar 
Box 2.2: Variable Rate Deposits
maturity depending on banks’ perception regarding inflation 
and the interest rate outlook over the longer period. 
Furthermore, banks were also urged to devise schemes for 
encouraging depositors to convert their existing long-term fixed 
rate past deposits into variable rate deposits. Commercial banks 
could consider paying the depositors at the contracted rate for 
the period of deposit already run and waive the penalty for 
premature withdrawal if the same deposit is renewed at the 
variable rate. 
Notwithstanding the fact that about 80 per cent of the loans 
extended by banks are floating rate instruments, only a few 
banks had introduced floating rate deposit products during the 
last 10 years.
liquidity stresses as it increases reliance on wholesale 
sources of funds. In order to boost retail deposits growth, 
certain product innovations like variable rate deposits 
could be considered (Box 2.2). 
Stress Test - Liquidity Risk
2.56 Liquidity risk analysis has been done using 
different definitions of liquid assets18. The stress 
scenarios are constructed to test the ability of banks to 
meet a run on their deposits using only their liquid 
assets. Under the stress scenarios, there were indications 
of deterioration in the liquidity position of some banks, 
though SLR investments helped them to ward off the 
liquidity pressure (Definition-1; Table 2.10).
2.57 The liquidity stress tests conducted on banks 
groups reveal that foreign banks have a better liquid 
asset position to guard against any stress, primarily due 
to their higher proportion of short term investments / 
excess SLR and most of their advances portfolio being 
short-term (less than one year).
Interest Rate Risk 
2.58 Investments accounted for 29.8 per cent of assets 
of the banking system, as at end September 2012. Stress 
tests carried out to evaluate the valuation impact by 
marking to market the banking book under different 
scenarios revealed that the banking system was capable 
of withstanding such shocks. The maximum impact due 
Table 2.10: Liquidity Risk: SCBs – September 2012
Liquid Assets Definition Liquid Assets Ratio (%)
Public 
Sector 
Banks
Old 
Private 
Banks
New 
Private 
Banks
Foreign 
Banks
All 
SCBs
Definition 1: Baseline 25.7 23.8 21.4 25.9 24.9
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit 
withdrawal 30 days
16.5 14.8 13.5 20.0 16.2
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit 
withdrawal each day for 
5 days
13.1 11.3 10.5 18.2 13.0
Definition 2: Baseline 5.4 4.2 2.9 11.9 5.4
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit 
withdrawal 30 days
-6.2 -7.2 -6.9 4.8 -5.6
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit 
withdrawal each day for 
5 days
-10.6 -11.6 -10.5 2.6 -9.6
Definition 1: Cash, Inter-bank-deposits, All-SLR-Investments
Definition 2: Cash, Inter-bank-deposits, Excess SLR
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and RBI Staff Calculations
18 The liquid assets comprise of cash, Inter-bank-deposits and Investments.
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to upward movement of yield curve, was on the low 
maturity buckets on the banking book. Under the 
scenarios (Shock 1; Table 2.11), the capital position of 
the banking system is reduced sharply by 320 bps. On 
the other hand, the impact of direct interest rate risk on 
the trading book was not high (only about 80 bps). 
Therefore, overall impact under the assumed scenarios 
would still be manageable.
Equity Price Risk 
2.59 The impact of assumed fall in equity prices by 40 
per cent does not impact significantly as the equity 
market exposure of banks in India is not high.  One 
specific reason is that there are regulatory limits 
prescribed for the capital market exposure of banks. The 
system level CRAR falls to 12.9 per cent under stress 
from the baseline at 13.6 per cent and no bank is severely 
impacted.
Foreign Exchange Risk
2.60 Banks have direct exposure that is visible in 
balance sheet items like foreign exchange liabilities and 
commitments provided to overseas branches. While the 
Indian banking system’s liabilities to overseas entities 
has grown over the last several years, it has dwindled 
as a proportion of total liabilities (Chart 2.38). Likewise, 
their foreign claims (assets abroad on an ultimate risk 
basis) too have grown strongly but have remained largely 
unchanged as a proportion of total assets (Chart 2.39). 
This suggests low direct exposures to exchange rate risks 
(indirect foreign exchange risk, through unhedged 
corporate exposure is discussed in para 1.23 of 
Chapter I).
2.61 The relatively more flexible ‘internal models’ 
approach under Basel-II allows each bank to measure its 
exposure after incorporating the relationships among 
its various trading and non-trading operations (model 
risk is discussed in para 3.9 of Chapter III). However, 
the use of ‘internal models’ approach for analysis of the 
foreign exchange risk across various banks is constrained, 
due to the differences in the business models of banks 
and other related factors. 
2.62 The foreign exchange risk under various scenarios 
(where INR appreciation of 10 and 20 per cent and 
depreciation of 10 and 20 per cent are assumed), do not 
show much impact on the commercial banks mainly 
Table 2.11: Interest Rate Risk – Trading and Banking Books 
September 2012
(Per cent)
CRAR (system level) Core CRAR (system level)
Baseline:
All Banks 13.6 10.0
Select 60 Banks 13.5  9.8
Stress Scenarios - Interest Rate Risk : Valuation Impact 
(Modified Duration Analysis)
Banking Book Trading Book Banking Book Trading Book
Shock 1 10.3 12.7 6.7 9.1
Shock 2 11.6 13.1 8.0 9.4
Shock 1 - Parallel upward shift of the INR yield curve by 250 bps
Shock 2 - Inversion of the INR yield curve 250 to -100 linearly
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.38: International Liabilities of Indian Banks 
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and BIS’ International Banking Statistics
Chart 2.39: Foreign Claims of Indian Banks
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and BIS’ International Banking Statistics
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because of low net open currency positions of individual 
banks. The reduction in CRAR is only 20 basis points 
under the assumed scenarios. 
Derivatives Portfolio of Banks
2.63 Derivatives could engender systemic risk on 
account of the size of the over-the-counter (OTC) 
segment of the derivatives market and the high 
concentration of financial obligations, with a relatively 
small number of banks serving as counterparties to a 
large number of OTC derivative transactions. 
2.64 The derivatives market in India grew sharply in 
the years leading up to the global financial crisis. 
Though the portfolio size has shrunk since 2008, it still 
remains large with the notional outstanding principal 
of the derivatives portfolio of banks constituting over 
1500 per cent of banks’ capital funds and over 160 per 
cent of its total assets as on March 31, 2012 (Chart 2.40 
and Table 2.12). A significant degree of concentration 
exists in the Indian derivative markets with foreign 
banks as a group constituting 70 per cent of the 
outstanding notional principal in the derivatives 
market, disproportionate to their share in balance sheet 
assets of the banking system at 7 per cent. Further, the 
share of the top five banks in notional principal 
outstanding constituted 43 per cent of the outstanding 
notional of the derivatives portfolio of all scheduled 
commercial banks as on March 31, 2012.
2.65 The bulk of outstanding derivative transactions 
are interbank transactions – for the 26 banks with the 
largest derivatives exposures, the interbank segment of 
the derivatives market constituted, on an average, 76 
per cent of the total outstanding derivatives as at 
September 2012 (Chart 2.41). This accentuates the inter-
connectedness between banks and increases the risk of 
contagion arising from the failure of any bank. Contagion 
analysis shows that in case of the top six banks in terms 
of derivatives exposure, the loss from failure of any one 
bank increases significantly when non fund based 
exposures are considered along with fund based 
exposures (Chart 2.42). 
Credit risk emanating from derivative receivables 
2.66 The net mark to market (MTM) value of the 
derivatives portfolio for the banks in the sample varied 
across the two segments – with most banks registering 
Chart 2.40: Notional Principal Outstanding in Derivatives Market 
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Table 2.12: Relative Size of the Derivatives Market in India – 
March 2012
` billion All Banks Top 5 banks* Top 10 banks*
Derivatives Notional Principal 127000 55000 87000
Total Assets 78000 7000 12000
Capital Funds 8000 1000 2000
Notional Principal as % of Assets 162.8 785.7 725.0
Notional Principal as % of Capital 1587.5 5500.0 4350.0
Note : i. *Top banks as per derivatives notional principal 
           ii.  Amount rounded off to nearest `1000 billion 
Source : RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.41: Share of Interbank Segment  in Total Derivatives 
Transactions  – September 2012
Source: Data collected from sample set of banks and RBI Staff Calculations
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negative net MTM in case of the interbank segment and 
positive net MTM in case of the customer segment. The 
receivables from the customer segment constituted 26 
per cent of the total receivables of banks. The gross 
receivables from customers were relatively small vis-à-vis 
the capital funds in case of public and private sector 
banks, while they were significantly higher in foreign 
banks. The credit risk emanating from these positions 
will need to be carefully monitored (Chart 2.43). 
Sensitivity of the derivatives portfolio to market risks 
2.67 A series of stress tests was carried out on the 
derivatives portfolio as on September 30, 2012 by a 
sample of 26 banks based on a common set of four 
interest rate and exchange rate sensitivity shocks20. The 
sample of banks and shocks were the same as used for 
the analysis presented in the June 2012 issue of the FSR. 
The results of the stress testing indicate that the 
sensitivity of the derivatives portfolio to market 
movements has increased in the period since the 
publication of the previous FSR, as the average change 
in net MTM as a ratio of capital based on a worst case 
analysis across the four shocks (the maximum impact 
across the set of four shocks) has increased from 2 per 
cent as at March 2012 to 10 per cent as at September 
2012. The impact of individual shocks, however, displays 
mixed trends (Chart 2.44).
19 Contagion loss refers to the loss caused to the banking system due to the failure of a trigger bank (one bank at a time). For more details refer to the 
analysis of contagion in the network of the banking system (para 2.11).
20 For details on shocks, refer to the Annex
Chart 2.43: MTM in Customer Segment as ratio of Capital Funds 
September 2012
Source: Data collected from sample set of banks and RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.42: Contagion Loss as a percentage of Capital Funds19 –
September 2012
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.44: Impact of Application of Shocks as on March 31, 2012 and 
September 30, 2012
Note: Impact is measured in terms of change in net MTM post application of each 
shock as a ratio of capital funds of the bank. Where the net positive MTM of 
the bank increases after application of the shock, the impact of the shock is 
more severe in September 2012 if the increase in September 2012 is lower 
as compared to the increase in March 2012. 
Source: Data collected from sample set of banks and RBI Staff Calculations
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2.68 The average impact of the application of shocks 
stood at about 10 per cent of capital funds. However, 
there were some outlier banks where the impact was 
significantly higher (Chart 2.45). 
Profitability 
2.69  An analysis of main components of income shows 
that the growth in interest income as well as interest 
expense has declined during the half year  ended 
September 12, but the decline was comparatively sharper 
in case of interest expense. This, apart from other 
factors, has contributed to growth in earnings before 
provisions and taxes (EBPT). The profit after tax has also 
grown at a rate of 36.8 per cent, reaching close to the 
growth rate of 37.4 per cent observed in September 2007 
(Chart 2.46).
2.70 The profitability during the current half year has 
been supported by a faster growth in other items of 
income like miscellaneous income, profit from trading 
and forex during the first half year (Chart 2.47). The 
commission income from selling insurance and mutual 
fund products by banks has also increased in recent 
period.  
2.71 The provision cover of many large banks, mainly 
the public sector banks, has steadily declined during last 
few quarters (Chart 2.48). The fall in provision coverage 
ratio (without write-offs), apart from other factors has 
perhaps helped banks in reporting an improved profit 
performance over the last two quarters, even as NPAs 
Chart 2.45: Change in Net MTM as ratio of Capital Funds of Banks 
September 2012
Note: Based on Worst Case Analysis (the maximum impact on the net MTM 
positions amongst the four sensitivity stress tests). 
Source: Data collected from sample set of banks and RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.46: Growth rate in EBPT, PAT, Interest Income and 
Interest Expenses
Source: Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.47: Growth rate (Y-o-Y) in some select items of incomes - 
All SCBs
Source: Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.48: Provisioning Coverage Ratio – SCBs
Source: Supervisory Returns
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have increased during the period. This effect is more 
marked in the cases of public sector banks, as they have 
experienced the fastest growth in NPAs and restructured 
assets. 
2.72 The net interest margin (NIM) at the system level 
has remained stable at about 3.0 per cent but declined 
slightly for a few large public sector banks. Going ahead, 
the NIM of the banks may remain under pressure as the 
benefit of a possible decline in cost of funds is likely to 
be offset by declining asset yields.
 Regional Rural Banks
2.73 An analysis of financial soundness indicators and 
balance sheet components of Regional Rural Banks 
(RRBs) reveals that the financial performance of RRBs 
bas been improving (Table 2.13). Fewer banks made 
losses during 2011-12 compared to 2010-11(3 as opposed 
to 7 earlier) and the loss amount too has shrunk from 
`710 million to ` 280 million. While there has been 17.7 
per cent growth in advances, deposits have grown to the 
extent of 12.1 per cent on a y-o-y basis. As on date, 19 
RRBs in 6 states have been amalgamated across 12 
sponsor banks. 71 RRBs are now in existence against 82 
RRB prior to amalgamation.        
Urban Co-operative Banks
2.74 There were 51 Scheduled UCBs (SUCBs) as on 
September 30, 2012. An analysis of all SUCBs revealed 
that overall CRAR declined from 12.8 per cent as on 
March 31, 2012 to 12.6 per cent as on June 30, 2012 and 
thereafter increased marginally to 12.7 per cent as on 
September 30, 2012. GNPA ratio increased from 4.6 per 
cent as on March 31, 2012 to 5.9 per cent as on June 30, 
2012 and increased further to 6.1 per cent as on 
September 30, 2012. Annualised RoA improved from 0.9 
per cent as on March 31, 2012 to 1.3 per cent as on June 
30, 2012 and thereafter declined to 1.1 per cent as on 
September 30, 2012. Liquidity Ratio based on stock 
approach for the SUCBs which was 34.0 per cent as on 
March 31, 2012 as well as June 30, 2012 improved 
marginally to 34.1 per cent as on September 30, 2012. 
Provision Coverage Ratio of SUCBs declined from 76.2 
per cent as on March 31, 2012 to 66.0 per cent as on June 
30, 2012 and thereafter improved to 66.2 per cent as on 
September 30, 2012 (Table 2.14).
Table 2.13:  Performance Parameters of RRBs 
(` Million)
S. N. Parameters 2010-11 2011-12 % Growth
1 Owned Fund 13,8390 16,4620 18.95 
2 Deposit 1,66,2320 1863360 12.09
3 Gross Loan (O/s) 98,9170 1163850 17.66
4 CD Ratio 59.51 62.46 4.96
5 Accumulated Losses 1,5320 13320 -13.05
6 Net Profit 1,7860 18860 5.59
7 Loss  (No. of RRBs) 710 (7) 280 (3) -60.56
8 Gross NPA % 3.75 5.03 34.13
9 Net NPA % 2.05 2.98 45.36
10 Branch Productivity 165.7 179.0 8.02
11 Staff Productivity 37.8 40.7 7.67
Source: NABARD
Table 2.14:  Select Financial Soundness Indicators of SUCBs 
(Per cent)
Financial Soundness Indicators March  2012 June 2012 September 2012
1. CRAR 12.8 12.6 12.7
2. Gross NPAs to Gross Advances 4.6 5.9 6.1
3. Return on Assets  (annualised) 0.9 1.3 1.1
4. Liquidity Ratio 34.0 34.0 34.1
5. Provision Coverage Ratio 76.2 66.0 66.2
Note: 1. Data exclude MMCB;
 2. Data are provisional and based on OSS Returns;
 3. Liquidity Ratio = 100 * (Cash + due from banks + SLR investment) / Total Assets;
 4. PCR is compiled as “NPA provisions held as per cent of Gross NPAs”.
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Stress Test - SUCBs - Credit Risk 
2.75 Stress tests on credit risk were carried out for 
SUCBs using the data based on Off-Site Surveillance 
(OSS) returns as on September 30, 2012. The impact of 
credit risk shocks on the CRAR of SUCBs was assessed 
under two different scenarios assuming an increase in 
the GNPA by 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. 
The results show that SUCBs could withstand shocks 
assumed under the first scenario easily, though they 
would come under some stress under the second 
scenario (Chart 2.49).
Stress Tests – SUCBs - Liquidity Risk 
2.76 Stress tests on liquidity risk were carried out 
under two different scenarios assuming an increase in 
cash outflows in the 1 to 28 days time bucket by 50 per 
cent and 100 per cent respectively. It was assumed that 
there was no change in cash inflows under both the 
scenarios. The banks would be considered to be impacted 
as a result of the stress if the mismatch or negative gap 
(i.e. the cash inflow less cash outflow) in the 1 to 28 
days time bucket exceeds 20 per cent of outflows. The 
stress test results indicate that the SUCBs would be 
significantly impacted even under the less severe stress 
scenario (Chart 2.50).
Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
2.77  In India, this sector has been in the regulated 
space  and its growth and development has been under 
the oversight of the Reserve Bank. Among NBFCs, the 
highest monitoring attention is accorded to firms 
identified as systemically important, specifically, the 
Non-Bank Financial Companies - Non-Deposit Taking 
– Systemically Important (NBFC-ND-SI). The CRAR norms 
were extended to NBFCs-ND-SIs and they are required 
to maintain a minimum capital, consisting of Tier-I and 
Tier- II capital, of not less than 15 per cent of their 
aggregate risk-weighted assets. 
2.78 The aggregate CRAR of the ND-SI sector stood at 
25.7 per cent for the quarter ended June 2012 (Chart 2.51). 
While it is high, the ratio has been deteriorating in the 
last few quarters. The gross NPA ratio21 of the NBFC 
Chart 2.49: Impact of NPA Shocks on Capital Position: SUCBs  
September 2012
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.50: Liquidity Risk: ALM Mismatch - SUCBs – September 2012
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations.
Chart 2.51: Trends in Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns.
21 The NBFC Sector follows the 180 day norm for recognition of NPAs as opposed to the 90-day norm in case of commercial banks.
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Chart 2.52: Trends in Gross NPA Ratio
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
sector has remained stable around 2.0 per cent for the 
past many quarters (Chart 2.52). 
Profitability Ratios
2.79 The return on assets (net profit as a percentage 
of total assets) of the NBFCs-ND-SI sector stood at 2.1 
per cent for the quarter ended June 2012 as compared 
with 2.5 per cent for the same quarter in the previous 
year (Chart 2.53). 
Sources & Uses of Funds of NBFC Sector
2.80 NBFCs (ND-SI) collect funds from a wide range of 
sources including debentures, borrowings from banks, 
financial institutions, commercial paper, inter-corporate 
borrowings etc (Chart 2.54). Owned fund is another 
prospective source of finance for NBFCs (ND-SI) and is 
accounted for 26 per cent of total liabilities. Of these 
sources of funds, accessing funds through debentures 
constitute a major portion of total funds followed by 
borrowings from banks. On the assets side, loans & 
advances is the major use of funds and is accounted for 
72 per cent of total uses of funds.
Chart 2.53: Trends in Return on Assets
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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2.81 Advances of NBFCs to real estate sector on an 
average accounted for 4.5 per cent of total advances of 
the ND-SI sector (Chart 2.55).
2.82 Capital market exposure(CME) includes 
(i) investments in listed instruments and (ii) advances 
to capital market related activities. CME of the NBFC 
sector on an average accounted for 9.0 per cent of total 
assets of the ND-SI sector, while CME to owned funds 
of the sector accounted for 34.5 per cent (Chart 2.56).
Infrastructure Finance Companies (IFCs)
2.83 Aggregate balance sheet size of the eight IFCs 
increased by 27.5 per cent during 2011-12 on top of 25.3 
per cent growth witnessed in the previous year. 
Debentures of these companies increased more than 2.5 
times during the period of three years i.e. from March 
2010 to March 2012 (Chart 2.57). This may be largely 
due to raising of huge funds through non-convertible 
debentures. Bank borrowings of IFCs increased 
marginally by 0.7 per cent in 2011-12 as against 14.3 per 
cent growth witnessed in the previous year. 
2.84 Leverage ratio of the IFCs hovered between 5.1 
and 5.7 during the period under review. The share of 
bank borrowings in total liabilities decreased from 17.5 
per cent as on March 31, 2010 to 12.5 per cent as on 
March 31, 2012, while the share of debentures increased 
from 34.5 per cent to 56.9 per cent during the same 
period. Return on assets of the IFCs, witnessed 
decelerating trend, it declined from 2.5 per cent as on 
March 2010 to 2.1 per cent as on March 2012. In tandem 
with RoA, return on equity also decelerated (declined 
from 15.1 per cent to 14 per cent) during the period 
under review.
Stress testing the NBFC sector (NBFC-D and ND-SI)
2.85 A stress test on credit risk for NBFC sector 
(includes both deposit taking and ND-SI) for the period 
ended June 2012 was carried out under two scenarios 
(i) where gross NPA increased two times and (ii) gross 
NPA increased 5 times from the current level. It was 
observed that in the first scenario, CRAR dropped by 0.7 
percentage points from 26 per cent to 25.3 per cent while 
in the second scenario CRAR dropped by 2.5 percentage 
points (CRAR dropped from 26 per cent to 23.5 per cent). 
It may be concluded that even though there was shortfall 
in provisioning under both the scenarios, the impact on 
Chart 2.55: Trends in Advances to Real Estate Sector
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.56: Trends in Exposure to Capital Market
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.57: Trends in Select Sources of Funds - IFCs
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns.
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CRAR was negligible as the sector had a higher level of 
CRAR at 26 per cent as against the bench mark CRAR of 
15 per cent. 
Stress Testing Major Individual NBFCs
2.86 A stress test on credit risk for major individual 
NBFCs for the period ended June 2012 was also carried 
out under two scenarios (i) where gross NPA increased 
two times and (ii) gross NPA increased 5 times from the 
current level. Under first scenario, it was observed that 
4.9 per cent companies would have CRAR less than 
regulatory CRAR of 15 per cent while in second scenario, 
CRAR of 9.5 per cent companies was found to be less 
than regulatory CRAR of 15 per cent.  
Pension System in India22
2.87 During financial crises a steep fall in asset prices 
trigger redemption pressure which is a potential 
destabiliser for the fund management industry. In such 
stressed scenario, only long-term funds such as, pension 
funds can be a source of financial stability providing 
buying support. The larger the pension funds’ investible 
resources, the stronger will be the stabilising force. In 
India, a continued reliance on unsustainable pay-as-you-
go pension schemes in the government has the potential 
for an adverse impact on financial stability by raising 
fiscal deficit. In the case of civil servants, a transition 
from the pay-as-you-go Defined Benefit to a fully funded 
Defined Contribution pension system has already been 
made for the centre and for a large majority of the states. 
However there exist a large number of Defined Benefit 
schemes for the unorganised sector both at the level of 
the centre and the states. These schemes which mainly 
target either the people Below Poverty Line (BPL) or 
occupational groups vary in terms of the benefit 
structures, administrative mechanisms and coverage. 
Often the scheme is announced without any actuarial 
estimation of the future liability or the funding 
requirement. However, unless a fiscally sustainable 
mechanism for delivering this goal is designed risks 
would be either an inadequate coverage or a poor benefit 
structure.
2.88 Infrastructure financing gap act as a drag on 
economic growth. Pension funds being long-term funds 
can be used to finance infrastructure projects. The 
working sub-group on infrastructure, Planning 
Commission has estimated available resources to the 
tune of `1507 billion to come from insurance/pension 
fund. It has also recommended the necessity of 
regulatory reforms for insurance/pension funds to 
mobilise savings through these channels into 
infrastructure.
22 Source: Pensions Funds Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA)
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Chapter III
Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
The global regulatory reforms agenda has largely crystallised. The focus is now on timely implementation. As a 
number of economies have announced their regulatory standards, concerns have emerged on the consistency of regulatory 
changes across jurisdictions. For emerging and developing economies (EDEs), there could potentially be negative 
consequences of the reform measures, especially from the extraterritorial nature of some reforms. Indian banks will 
face challenges as they migrate to Basel III given the declining asset quality and regulatory changes necessitating 
additional provisioning. Risks from the increased use of models, as banks migrate to advanced approaches under 
Basel II, will need to be managed.
The identifi cation metrics for Financial Conglomerates (FCs) will need to be fi ne tuned to take into account the 
work being done internationally for the identifi cation of domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) and 
systemically important insurance companies and non-banking fi nancial entities. The non-banking fi nancial segment 
in the country is small relative to peer nations, but is growing at a faster pace. Gaps in the regulatory coverage of the 
non-banking fi nancial sector will need to be progressively addressed.
Signifi cant progress is being made in the implementation of OTC derivative reforms in the country. Mandating or 
incentivising migration to guaranteed clearing will need that certain legal/ regulatory issues related to bilateral 
netting, exposure norms, etc. are addressed. Initiatives are being taken to address issues such as low coverage levels 
and delayed payments to depositors by the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC).
Financial inclusion and literacy are tools to ensure growth with equity. Financially aware citizens make choices that 
strengthen fi nancial system through greater use of fi nancial products. This chapter also covers the efforts towards 
fi nancial inclusion and literacy that the government and regulators have undertaken in the interest of fi nancial 
stability. The aim of such efforts is to provide easy access to fi nancial products and ensure that savings remain within 
the formal fi nancial sector for productive deployment.
Regulatory Infrastructure
Implementation of Global Regulatory Reforms
3.1 In the wake of the financial crisis, an ambitious 
global reforms agenda focusing on major risks to the 
stability of the financial system was launched. The 
reform initiatives announced include the Basel capital 
and liquidity framework, policy measures for global 
systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs), 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market reforms 
and strengthening the regulation and monitoring 
of the shadow banking system. The focus has now 
progressed from policy formulation to effective and 
timely implementation.
1  http://www.bis.org/press/p121029.htm
3.2 A progress report1 on the implementation of 
the Basel Committee recommendations observed that 
several member countries have missed the globally-
agreed implementation dates for Basel II and 2.5. In 
case of Basel III, ten countries have published the 
final domestic guidelines. The Basel Committee is, 
however, hopeful that the remaining jurisdictions 
will finalise their domestic regulations during the 
year 2013. Implementation delays have also been 
observed in case of several other reform measures, 
e.g. implementing an effective resolution regime for 
G-SIFIs, convergence of accounting standards, reducing 
reliance on credit rating agencies and achieving the 
full implementation of the agreed reforms in the OTC 
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derivatives market. At the implementation stage, some 
jurisdictions are finding it necessary to modify some of 
the regulatory prescriptions to ensure that transitions 
are non disruptive.
3.3 Consistency in the implementation of reforms 
has emerged as a key concern as several jurisdictions 
have come out with their own regulatory standards. 
A Basel Committee review of the implementation 
of domestic Basel III guidelines, for example, found 
inconsistencies in risk measurement approaches in 
some jurisdictions. Such differences could potentially 
lead to migration of financial sector activities to less 
regulated jurisdictions and/or to the shadow banking 
sector with stability implications for the global 
financial system. It is important to ensure that there 
is no disharmony between the regulations in different 
jurisdictions so as to avoid confusion and regulatory 
arbitrage, which would ultimately erode the credibility 
of the reforms process.
Side-effects of Regulatory Reforms
3.4 Concerns have emerged about the unintended 
side effects of regulatory reforms. These might be 
significant in case of EDEs. It is important to ensure 
that financial intermediaries in EDEs are not placed at 
a relative disadvantage as the opportunities, risks and 
challenges they face are different. Also, EDEs may be 
adversely impacted if demanding regulatory standards 
lead to deleveraging by global financial institutions 
in these economies. The effects on EDEs may also be 
exacerbated by the extraterritorial2 nature of some 
reforms and extant regulations (Box 3.1). A recent 
report prepared by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
in coordination with the staff of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank3, highlights the 
potential adverse impact of the implementation of the 
reform measures on emerging markets and developing 
economies.
Capital Requirements of Banks under Basel III
3.5 India has issued the final guidelines on Basel III. 
The implementation of Basel III capital requirements 
will begin on January 1, 2013 and is expected to be 
completed by March 31, 2018.
3.6 Earlier FSRs have reported that banks in India 
will start from a position of strength in implementing 
the Basel III measures. Quick estimates place the 
additional capital requirement of banks on account of 
Basel III at ` 5 trillion, of which non-equity capital will 
be to the order of `  3.25 trillion while equity capital will 
be to the order of ` 1.75 trillion4. Additional challenges 
could be posed by the recent trends in asset quality of 
banks, regulatory changes in restructuring guidelines 
and the proposed implementation of dynamic 
provisioning norms that may increase the provisioning 
requirements of the banking sector. The deterioration 
in the macroeconomic conditions could further add to 
asset quality pressures.
Migration to Advanced Approaches under Basel II
3.7 The guidelines on internal ratings based (IRB) 
approach for computing credit risk capital charge; 
the standardised approach (TSA) and advanced 
measurement approach (AMA) for operational risk; 
and internal models approach (IMA) for market risk 
have been issued. While three banks have applied to 
the Reserve Bank for accreditation for migrating to IMA 
under market risk, 15 banks have applied for migrating 
to IRB approach for calculation of credit risk capital 
charge. Further, 12 banks have applied for migrating 
to TSA, and nine banks have given letter of intention 
for migration to AMA for calculation of operational risk 
capital charge. One bank has been granted approval for 
migrating to TSA on ‘parallel run’ basis. Applications 
of the remaining banks are at various stages of 
examination. 
3.8 The migration to advanced approaches, however, 
comes with inherent challenges as the process hinges 
on the sophistication of risk management systems, 
processes and culture as well as the availability of 
data; tools; methodologies; and necessary expertise in 
banks.
2 Extraterritoriality is the application of a local regulatory requirement (whether licensing or transactional) to firms or market participants beyond the 
jurisdiction enacting it, or imposition of substantive compliance, or reporting burdens of such requirements outside the enacting jurisdiction.
3 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120619e.pdf
4 “Basel III in International and Indian Contexts Ten Questions We Should Know the Answers For”, Inaugural Address by Dr. Duvvuri Subbarao, Governor, 
Reserve Bank of India at the Annual FICCI - IBA Banking Conference at Mumbai on September 04, 2012.
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3.9 The advanced approaches under Basel II 
necessitate the use of complex internal models for 
the calculation of capital charge. Concerns have been 
raised that banks’ modelling approaches are being 
used to optimistically calculate risk weights resulting 
in portfolios of similar risk being assigned varying 
amounts of equity capital. The complexity and opacity 
of such models add to the difficulties in scrutinising 
and assessing the capital adequacy ratios. In a recent 
report, the Bank of England has voiced concerns about 
the use of models for the aggressive application of risk 
weights resulting in capital positions of banks being 
The focus on addressing systemic risk at both the domestic 
and international level has led to a new dimension in terms 
of regulatory initiatives – extraterritoriality of regulations. 
As national authorities embark on efforts to avoid importing 
risks in an interconnected world and protect their respective 
economies, regulators often take a broad view of their 
regulatory perimeter. This, on occasions, results in an 
overarching reach of regulations making them applicable to 
entities beyond the home jurisdiction.
Extraterritorial application of regulations arise as legislation 
or regulation is developed at a national or regional level 
ahead of, or inconsistently with, a globally agreed standard. 
In addition to regulations prescribed by national authorities, 
there are some prescribed by multilateral organisations 
such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
or International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), which are often a precursor to national regulatory 
initiatives. Despite efforts to ensure that global standards are 
adopted consistently across jurisdictions, national interests 
could take precedence as the transnational reach of certain 
recent regulations impinge on the sovereignty of other 
nations. Concerns are emerging about the potential costs 
of compliance requirements and the possibility of similar 
unilateral action by other countries leading to regulatory 
fragmentation.
Some notable regulations with significant extraterritorial 
implications include:
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
The objective of FATCA is to identify tax evaders among 
American tax payers and is made applicable to any non-US 
organisation that holds or manages customers’ or affiliates’ 
money. The provisions require the foreign financial 
institutions (FFIs) and non-financial foreign entities (NFFEs) 
to enter into a compliance agreement with the US Treasury and 
identify and report US accounts annually. The regulation has 
a sweeping reach as it does not mandate that such institutions 
should have a presence in the US. It imposes extensive due 
diligence and compliance requirements on foreign entities 
and stringent withholding tax in case of non-compliance. 
In addition, the reporting requirements could potentially 
conflict with some data privacy laws outside the US.
Margin requirements for OTC derivatives under the Dodd-
Frank Rules
The proposed rules impose significant margin requirements 
for certain OTC derivative transactions. The requirements 
would have direct extraterritorial effect as they are made 
applicable to all such transactions if the transactions take 
place in the US or if any of the counterparties is controlled in 
any way by a US entity.
Solvency II
Solvency II is a risk-based regulatory regime that will apply 
to insurance establishments in the European Union. The 
Solvency II directive recognises the fact that the insurance 
industry is a global industry and therefore allows the 
European Commission to decide about the equivalence of a 
third country’s solvency and prudential regime.
Registration Requirements under Rule 15(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 1934 (US)
Rule 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that any 
person who induces or attempts to induce the purchase or sale 
of a security using mails or some other means of interstate 
commerce must register as a broker-dealer with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), US. There is no explicit 
territorial limitation to this requirement of registration of 
broker-dealers and hence, the provision extends to foreign 
broker or dealers also. The Rule provides a limited set of 
exemptions to a foreign broker-dealer from the registration 
requirements. Due to the limited scope of such exemptions, 
the extant regulatory framework in the US does not permit 
solicitation and marketing of offshore equities in the US by 
any entity, unless such broker-dealer is registered with the 
SEC. This creates a significant challenge to the portfolio 
investments from the US in India particularly through the 
recently introduced Qualified Foreign Investors (QFI) scheme 
which allows foreign institutions as well as individuals to 
directly access the Indian securities market.
Box 3.1: Extraterritorial Implication of Regulations
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over-stated5. The Basel Committee is also evaluating the 
sources of material differences in risk weighted assets 
(RWAs) across banks in order to estimate the extent to 
which the differences are practice based rather than 
risk based and to assess whether the RWA calculations 
are consistent with the relevant Basel standards. The 
final report in this respect is expected in early 2013.
3.10 As an increasing number of banks migrate to 
advanced approaches, validation and accreditation 
exercise will assume significance (Box 3.2).
Assessing Operational Risk Capital
3.11 Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, 
several high profile cases of frauds in banks, mainly 
involving traders in global banks, have surfaced and 
raised concerns that operational risk is emerging as a 
prominent risk for the banking sector. There are recent 
instances of banks being penalised for operational 
failures, under-scoring the fact that failure to manage 
operational risk can be expensive. These developments 
have focussed attention on the quantum of operational 
risk capital maintained by banks. There are concerns 
that under the standardised approaches under Basel 
II, the quantum of operational risk capital maintained 
by banks is linked to its revenue rather than being 
calibrated to the magnitude of operational losses 
incurred by the firm. Operational risk is recognised as 
one of the most difficult risks to measure and, even 
under the advanced approaches, capital requirements 
for operational risk are likely to be underestimated.
3.12 In the Indian banking system, measuring the 
extent of operational risks poses formidable challenges 
given the lack of historical data on operational loss 
events. Time series data is available only for the 
incidence of frauds. An analysis of such data indicates 
that losses incurred due to the incidence of frauds are 
Box 3.2 : Challenges in Relying on Internal Models for Calculation of Capital Charge
Calculation of capital charge under the advanced approaches 
of Basel II places extensive reliance on internal models. 
However, concerns have emerged over the potential for 
adverse consequences from decisions based on incorrect or 
misused model outputs and reports.
Model risk can lead to financial loss, poor business and 
strategic decision making, or damage to a bank’s reputation. 
The risks inherent in the use of model derived risk-sensitive 
weights are a case in point. Model selection or model 
calibration (particularly PD and LGD estimation) have been 
identified as potential drivers of RWA variation as the same 
asset gets rated differently by different banks, even within a 
jurisdiction.
Some jurisdictions have issued comprehensive guidance 
on effective model risk management. The US Supervisory 
guidance on model risk management issued in April 2011 
identifies “effective challenge” of models as the central 
principle for managing model risk. Effective challenge 
depends on a combination of incentives, competence and 
influence. Such challenge can come from an internal source, 
such as model experts in the compliance and risk, or internal 
audit function; or in the form of external source, like 
consultants. The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), UK, 
has also identified challenges in use of internal model for 
the purposes of calculating regulatory capital requirements 
and expects models used to calculate capital requirements 
to be “conservative”, failing which the PRA would call for 
adjustments to the model, or set capital floors. The European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
in its consultation paper on guidelines for own risk and 
solvency assessment (ORSA), a Solvency II requirement, lays 
out detailed guidelines for firms using internal models. The 
paper calls for the ORSA process to consider whether the firm 
is exposed to any risks other than those addressed through 
the internal model and whether the internal model deals with 
the risks it covers appropriately.
Challenges are also posed by the fact that models cannot 
account for all kinds of risks. This is testified to by the recent 
operational risk events which indicate that “the risk of loss 
from failures by people and bank processes” could be rising. 
These challenges are further accentuated in banks where 
processes are complex. Recent high profile events have 
under-scored the fact that flawed risk models – one form of 
operational risk – can be expensive. Complex models can also 
facilitate frauds by enabling concealment of losses and short 
circuiting of risk controls.
5 Bank of England Financial Stability Report, November 2012
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rising for Indian banks in recent quarters (Charts 3.1 
and 3.2).
Identification Metrics for Financial Conglomerates 
(FCs)
3.13 A framework for dealing with D-SIBs that 
complements the work done so far towards dealing 
with global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has 
been finalised as part of the global reforms agenda6. 
The framework comprises a set of 12 principles that 
focus on the assessment methodology and the higher 
loss absorbency (HLA) requirement for D-SIBs. The 
assessment methodology is based on the potential 
impact of a bank’s failure on the domestic economy, 
which is determined in terms of bank-specific factors 
such as size, interconnectedness, substitutability/ 
financial institution infrastructure and complexity. The 
HLA requirement is expected to be met fully by Common 
Equity Tier1 (CET1) through an extension of the capital 
conservation buffer, in line with the treatment of the 
additional loss absorbency requirement for G-SIBs.
3.14 No Indian bank has been classified as a G-SIB. 
While, no specific mechanism for identification and 
monitoring of SIFIs/D-SIB presently exists in India, a 
mechanism for monitoring and oversight framework 
of FCs is in place since 2004-2005. An FC is defined 
as a cluster of entities belonging to a Group, if (i) any 
group entity coming under the jurisdiction of specified 
regulators and having a significant presence in the 
respective financial market segment; and (ii) the group 
having operations in at least one more financial market 
segment viz., bank, insurance company, mutual fund, 
NBFC (deposit taking), NBFC (non-deposit taking) and 
primary dealer. Significant presence in the respective 
financial market segment is defined in terms of 
asset base (for banks and non-deposit taking NBFCs), 
turnover (for insurance companies), deposit base (for 
deposit taking NBFCs) and assets under management 
(for mutual funds).
3.15 The current framework for identification of 
FCs is based only on the “size” of the financial sector 
entity. Little cognisance is taken of off balance sheet 
assets, payment system obligations, intra-financial 
6 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs233.htm
 Chart 3.1: Operational Risk Weighted Exposures
of the Banking System
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.2: Amount Involved in Outstanding Cases of Frauds
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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sector transactions, etc. The operations of non-banking 
finance companies like housing finance companies are 
not considered as part of any market segment. Further, 
the identification metrics do not factor in the impact of 
failure of an entity on the financial system. This system 
of identification could give rise to ‘blind spots’ with 
the potential of both Type 1 (treating an entity as an FC 
when it is not an FC) and of Type 2 (not identifying a 
financial sector entity as an FC when it is an FC) errors.
3.16 Going forward, an indicator based approach for 
the identification of FCs will need to be developed. The 
framework will need to factor in the work of the Basel 
Committee for D-SIBs as well as ongoing FSB work 
related to identification of systemically important 
insurance companies and identification of systemically 
important non-bank financial institutions (other than 
insurers and financial market infrastructures). Some of 
these FCs of which the bank is the parent entity, are 
likely to be identified as D-SIBs. An Inter Regulatory 
Forum for monitoring FCs set up by the Sub-Committee 
of the Financial Stability Development Council (FSDC) 
is examining the related issues.
Intra Group Transactions and Exposures (ITEs)
3.17 ITEs invoke supervisory concerns due to 
the possibility of regulatory arbitrage and risk 
concentrations within the Group. With different 
approaches to setting limits or defining concentrations 
in entities within a Group or where there are 
unregulated entities, the differences in requirements 
can result in regulatory arbitrage. ITEs could also lead 
to drain on capital and double or multiple gearing 
which could impinge adversely on the banking group. 
The presence of ITEs can potentially complicate the 
resolution of the regulated entities within a troubled 
or failing conglomerate (Chart 3.3).
3.18 In the Indian context, an analysis of the 
magnitude of intra group exposures as on June 30, 
2012 in the case of 11 large banks (including some FCs) 
indicates that such exposures comprise a significant 
percentage of the capital funds of the banking company 
in some cases (Chart 3.4).
Chart 3.4: Intra Group Exposures as a Percentage of Capital Funds 
of the Bank in the Group
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.3: Intra Group Exposures in case of One Large Financial 
Conglomerate7
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
7  The chart represents the exposures (fund and non-fund based between different group companies of a financial conglomerate as on June 30, 2012). 
The balls in the chart represent the group companies (with the red ball centre representing the banking company in the FC) while the lines represent 
the exposures. The size of the balls represents the share of the entity in total intra group exposures of the FC.
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3.19 Keeping in view the risks posed by ITEs, the 
Reserve Bank has issued draft guidelines in August 
2012 to ensure that banks maintain arms length 
relationship in their dealings with the Group entities. 
Both quantitative limits for the financial ITEs8 and 
prudential measures for the non-financial ITEs9 have 
been proposed so as to contain concentration and 
contagion risk arising out of ITEs. Recent amendments 
to the banking legislations granting powers of 
consolidated supervision will further equip the Reserve 
Bank to, inter alia, monitor such risks (Box 3.3).
Subsidiarisation of Foreign Banks
3.20 The increasing complexity and 
interconnectedness of cross border banking groups, 
along with the absence of effective resolution regimes, 
has led to an emerging debate about the preferred 
cross-border banking structure, viz., “subsidiarisation” 
as opposed to foreign banks operating as branches in 
the host country. Different models/ combinations of 
cross border banking structures co-exist in different 
regions (Chart 3.5).
3.21 From the perspective of policymakers-both home 
and host authorities, subsidiarisation has important 
The Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2012, has been passed by 
both houses of Parliament to amend the Banking Regulation 
Act, 1949, the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of 
Undertakings) Act, 1970, the Banking Companies (Acquisition 
and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 and to make 
consequential amendments in certain other enactments.
The Bill empowers the Reserve Bank to ensure that banks 
are owned and managed by persons meeting fit and proper 
criteria. It gives powers to the Reserve Bank to supersede 
the Board of Directors of a banking company and appoint an 
administrator for a period of 12 months with the objective 
of preventing the affairs of any banking company being 
conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the 
depositors or any banking company or for securing the proper 
management of any banking company.
Box 3.3: Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2012
The Bill also empowers the Reserve Bank to supervise banks 
on a consolidated basis including their subsidiaries and 
associate enterprises, to ring fence the banking entity in the 
group from contamination by associated financial and non 
financial entities.
Further the amendment provides for setting up of a Depositors 
Education and Awareness Fund by taking over unclaimed 
funds lying in inoperative accounts for ten years or more 
with banks and utilise the same for promotion of depositors’ 
interests and for such other purposes as may be specified by 
the Reserve Bank. The Bill will also facilitate consolidation 
of co-operative banking sector and viable functioning of co-
operative banks in a sound and healthy manner without 
detriment to the interests of the stakeholders.
8 Financial ITEs are those whose outcomes can be associated with financial flows manifesting in the form of assets, liabilities and/ or revenue transactions. 
Examples of financial ITEs are fund-based and non-fund based transactions.
9 Non-financial ITEs refer to operations arising out of ‘matrix’ management facilitating control/ effective risk management over a business segment 
or a line of activity across a number of legally independent entities. Examples of non-financial ITEs are back-office arrangements, cross selling of 
products, etc.
Chart 3.5: Share of Branches and Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks to 
Total Assets – as on end-2008
Source: “Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All?”, IMF Staff Discussion 
Note, March 2011
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stability implications. Home authorities might prefer 
the subsidiary model when their banks expand into 
risky cross border business environments. Host 
authorities might also prefer the subsidiary model, 
because the problems of the parent would not be 
passed down to the affiliate. Potential down side risks 
may arise if subsidiaries promoted by foreign banks 
become dominant in the domestic financial system. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in countries where 
such subsidiaries had a large presence, they tended 
to substantially curtail their operations or withdraw 
from the host country when there were adverse 
developments in their home country. In addition, 
setting up of subsidiaries will not necessarily ensure 
unconditional support from the parent bank.
3.22 The Reserve Bank released a Discussion Paper 
on Presence of Foreign Banks in India in January 2011. 
The paper proposes mandating the subsidiary form 
of presence (i.e. wholly owned subsidiary (WOS)) of 
foreign banks at the entry level itself under certain 
conditions and subject to certain thresholds. Foreign 
banks which enter as branches would also be mandated 
to convert to WOS once they meet the conditions/ 
thresholds or become systemically important. 
Convergence of Accounting Standards
3.23 The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), 
Government of India had announced that banks in 
India will transition to the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) converged Indian 
accounting standards (Ind AS) with effect from April 
1, 201310. The schedule was announced keeping in 
view the then proposed International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) timeline (June 2011) for 
finalisation of IFRS 9 and the implementation time 
required after the finalisation of a standard. However, 
the IASB has deferred the mandatory date of its new 
financial instruments standard (IFRS 9) from 2013 to 
2015 and has issued an Exposure Draft in November 
2012 proposing limited modifications to the previously 
finalised portion of IFRS 9 pertaining to classification 
and measurement of financial assets. Further, the 
US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has 
recently decided to explore a revised approach to 
impairment (loan loss provisioning) model that could 
differ from the IASB’s “three bucket” impairment 
model11. These developments at the international level 
have added to the complexity and uncertainty of the 
convergence process for domestic banks.
Shadow Banking System
3.24 Considerable progress has been made globally 
towards the finalisation of the policy framework for 
strengthening the regulation of the shadow banking 
system and to mitigate potential systemic risks
(Box 3.4).
3.25 The broad objective of the global reforms agenda 
is to ensure that the shadow banking system is subject 
to appropriate oversight which addresses the risks 
posed by the sector. The approach, however, recognises 
that, in many jurisdictions, the shadow banking system 
can play a useful economic role and lead to efficiency 
gains, for example, due to:
 diversification of risk and limiting risk 
concentration;
 economies of scale;
 some specialised finance companies being more 
efficient than banks in serving certain market 
segments; and
 financial inclusion considerations.
3.26 While the policy framework has been set out for 
regulating and monitoring the shadow banking system, 
the final recommendations are to be developed in a 
number of areas. The emergent policy framework will 
10 In February 2011, the MCA published 35 IFRS converged Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS) stating that their implementation date would be 
notified later after resolving all issues including those relating to taxation. Subsequently, there has been no further announcement from the MCA 
on the implementation date. Consequently, entities that were scheduled to transition to IFRS from April 1, 2011 and April 1, 2012, as per the MCA’s 
Roadmap, have not done so.
11 The IASB impairment model places financial assets into three categories (or ‘buckets’) for the purpose of assessing the timing of recognition of expected 
losses. The impairment loss recognised would vary depending on which category an asset is allocated to. Generally, 12 months of expected losses are 
recognised for financial assets placed in the first bucket with life time losses recognised on transfers to buckets 2 and 3. However, the finer details 
of the impairment model are still being deliberated by the IASB and an Exposure Draft on impairment is expected only in 2013.
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also need to remain vigilant to the strongly adaptive 
nature of the shadow banking system which constantly 
innovates to developments in the financial and 
regulatory landscape.
3.27 In the Indian context, a Working Group on 
“Issues and Concerns in the NBFC Sector” set up by the 
Reserve Bank had made a series of recommendations 
to address issues relating to regulatory arbitrage and 
systemic risk, so as to create a strong and resilient non-
banking financial sector. Based on recommendations 
made by the Working Group, the Reserve Bank of 
India has, in December 2012, issued draft revised 
guidelines related to entry point norms, principal 
business criteria, prudential regulations, liquidity 
requirements for NBFCs and corporate governance. 
The draft guidelines have proposed ample transition 
The FSB has recently published a series of reports setting out 
recommendations for effective monitoring of the shadow 
banking sector.
Banks’ interactions with shadow banking entities
Since the crisis, a number of measures have been / are being 
implemented (through Basel 2.5 and Basel III) that aim 
to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector against 
some risks posed by shadow banks. These measures include 
increased capital requirements for banks’ exposures to re-
securitisation and to financial institutions; enhanced internal 
capital adequacy assessment process for securitisation risk and 
enhanced disclosure requirements related to securitisation. 
Going forward, the Basel Committee is working towards 
making further refinements to the regulatory treatment 
of banks’ exposures to shadow banking entities including 
developing a large exposure regime and introducing a risk 
sensitive capital treatment for banks’ investment in the 
equity of funds.
Money market funds (MMFs)
Given the demonstrated potential for systemic risk among 
MMFs, especially among funds offering stable or constant net 
asset value (NAV) to their investors, policy recommendations 
have been issued which provide a basis for common 
standards for the regulation and management of MMFs across 
jurisdictions. The recommendations cover a range of issues 
including valuation, liquidity management, use of credit 
ratings, disclosures and use of repos.
Other shadow banking entities
Given the high degree of heterogeneity and diversity in 
business models and risk profiles across the non-bank 
financial space (other than MMFs), an economic function-
based (i.e. activities-based) perspective has been adopted 
Box 3.4: Strengthening Regulation of the Shadow Banking System12
to mitigate risks posed by these entities. A framework of 
five economic functions, as under, has been set out for the 
purpose:
 management of client cash pools with features that make 
them susceptible to runs;
 loan provision that is dependent on short-term funding;
 intermediation of market activities that is dependent on 
short-term funding or on secured funding of client assets;
 facilitation of credit creation; and
 securitisation and funding of financial entities.
Securitisation
Since the crisis, many regulatory reforms, including reforms 
related to retention requirements and measures to enhance 
transparency and standardisation of securitisation products, 
have been undertaken to address the systemic vulnerabilities 
and incentive problems associated with securitisation. 
Further, possible policy actions have been identified 
towards convergence and enhanced monitoring of risk 
retention requirements, improving disclosures by issuers and 
encouraging standardisation of securitisation products.
Securities lending and repos
To address financial stability risks arising from practices in 
the securities lending and repos market, a series of policy 
recommendations are being developed. These encompass 
improved reporting to regulators and end-investors, 
improving transparency and disclosures, addressing risks 
associated with re-investment of cash collateral and with 
re-hypothecation of client assets, introducing minimum 
standards for haircut practices, strengthening collateral 
valuation and management practices, exploring the feasibility 
of establishing central clearing and addressing bankruptcy law 
treatment of securities lending and repo transactions.
12 Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Integrated Overview of Policy Recommendations”, Financial Stability Board, November 
2012
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time to bring the new regulatory framework into 
existence so as to ensure that the revised regulations 
are implemented in a non-disruptive manner.
Growth Trends in the Non-Banking Financial Sector
3.28 In the Indian context, the ‘shadow banking 
system’, as it existed in much of the developed world 
is largely irrelevant as the regulatory perimeter of the 
country is relatively wide, encompassing most non-
banking financial entities. NBFCs are regulated by the 
Reserve Bank, while insurance companies and asset 
management companies are regulated by IRDA and 
SEBI respectively.
3.29 Over the years, the NBFC sector has seen a fair 
degree of consolidation, leading to the emergence of 
larger companies with diversified activities. There has 
been a gradual, regulation induced reduction in the 
number of deposit taking NBFCs from nearly 1500 
in March 1998 to less than 300 currently. No new 
NBFC has been permitted to commence raising public 
deposits since 1997.
3.30 The size of the non banking financial sector, at 
21 per cent of GDP, is relatively small compared to the 
global average. Post crisis, however, the growth rate of 
“other financial intermediaries13” has been relatively 
higher than peer economies including Mexico, Brazil, 
South Africa and China. While a part of the growth 
in this segment can be attributed to structural factors 
such as the financial deepening of the economy, the 
underlying trends will need to be closely monitored 
especially in view of the interdependencies between 
the banking and non-banking financial sector in the 
country, as discussed in Chapter II (Charts 3.6 and 3.7).
Regulatory Coverage of the Non-Banking Financial 
Sector
3.31 There are, however, some gaps in terms of 
regulatory coverage and data availability in respect 
of the shadow banking system in the country. For 
instance,
 Government sponsored NBFCs remain outside the 
regulatory and supervisory framework for NBFCs;
 There is little regulatory oversight over the 
large quantum of funds handled by post offices, 
employees’ provident funds or government pension 
schemes; and
 There are regulatory ambiguities/ gaps in case of 
entities operating collective investment schemes 
such as chit funds, multi-level-marketing schemes, 
etc.
13 As defined in the FSB report, “Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2012”, November 2012, “Other Financial Intermediaries” include “NBFIs 
that cannot be categorised as insurance corporations or pension funds or public sector financial entities”. In the Indian case, this primarily refers to 
the NBFC sector and the liquid mutual funds.
Chart 3.6: Size of Other Financial Intermediaries (as a percentage of GDP, by jurisdiction )
Source: “ Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2012”, FSB, November 2012
 Chapter III Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
58
3.32 Plugging the data gaps will be necessary for 
a holistic assessment of the size of the non banking 
financial segment in the country and of the systemic 
risks posed by the segment. To address these issues, 
a Working Group with representation from all the 
financial sector regulators is attempting to “macro 
map” the shadow banking sector in the country.
Bancassurance
3.33 Banks account for a significant share in the 
distribution of products in the life insurance segment. 
IRDA issued, in October 2012, a revised exposure draft 
on bancassurance. The proposed regulations allow 
banks to sell insurance products by either becoming 
a broker or a corporate agent. Banks selling insurance 
products offer several benefits viz., it encourages 
customers of banks to purchase insurance policies 
and further helps in building better relationship with 
the bank; reach of insurance products could improve 
through the widely distributed networks and better 
marketing channels of banks; and the increased 
competition could facilitate better premium rates and 
services for the customer. However, as highlighted 
in the previous FSR, many instances of mis-selling of 
insurance products through this channel have been 
evidenced. The exposure draft seeks to leverage on 
the benefits of bancassurance while addressing the 
concerns of mis-selling through stipulations such as 
imposition of a ceiling on number of tie ups a bank can 
enter into as bancassurance agent, improved grievance 
redressal systems, prescription of a code of conduct 
and enhanced due diligence and compliance of KYC 
(Tables 3.1 and 3.2).
Chart 3.7: Average Annual Growth of Other Financial Intermediaries Sector Pre- and Post-Crisis
(in per cent, by jurisdiction)
Source: “ Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2012”, FSB, November 2012
Table 3.1: Premium under Life Sector: Bancassurance Vs Other Channels
Financial Year
Individual Category Group Category
Banks Others Banks Others
No. of Poli-
cies (million)
Premium
(` billion)
No. of Policies 
(million)
Premium
(` billion)
No. of
Schemes
Premium
(` billion)
No. of
Schemes
Premium
(` billion)
2009-10 2.1 86.9 52.3 758.9 444 6 28224 272.8
2010-11 1.9 110.7 46.7 729.5 1834 13.2 28765 418.7
2011-12 2.2 97 42 551.1 936 31.0 30593 459.8
Source: IRDA
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3.34 Several aspects of the exposure draft will need 
careful consideration. Extant regulations do not permit 
banks to become insurance brokers. Banks assuming 
the role of insurance brokers may also lead to conflict 
of interests where the bank is also the promoter of an 
insurance company. Further, some provisions of the 
exposure draft, if implemented, may expose the banks 
to reputational risks.
Payment and Settlement Systems
3.35 The payment and settlement systems continued 
to function in a robust manner with increased usage of 
electronic modes of transaction settlement (Charts 3.8 
and 3.9). Regular disaster recovery tests for large value 
payment systems testified to the robust arrangements 
in place for business continuity of such systems.
3.36 The Reserve Bank released its Payment Systems 
Vision Document for the three year period (2012-2015) 
in June 2012. The document reaffirms the Reserve 
Bank’s commitment towards providing safe, efficient, 
accessible, inclusive, interoperable and authorised 
payment and settlement systems for the country.
Margin Movements in Foreign Exchange Settlements
3.37 The global financial crisis has brought to the 
fore the risks to financial stability posed by excessive 
procyclicality of the financial system which could 
amplify swings in the real economy and exacerbate 
market stress and volatility. In the case of OTC 
derivatives market, procyclicality could be caused by 
the correlation between changes in risk management 
practices (margins, haircuts) and business or credit 
cycle fluctuation. The margining policies of central 
counterparties (CCPs) and exchanges acquire particular 
importance in this context. CCPs impose margins in 
order to protect the systems from potential future 
losses arising from counterparty failures. But, if the 
assessment of potential future losses is based purely 
on volatility, there will be a sharp increase in margins 
if market volatility were to increase. Key considerations 
enunciated in the recently issued Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructure14 on collateral and 
margins, emphasise the need to establish stable 
Chart 3.8: Percentage Distribution of Settlement Systems (in value)
Source: RBI
Chart 3.9: Percentage Distribution of Settlement Systems (in volume)
Source: RBI
Table 3.2: Premium under Non Life Sector: Bancassurance
Vs Other Channels
Financial 
Year
Banks Others
No. of Policies 
(million)
Premium
(` billion)
No. of Policies 
(million)
Premium
(` billion)
2009-10 6.5 2819.3 82.5 35650.0
2010-11 6.5 2849.3 101.2 44258.4
2011-12 7.1 3273.3 81.6 54690.7
Source: IRDA
14 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101.htm
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collateral and margining policies that reduce the need 
for procyclical adjustments.
3.38 An analysis of the trends in foreign exchange 
market volatility and margins collected by the Clearing 
Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) over the last 
one year provide some indications of procyclicality. 
CCIL’s stipulation of a minimum margin as part of its 
initial margin computation could, however, reduce 
the procyclicality impact to some extent. Recent 
refinements to the initial margin computation carried 
out by CCIL to reflect the increased volatility of 
forward premium in USD/INR foreign exchange market 
have resulted in significant increase in minimum 
margin requirements. This could further mitigate the 
adverse impact of such procyclicality. Nonetheless, the 
underlying trends in margins will need to be closely 
monitored (Charts 3.10 and 3.11).
3.39 The above issues are equally relevant for 
trading on exchanges. A recent assessment by SEBI 
found that initial margin prescriptions by CCPs for 
equity derivatives and currency futures trades were 
adequate to cover daily volatility of prices/exchange 
rates. The potential procyclicality, if any, of such 
margin prescriptions may also need to be assessed and 
monitored.
Exposure of Equity Market CCPs to Banks
3.40 Previous FSRs have discussed the 
interdependencies in the domestic payment and 
settlement systems. CCPs in the equity market accept 
margins/ contribution to the settlement guarantee fund 
(SGF) in the form of bank guarantees and securities 
(which may in turn be issued by banks) amongst 
others. This exposes the CCPs to credit risk vis-à-vis 
the banking sector. Prudential regulatory limits are in 
place to prevent excessive concentration of the CCPs 
to any one bank or to any particular class of banks. 
The exposure of the National Securities Clearing 
Corporation Limited (NSCCL) and the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) to the banking sector is well diversified 
with their exposure to the top five banks standing at 
18.5 per cent and 24.1 per cent, respectively, of total 
exposure to the banking system. However, four banks 
are common in this list of top five banks for both NSCCL 
and BSE, indicating that any disturbance emanating 
from any one of these four banks could adversely 
impact both the CCPs concurrently (Table 3.3). Though 
Chart 3.11: Forex Market Volatility and Change in Initial Margins 
collected by CCIL
Source: CCIL
Chart 3.10: Forex Market Volatility and Margin (Initial and Volatility 
Margins) collected by CCIL
Source: CCIL
Table 3.3: Exposure of NSCCL and BSE to Banks
Exposure as a % of SGF
NSCCL BSE
Bank 1 6.8 8.5
Bank 2 5.7 5.4
Bank 3 3.2 3.0
Bank 4 1.7 5.6
Source: SEBI
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the exposures of the CCPs to the banks are well within 
the prudential exposure limits prescribed by SEBI, 
the interconnectedness between the CCPs and banks 
needs to be monitored.
Settlement Guarantee Funds of Equity Clearing 
Corporations
3.41 “Owned funds” and the SGFs play a critical role 
in the risk management framework of a CCP which 
guarantees settlement of net obligations arising out of 
trades settled by it. The risk management framework 
of the CCP will therefore need to ensure that sufficient 
funds are available with it to meet the obligations of 
its members, including the member with the largest 
net debit position, should it default. In the case of 
equity clearing corporations in the country, the broad 
framework for risk management is prescribed by SEBI.
3.42 The funds/resources available to the CCP are 
typically employed in a hierarchical order in the case 
of a default by a member. For example, in the case 
of the NSCCL, the initial recourse is made to the 
margin contributed by the defaulting member and any 
contribution or deposit made by or bank guarantee 
arranged by the member to the SGF. If these funds 
are not sufficient, then other funds are sourced e.g. 
the amount of security deposit, if any, made by the 
defaulting member to the specified exchange; or the 
fines, penalties, interest on delayed payment, etc., if 
any, available with the CCP. Thereafter, the earnings 
of the CCP are used following which the amount 
of contribution and deposit made by all categories 
of clearing members to the SGF in proportion to the 
total contribution and deposit made by each clearing 
member are utilised.
3.43 An analysis of the SGF available with the major 
equity exchanges viz., NSE and BSE for cash and the 
derivatives segment indicates that, in most cases, the 
quantum of SGF is sufficient to cover the average daily 
delivered value. SEBI’s recent measures in mandating 
all stock exchanges to transfer 25 per cent of their 
profits to the SGF of the CCPs where their trades are 
settled, will further buttress the risk management 
framework of the CCPs (Charts 3.12 to 3.14).
Chart 3.12: Settlement Statistic for Cash Market in BSE and NSE
Source: SEBI
Chart 3.13: Settlement Statistics for Equity Derivatives
Market of NSE
Source: SEBI
Chart 3.14: Settlement Statistics for Equity Derivatives 
Market of BSE
Source: SEBI
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Progress in OTC Derivative Reforms
3.44 In October 2012, the FSB published its fourth 
progress report on OTC Derivatives Market Reforms15. 
The Report points to substantial progress towards 
implementation of the agreed reform measures 
viz., electronic trading and/or central clearing of 
all standardised OTC derivative contracts by end-
2012; and reporting of OTC derivative contracts to 
trade repositories (TRs); imposition of higher capital 
requirements for non-centrally cleared contracts. 
However, it is now clear that the agreed deadline 
of end-2012 for full implementation of the reform 
measures will not be met.
3.45 The Report indicates, subject to limitations of 
data, that approximately 10 per cent of outstanding 
credit default swaps (CDS) and 40 per cent of outstanding 
interest rate derivatives were centrally cleared as of 
end-August 2012. It estimates that while transaction 
information on well over 90 per cent of OTC interest 
rate and credit derivative contracts is being reported 
to TRs, only around 50 per cent of foreign exchange 
derivative transactions are being reported.
3.46 Going forward, a number of challenges remain 
in achieving complete implementation of the OTC 
derivative reforms, especially in ensuring that all 
standardised OTC derivative transactions are cleared 
centrally (Box 3.5).
Globally, there is widespread acceptance of the broad objective 
that OTC derivative products have to migrate to central 
clearing. Within the ambit of this broad objective, however, 
there is recognition of the fact that only products meeting 
certain conditions can migrate to central clearing. In particular, 
the features of the product should facilitate management of 
the risks of the product by a CCP. These features include 
standardisation; relative lack of complexity in contract terms; 
sufficient market liquidity; and readily available pricing 
information. There is, thus, a need for careful assessment and 
definition of the product scope for mandatory migration to 
central clearing.
There are also divergent views about the participants to be 
included under the mandatory central clearing requirement. 
Views have emerged that the mandatory central clearing 
requirements should apply only to participants which pose 
systemic risk and that exemptions/carve outs could be 
considered for smaller users of derivatives, especially non-
financial entities. There are also fears that CCP clearing will 
result in exposures being concentrated in a small number of 
clearing banks leading to increased systemic risk in case of 
failure of a clearing member.
A large number of operational issues are also arising. These 
include issues related to inter-operability across different 
CCPs in the same jurisdiction and across CCPs in different 
jurisdictions, cross margining and netting. Each of these 
issues may, in turn, change the risk profile of individual 
CCPs while potentially posing systemic risks, which will 
need to be assessed and managed. There are also concerns 
arising from legal complexity, regulatory uncertainties and 
inconsistencies, applicability of insolvency regimes and of the 
default management processes of CCPs and potential increase 
in collateral requirements.
Box 3.5: Challenges in Migrating to Central Clearing
Yet another set of issues relate to cost considerations. On 
the one hand, substantial costs are likely to be incurred in 
providing for the technological and other resources for setting 
up CCP arrangements and for establishing links and interfaces. 
On the other, there is also a general consensus among market 
participants that central clearing is likely to increase the 
cost of dealing in OTC derivatives. There are fears that the 
regulatory changes being envisaged for the OTC derivatives 
market may result in the market itself getting impaired/killed 
in the medium to long run.
There are views that benefits from central clearing are 
unlikely to accrue to market participants in the short run 
even though, in the long run, there are benefits in terms 
of increased market efficiency as well as lower risks of 
instability. Regulators around the world are, therefore, 
exploring the possibility of either mandating the migration 
to central clearing or incentivising it, or both. The Basel III 
capital rules, for example, will create an incentive to move 
to central clearing because exposures to a CCP will generally 
attract a lower capital charge than other bilateral exposures.
It is also clear that implementation of the G20 reform 
measures will increase concentration risks vis-à-vis the CCPs. 
It will, thus, be critical to ensure the compliance of CCPs with 
the four “safeguards” identified by the FSB for a resilient 
and efficient framework for central clearing: (i) fair and open 
access by market participants to CCPs, based on transparent 
and objective criteria; (ii) cooperative oversight arrangements 
between all relevant authorities, both domestic and 
international, that result in robust and consistently applied 
regulation and oversight of global CCPs; (iii) resolution and 
recovery regimes that ensure the core functions of CCPs 
are maintained during times of crisis and that consider the 
interests of all jurisdictions where the CCP is systemically 
important; and (iv) appropriate liquidity arrangements for 
CCPs in the currencies they clear.
15 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031a.pdf
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3.47 With regard to margin requirements for non-
centrally cleared derivative transactions, there are 
concerns that the greater collateralisation of such 
transactions may, in turn, lead to new risks. Margin 
requirements on non-centrally cleared derivative 
transactions will mitigate counterparty risks but 
the underlying collateral may by itself be a source 
of credit and liquidity risks. There are also concerns 
about the systemic implications of increased collateral 
requirements, especially at a time when other 
regulatory reforms (e.g. Basel III) will also impose 
demands on similar high quality, liquid collateral.
3.48 Significant progress has been made in 
implementing the OTC derivative reform measures in 
the domestic economy. In July 2012, a Trade Repository 
(TR) for OTC derivative product was launched and, in 
two phases, reporting of all major foreign exchange 
OTC derivatives to the TR has commenced. These 
arrangements will be extended, in phases, to cover 
foreign currency OTC derivative trades between banks 
and their clients under a suitable protocol to ensure 
confidentiality of client trades as also interest rate 
derivative products including client trades in rupee 
interest rate swaps (IRS).
3.49 Following the recommendations of the Working 
Group on Enhancing Liquidity in the Government 
Securities and Interest Rate Derivatives Markets16, 
it has been decided to standardise IRS contracts to 
facilitate centralised clearing and settlement of these 
contracts.
3.50 Infrastructure for the central clearing and 
guaranteed settlement of foreign exchange forward 
transactions in the US dollar / Indian rupee segment 
from the trade date to the settlement date has been in 
place since December 2009 for inter bank transactions. 
IRS and forward rate agreements (FRA) in the Indian 
rupee, which form the bulk of interest rate derivative 
transactions in the country, are currently being 
centrally cleared in a non-guaranteed mode. Though, 
it is not mandatory for market participants to clear 
their trades through CCP, more than 70 per cent of IRS 
trades are cleared through CCP.
3.51 Guaranteed clearing of foreign exchange forward 
transactions in the US dollar / Indian rupee segment 
has been mandated and the migration of transactions 
in this segment to guaranteed clearing is likely to 
commence shortly. An “in principle” decision to bring 
IRS and FRA transactions in the Indian rupee within the 
ambit of guaranteed settlement has been taken. The 
risk management framework and procedural aspects 
proposed by the central counterparty are currently 
being examined.
3.52 Mandatory guaranteed clearing will result in the 
exposures of banks, which are currently spread across 
a large number of counterparties, being concentrated 
against the central counterparty. These exposures are 
required to be calculated using the current exposure 
method (the sum of gross positive MTM and potential 
future credit exposure) and will be subject to the extant 
exposure limits which prescribe a single borrower 
exposure limit of 15 per cent of the capital funds of 
the bank. Mandating settlement of a larger number 
of derivative products through CCIL is, thus, likely to 
result in banks’ exposures vis-à-vis CCIL breaching the 
single borrower limit. Given the general consensus 
that migration to guaranteed clearing will increase 
settlement costs for participants, incentivising banks 
to move to guaranteed clearing in the Indian context 
may also be difficult.
3.53 Several options could be explored for addressing 
these issues viz., designing a suitable exposure 
framework for CCIL which addressed the issue of the 
single borrower limit; taking recourse to the provisions 
of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 
(which defines netting and provides legal recognition 
for the procedures adopted by the system operator 
provided the same are approved by the Reserve Bank 
when it authorises such a system) to permit netting of 
exposures for capital calculations; examining setting up 
of additional CCPs; etc. CCIL’s eligibility to be treated 
as a qualified CCP under the new framework issued by 
the Basel Committee which provides for concessional 
capital treatment to bank exposures to qualified CCPs 
would also need to be examined in this connection.
16 The Working Group on Enhancing Liquidity in the Government Securities and Interest Rate Derivatives Market (Chair: R. Gandhi, Executive Director, 
Reserve Bank of India) submitted its report in August 2012 (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=677#L1 )
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Safety Net Arrangements
3.54 The global financial crisis illustrated the 
importance of effective depositor protection 
arrangements and also revealed several weaknesses in 
extant depositor protection systems. As an immediate 
response to the financial crisis, several countries 
increased their insurance coverage limits and some 
even extended blanket deposit guarantee as a temporary 
measure. Many countries are overhauling the design 
of deposit insurance system to be able to make quick 
payout arrangements by improving access to depositor 
information on the lines of single customer view of 
deposits as in the US. In several countries, initiatives 
are underway towards making deposit insurance an 
integral part of the safety net framework. The initiatives 
are primarily aimed at ensuring the proactive and early 
involvement of deposit insurance agency in resolution 
of weak/ failing banks.
3.55 Several issues, as under, pertaining to deposit 
insurance in India have been highlighted in previous 
FSRs:
(i) The coverage levels were low by international 
standards and have remained unchanged since 
May 1993. The DICGC has submitted a proposal 
to the Government of India for increasing the 
cover.
(ii) DICGC provides insurance cover to a 
heterogeneous range of banks whose failure rates 
differ. However, as premium is being charged at 
a uniform rate, this leads to cross-subsidisation 
and raises moral hazard issues. As the risk-based 
rating system has not evolved in India, it may 
be difficult to migrate to risk-based premiums. 
DICGC is, however, considering implementing a 
differential premium system based on available 
supervisory ratings.
(iii) DICGC has been facing delays in obtaining 
depositor information from the liquidators of 
failed co-operative banks, thus leading to delays 
in making payments to depositors. It has also 
been observed that some liquidators were not 
prompt in making payment to depositors after 
the claim was settled by DICGC. Both these have 
led to delays in making payments to depositors. 
In order to resolve the problem, DICGC has 
initiated steps to make direct payment to 
depositors and for expediting reimbursement to 
depositors along with technology upgradation.
(iv) A bank resolution framework is yet to evolve 
in India. The legal framework governing bank 
resolution is spread over a large number of laws 
and regulations, making the framework complex 
and non-transparent. A high level Working 
Group set up by the Sub Committee of the FSDC 
is examining the related issues.
Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC)
3.56 The FSDC and its Sub Committee continued to 
provide focussed attention to potential risks to financial 
stability including, inter alia, the risks from a potential 
downgrade of the country’s rating; the concerns arising 
from the elevated demand for gold in the country; and 
the external sector vulnerabilities of the country. The 
Sub Committee commenced work towards setting up 
an effective mechanism for the monitoring of FCs 
and putting in place an effective resolution regime 
for all financial institutions in the country. Significant 
initiatives towards greater financial inclusion and 
literacy were set in motion by the Sub Committee, as 
discussed in paragraph 3.78.
Product Innovations in India
3.57 Financial innovation is not an end in itself, but 
instead, a means to an end of sub-serving the real sector 
and in that sense it is consistent with, and a natural fit 
to, public policy purpose of “financial sector-real sector 
balance”. It was the unsustainable “financial sector-real 
sector imbalance” due to certain financial innovations 
that was the real cause of the last global financial 
crisis17. Opacity and complexity of OTC derivatives 
have time and again raised concerns on suitability and 
appropriateness of the products sold in the market.
17 Sharma, V.K. (2012), “The Financial Innovations That Never Were”, Keynote Address delivered at Finnoviti 2012 organised by Banking Frontiers, on 
November 8, 2012, Mumbai.
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3.58 In India, most of the innovations in the 
market have been spearheaded by the regulators in 
their efforts to develop the markets and also ensure 
consumer protection. New products in derivative 
segments in equities, foreign exchanges etc. have been 
well received, and market volumes and widespread 
usage are indicative of this. The bid-offer spreads also 
indicate that liquidity in these markets is reasonably 
high.
3.59 In this context, an analysis was undertaken 
into the reasons for the skewed response to some 
of the interest rate derivative products introduced 
in the Indian markets. Interest Rate Swap (IRS), in 
India, is primarily used by a narrow set of foreign 
banks. Returns filed by banks reveal that trades with 
corporates constitute about 3 per cent of total turnover 
of the IRS market.
3.60 The fixed rates of 2-year and 5-year IRS 
(predominantly Overnight Indexed Swaps) reflect 
the participants’ view of the future path of overnight 
interest rates in India18. That is why trading activity 
increases ahead of monetary policy announcement 
dates, particularly when the markets are uncertain 
about the rate move by the Reserve Bank. It tends to 
fall within a day or two of the announcement after 
squaring off of positions by traders. IRS is not liquid 
beyond 5-year maturity and most of the trading activity 
is concentrated in the 1-year. IRS was introduced with 
the objective of providing a tool for hedging interest 
rate risk of bonds (invested or issued). The largest 
issuers of bonds in India are public sector banks and 
NBFCs and 10-year maturity is a popular segment. 
This suggests that IRS is not used by clients to hedge 
their bond issuances or investments. Moreover, bonds 
in India, unlike in advanced countries, are not priced 
as a spread over swap rates. Banks price their loans 
to borrowers as spreads over their respective base 
rates which depend on their cost of funds and do not 
incorporate government bond or treasury bill yields. 
This creates a wedge between IRS and government bond 
yields. In fact, swap rates are often lower than that of 
government bond yields of comparable maturity.
3.61 Interest Rate Futures (IRF) contract was first 
introduced in 2003 for the 10-year sector. It received 
a poor response and a committee headed by Shri 
V.K.Sharma, Executive Director, the Reserve Bank of 
India, looked into product features that are best suited 
for Indian conditions. The reintroduced product also 
has not fared much better. Interaction with market 
participants indicates that this could be because 
neither the banks nor the borrowers find the product 
as an effective hedge, since their exposures are to 
the Base Rate which is not currently having any link 
to the underlying rate of the IRF. Banks (which hold 
around 37 per cent), Insurance companies (around 22 
per cent), the Reserve Bank (around 13 per cent) and 
Provident Funds (around 7 per cent) together hold 
four-fifths of the outstanding government bonds and 
do not require marking-to-market. One more reason 
for lower interest, according to market participants, is 
the relatively restricted regulatory regime for shorting 
of securities. Cash-and-carry arbitrage strategies, which 
often provide volumes to the market are rare. The IRF, 
as a result, failed to provide liquidity to bonds in the 
deliverable basket. There is a fear among participants 
that they will have to take delivery of the Cheapest-
To-Deliver (CTD) security in the deliverable basket, 
typically a very illiquid one.
Regulatory Initiatives for Financial Inclusion and 
Financial Stability
3.62 Financial Inclusion is the process of ensuring 
access to appropriate financial products and services 
needed by all sections of the society in general and 
vulnerable groups such as weaker sections and low 
income groups in particular, at an affordable cost in a 
fair and transparent manner by regulated mainstream 
institutional players. Globally, the triad of Financial 
Inclusion, Financial Literacy and Consumer Protection 
has been recognized as intertwining threads in pursuit 
of Financial Stability. For any kind of stability, whether 
financial, economic, political or social, inclusive 
growth is an essential prerequisite. Inclusive growth, 
in turn, is largely driven by financial inclusion and 
an inclusive financial system. Financial Inclusion and 
financial literacy are complementary to each other. For 
18 They are the market’s neutral view about the Reserve Bank’s policy rate and its ability to influence the call rate.
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EDEs, ensuring adequate access to financial products 
and services is important at their current stage of 
development. The lack of easy access to financial 
products creates demand for non-financial products 
like gold and real estate19. Financial literacy creates 
demand for financial products and services and thus 
encourages a more sustainable growth of the financial 
sector.
Reserve Bank of India
3.63 The Reserve Bank is furthering financial 
inclusion through a combination of strategies ranging 
from relaxation of regulatory guidelines (e.g. simplified 
Know Your Customer (KYC) norms), provision of 
new products and other supportive measures to 
achieve sustainable and scalable financial inclusion. 
It has a structured and planned approach to financial 
inclusion wherein all banks have prepared Board 
approved Financial Inclusion Plans (FIPs) with a three 
year horizon extending up to 2013. The initial goal 
of providing access to banking services in all villages 
with population more than 2000 by March 2012 has 
been successfully met and the focus now has shifted to 
providing banking services for all the other villages in 
a time bound manner. The focus now is more on the 
volume of transactions in new accounts opened as a 
part of the financial inclusion drive.
3.64 India has adopted a bank-led model for financial 
inclusion which seeks to leverage on technology. 
The financial inclusion initiatives would have to be 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
based and would ride on new delivery models that 
would need to be developed by the market participants 
to best suit their requirements. Experience shows 
that the goal of financial inclusion is better served 
through mainstream banking institutions as only 
these institutions have the ability to offer the suite 
of products required to bring in effective/meaningful 
financial inclusion. Other players such as mobile 
companies have been allowed to partner with banks in 
offering services collaboratively.
3.65 To meet the criterion of availability of banking 
services, banks have been advised to offer a minimum 
of four basic products to customers, viz. a basic savings 
bank deposit account with emergency credit facility like 
overdraft; a remittance product for Electronic Benefit 
Transfer and other remittances; a pure savings product 
such as a recurring deposit or a variable recurring 
deposit and facility of entrepreneurial credit such as 
General Credit Card and Kisan Credit Card. In order 
to further strengthen the ongoing financial inclusion 
agenda in India, a high level Financial Inclusion 
Advisory Committee has been constituted by the 
Reserve Bank. The Committee would pave the way for 
developing a viable and sustainable banking services 
delivery model focusing on accessible and affordable 
financial services, developing products and processes 
for rural and urban consumers presently outside 
the banking network and for suggesting appropriate 
regulatory framework to ensure that financial inclusion 
and financial stability move in tandem.
3.66 The Reserve Bank has been spearheading 
financial inclusion efforts through credit allocation 
norms mandating scheduled commercial banks to lend 
to the priority sector. More recently, the Reserve Bank 
had set up a Committee to re-examine the existing 
classification of priority sector lending and suggest 
revised guidelines with regard to priority sector 
lending classification and related issues (Chairman: 
Shri M. V. Nair). Based on the Committee’s report 
and suggestions/ comments received from various 
stakeholders, the guidelines on priority sector lending 
were revised by the Reserve Bank on July 20, 2012. In 
terms of the revised guidelines, foreign banks with 20 
or more branches have been brought at par with the 
domestic commercial banks in terms of the target/
sub-targets under priority sector lending to 40 per cent 
from 32 per cent of Average Net Bank Credit or Credit 
Equivalent amount of Off Balance Sheet Exposures, 
whichever is higher, as on March 31 of the previous 
year.
Lead Bank Scheme
3.67 To ensure provision of banking services across 
India especially in rural areas, the lead banks (under 
the Lead Bank Scheme) were advised to draw up a 
roadmap to provide banking services through a banking 
outlet in every village having a population of over 2000. 
Under the roadmap, out of 74,414 such unbanked 
villages identified and allotted to various banks (public 
19 Chapter I has discussed the issue of higher non-financial savings in the country vis-à-vis financial savings in the household sector.
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sector, private sector and Regional Rural Banks (RRBs)), 
banking outlets have been opened in 74,199 villages 
as on March 31, 2012, comprising 2493 branches, 
69374 Business Correspondent (BC) and 2332 through 
other modes like rural Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), mobile van, satellite branch, etc. Banks are 
being encouraged to start with Electronic Benefit 
Transfer (EBT) services. The objective is to provide a 
bank account to every household/person throughout 
the country. Hence, banks should endeavour to have 
a BC touch point in each of the villages in the country, 
to start with, through provision of EBT services, at 
least once a fortnight to facilitate transfer of all State 
benefits including Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) wages and 
various cash subsidies to beneficiaries by direct credit 
to the bank accounts.
3.68 In order to enhance the penetration of banking 
services in Tier 2 centres (with population of 50,000 to 
99,999 as per Census 2001), RRBs have been permitted 
to open branches in Tier 2 centres on par with the 
policy for Tier 3 to 6 centres i.e without the need to 
take approval from the Reserve Bank subject to certain 
conditions.
Financial Inclusion Plan of banks
3.69 A major initiative taken by the Reserve Bank 
in January 2010 was that all public and private sector 
banks were advised to submit a Board approved three-
year Financial Inclusion Plans (FIPs) starting April 2010. 
Banks were advised to devise FIPs congruent with their 
business strategy and comparative advantage to make it 
an integral part of their corporate business plans. Banks 
were advised to integrate the Board-approved FIPs with 
their business plans and to include the criteria on 
financial inclusion as a parameter in the performance 
evaluation of their staff. The implementation of 
these plans is being closely monitored by the Reserve 
Bank through quantitative and qualitative reporting 
and review meetings with Chairman and Managing 
Director s and other senior officials of banks.
3.70 A snapshot of the progress under FIP for the 
period March 2010 to September 2012 is in Tables 3.4 
and 3.5. The number of transactions through ICT based 
BC outlets, though encouraging, are still very low as 
compared to the manifold increase in the number of 
Table 3.4 Financial Inclusion Initiatives
i. Banking connectivity has been extended to more than 1,99,702 villages 
up to September 2012 from 67,694 villages in March 2010. 4848 rural 
branches have been opened.
ii. Numbers of Business Correspondents have increased from 34,532 to 
128,054.
iii. 83.70 million Basic Savings Bank Accounts (NFAs) have been added.
iv. 7.35 million KCCs and about 0.98 million GCCs have been added.
v. About 37 million people/families have been credit-linked.
vi. Share of ICT based accounts have increased substantially - % of ICT 
accounts to NFAs has increased from 25% to 45%.
Source: RBI
Table 3.5 Progress under FIP for the period 
March 2010 to September 2012
(Summary of all banks including RRBs)
Particulars
Year 
ended 
Mar 10
 Year 
ended 
Mar 11
 Year 
ended 
Mar 12
Quarter 
ended 
Sept 12
Total No. of Branches 85457 91145 99242 101413
No. of Rural Branches 33433 34811 37471 38281
No. of CSPs Deployed 34532 60993 116548 128054
Banking outlets-Villages >2000 
-Sub Total 37791 66447 112130 117570
Banking Outlets-Villages<2000-
Sub Total 29903 49761 69623 82132
Banking Outlets-All Villages-
Branches 33378 34811 37471 38281
Banking Outlets-All Villages-BCs 34174 80802 141136 158159
Banking Outlets-All Villages-
Other Modes 142 595 3146 3262
Banking Outlets-All Villages-
Total 67694 116208 181753 199702
Urban Locations covered 
through BCs 447 3771 5891 10985
Source: RBI
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banking outlets. The focus of monitoring is now more 
on the number and value of transactions in no-frills 
accounts and also on the credit disbursed through 
ICT based BC outlets. In this direction, banks have 
been advised that FIPs prepared by their head offices 
are disaggregated at respective controlling offices and 
further at the branch level and the progress monitored 
periodically.
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
(IRDA)20
3.71 For access to insurance products, the vast 
network of insurance offices including micro or one-
man offices reaching out to several towns and villages 
is a pointer to the availability of sales touch points in 
smaller places. With a view to ensuring special attention 
to the rural, economically and socially vulnerable 
segments of the population, the IRDA (Rural and Social 
Obligations) Regulations cast obligations on Insurers to 
cover these segments under insurance.
3.72 The potential and performance of the insurance 
sector is universally assessed in the context of two 
parameters, viz., Insurance Penetration21 and Insurance 
Density22 (Charts 3.15 and 3.16). The Insurance 
Penetration was 2.32 (Life 1.77 and Non-life 0.55) 
in the year 2000 when the sector was opened up for 
private sector, and has increased to 4.10 in 2011 (Life 
3.4 and Non-life 0.7). The insurance density in India 
was US$9.9 in 2000 which has increased to US$59 
in 2011 (Life 49 and Non-life 10). For the year 2011-
12, more than 31 per cent of the total life insurance 
policies were issued in rural areas. In non-life sector, 
a business of ` 74.7 billion which constitutes 14.1 per 
cent of total non-life insurance business was generated 
from rural areas.
3.73 IRDA has pioneered the issuance of Micro 
Insurance Regulations which encourage simple and 
low ticket premium products covering the risks of life 
as well as livelihood. Many categories of individuals 
and entities that were considered by the Reserve 
Bank to act as BCs are under consideration of IRDA for 
according Micro Insurance Agency eligibility, with a few 
20 Contributed by IRDA.
21 Insurance penetration is defined as the ratio of premium underwritten in a given year to the GDP.
22 Insurance density is defined as the ratio of premium underwritten in a given year to the total population (measured in US$ for convenience of 
comparison).
Chart 3.16: Insurance Density in Select Countries (2011)
 US $
Note: # Data relates to financial year 2010-11 and 2011-12
Source: IRDA
Chart 3.15 Insurance Penetration in Select Countries (2011)
 Per cent
Note: # Data relates to financial year 2010-11 and 2011-12
Source: IRDA
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exceptions. Further a number of District Cooperative 
Banks, Regional Rural Banks and urban co-operative 
banks that are working in rural and semi urban areas 
are also being considered for permitting to act as Micro 
Insurance Agents. In addition to one Life Insurance 
Company and one General Insurance Company, a Micro 
Insurance Agent is now proposed to be permitted to 
work with Agriculture Insurance Company of India Ltd 
for the limited purpose of distributing crop insurance. 
The proposed modified regulations also entitle 
the individual insurance agents, who were already 
licensed to act as insurance agents, in rural areas 
where population is not more than 2000, to the higher 
percentage of Micro Insurance Remuneration. Further, 
it is also proposed to link the higher remuneration / 
commission rates payable on Second and Subsequent 
years’ premium to the persistency rate of Micro 
Insurance business portfolio of Micro Insurance Agent 
so as to encourage and emphasize on the quality of 
business.
3.74 As regards the scope of Micro Insurance 
Products, in the existing regulations, non life Micro 
Insurance (MI) products are covering retail risks faced 
by individuals. They do not address the institutional 
risks faced by Micro, Small and Medium enterprises 
that are playing a significant role in the country’s 
growth. Therefore, a proposal is under consideration 
that General (Non Life) Insurance policies issued to 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises as defined in 
Section 7 of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development (MSMED) Act, 2006 under various 
classes of non-life insurance business will be qualified 
as non-life micro insurance business up to a premium 
of ` 25000 per annum per policy. However, the non 
life insurance companies will have enough discretion 
to decide whether to appoint MI Agents, if so to which 
sector / enterprises of MSME Sector.
Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority 
(PFRDA) 23
3.75 Old age protection is an essential part of the social 
security needs of the unorganized sector and should 
form an important welfare goal. Introducing a Defined 
Contribution pension scheme (NPS-Swavalamban) for 
the unorganized sector workers enabling them to save 
small amounts during their productive years with a 
co-contribution from the government is an important 
step in achieving old age income security. Not only 
does the scheme enable aggregation of small savings, 
it also helps the government in limiting its liability 
and projecting the funding requirement. A number 
of countries such as Mexico, Vietnam run such co-
contributory pension schemes.
Securities and Exchange Board of India(SEBI) 24
3.76 SEBI is furthering financial inclusion via a 
number of measures. With a view to achieve wider 
financial inclusion, encourage holding of demat 
accounts and to reduce the cost of maintaining securities 
in demat accounts for retail individual investors, SEBI 
has decided that all depository participants (DPs) shall 
provide a “Basic Services Demat Account” (BSDA) 
with limited services, which will not charge any fee 
upto holding worth of `50,000/- and nominal charge 
of `100/- upto holding of `2,00,000/-. In order to 
encourage participation of small investors (who may 
not be tax payers and may not have Permanent Account 
Number (PAN)/bank accounts, the KYC requirement 
(such as PAN, Bank A/c’s etc.) has been relaxed for 
the investment upto `20,000 per investor, per mutual 
fund, per financial year subject to certain conditions. 
In order to encourage distribution of Mutual Fund 
products to semi-urban and rural areas, additional 
Total Expense Ratio (TER) upto 30 basis points has 
been allowed to be charged if net flows from beyond 
15 cities are at least 30 per cent of gross new inflows 
/ 15 per cent of assets under management. Other 
measures such as increasing the category of persons 
to be employed as mutual fund distributors have been 
undertaken to improve mutual fund penetration in 
rural and semi-urban areas.
3.77 SEBI has initiated a multipronged approach 
to spread financial literacy all over India. Investor 
Awareness Programs/ Workshops are organized 
for educating investors and to spread awareness. 
Regional Seminars are conducted in association with 
various exchanges, depositories and trade bodies. 
23 Contributed by PFRDA.
24 Contributed by SEBI.
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The objective of such seminars is to reach out to more 
people and concentrating primarily on tier 2 and tier 
3 cities. SEBI continues its association with Investor 
Associations (IA) as well as Exchanges, Depositories 
and various trade bodies etc. It has launched a financial 
education drive through Resource Persons (RPs). The 
program aims at imparting understanding of financial 
concepts to the targeted groups. These empanelled 
RPs also supplement the investor education programs 
that are conducted through investor associations. A 
Pocket Money Program for school students jointly with 
National Institute of Securities Market is positioned 
as an important life skill at the school level (including 
municipal schools) targeting mainly 8th and 9th 
standard students.
National Strategy on Financial Education (NSFE)
3.78 A draft document on the NSFE has been prepared 
under the aegis of the Technical Group on Financial 
Inclusion and Financial Literacy, set up by the Sub 
Committee of the FSDC. The draft Strategy seeks 
to create a financially aware and empowered India. 
The Technical Group had constituted a Sub Group 
to draft the NSFE for India. The Strategy prepared by 
the Group envisages ways towards creating awareness 
and educating consumers on access to financial 
services; availability of various types of products 
and their features; changing attitudes to translate 
knowledge into responsible financial behaviour; and 
Chart 3.17: Action Plan for NSFE
making consumers of financial services understand 
their rights and obligations. The Strategy calls for 
active involvement of individuals, financial sector 
regulators, educational institutions, NGOs, financial 
sector entities, multilateral international players and 
the Government at both the Centre and the States. The 
Strategy envisages a time frame of five years for its 
financial education campaign (Chart 3.17).
3.79 The draft NSFE was placed in the public domain 
by all the financial regulators for public consultation 
in August 2012. Currently, the Technical Group is 
finalising the Strategy and drawing up a road map for 
its implementation.
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Annex
Methodologies
Macroeconomic Stability Map
The Macroeconomic Stability Map is based on seven sub-indices, each pertaining to a specific area of 
macroeconomic risk. Each sub-index on macroeconomic risk includes select parameters representing risks in 
that particular field. These sub-indices have been selected based on their impact on macroeconomic or financial 
variable such as GDP, inflation, interest rates or assets quality of banks. The seven sub-indices of the overall 
macroeconomic stability index and their components are briefly described below:
Global Index: The global index is based on output growth of the world economy. A fall in output growth affects 
overall sentiments for the domestic economy in general and has implications for demand for domestic exports, 
in particular. Capital flows to the domestic economy are also affected by growth at the global level. Therefore, a 
fall in output growth is associated with increased risks.
Domestic Growth: The domestic growth index comprises of growth of gross domestic product. A fall in growth, 
usually, creates headwinds for bank asset quality, capital flows and over-all macroeconomic stability. Hence, a 
fall in growth is associated with increased risks.
Inflation: Wholesale Price Index Inflation is used to arrive at the Inflation Index. Increase in inflation reduces 
purchasing power of individuals and complicates investment decision of corporates. Therefore, an increase in 
inflation is associated with higher risks.
External Vulnerability Index: The Current Account Deficit to GDP Ratio, Import Cover and ratio of Short Term 
Debt to Total Debt are included in the external vulnerability Index. In the Indian context, the CAD depicts the 
resources that need to be raised to finance imports that are in excess of exports. Capital flows from abroad can 
be volatile and could pose a problem in being able to finance the CAD, thereby increasing external vulnerability. 
Similarly, reserves cover of imports and ratio of short term debt to total debt are indicators of external vulnerability. 
Rising CAD and ratio of short term debt to total debt and falling import cover depict rising vulnerability.
Fiscal Index: The fiscal index is based on fiscal deficit and primary deficit. Higher deficits are associated 
with higher risk. High government deficit, in general, reduces the resources available to the private sector for 
investment and also has implications for inflation.
Corporate Index: The health of the corporate sector is captured through profit margin. The risks emanating from 
the sector are inversely related to it. Similarly, the interest coverage ratio depicts whether firms are able to meet 
the interest expenses. A lower interest coverage ratio is associated with higher risks.
Household Index: Incremental credit to deposit ratio and retail non-performing assets comprise the household 
index. Increase in both variables is associated with higher risk.
The current map is based on the data available till June 2012.
Financial Markets Stability Map
With the objective to measure stability of the financial market, Financial Market Stability Map has been prepared 
based on the indicators of four sectors/markets namely banking sector, foreign exchange market, equity market 
and debt market. The indicators selected from various sectors/markets are following; i) Banking Sector: Banking 
Beta of CNXBANK Index and NIFTY Index, CD Rate and CD rate minus Implied Forward rate, ii) Foreign Exchange 
Market: CMAX of daily INR-US Dollar exchange rate, which is defined as Xt/Max(Xi, i=1,2,..upto one year). 
Where, Xt is the INR-US Dollar exchange rate at time t, and 25 Delta Risk Reversals of foreign exchange rate,
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iii) Equity Market: Inverse of NIFTY CMAX and India VIX, and iv) Debt Market: Corporate bond which is average 
return of corporate bonds rated A, AA, and AAA, 10-years Government bond yield and CP Rate.
Variance-equal transformation has been used to convert the indicators at same level before construction of the 
Map. Four indicators for the four selected sectors/market were prepared based on simple average of elementary 
indicators which are presented as a cobweb map.
The current map is based on the data available till November 2012.
Banking Stability Map and Indicator
The Banking Stability Map and Indicator (BSI) present an overall assessment of changes in underlying conditions 
and risk factors that have a bearing on stability of the banking sector during a period. Following ratios are used 
for construction of each composite index:
Table : Indicators used for construction of Banking Stability Map and Banking Stability Indicator
Dimension Ratios
Soundness CRAR Tier-I Capital to Tier-II Capital Leverage ratio as Total-Assets to Capital and Reserves
Asset-Quality Net NPAs to Total-Advances Gross NPAs to Total-Advances Sub-Standard-advances to 
gross NPAs
Restructured-Standard-
Advances to Standard-
Advances
Profitability Return on Assets Net Interest Margin Growth in Profit
Liquidity Liquid-Assets to Total-Assets Customer-Deposits to Total-
Assets
Non-Bank-Advances to 
Customer-Deposits
Deposits maturing within-1-
year to Total Deposits
Efficiency Cost to Income Business
(Credit + Deposits) to staff expenses
Staff Expenses to Total 
Expenses
The five composite indices represent the five dimensions of Soundness, Asset-quality, Profitability, Liquidity 
and Efficiency. Each index, representing a dimension of bank functioning, takes values between zero (minimum) 
and 1 (maximum). Each index is a relative measure during the sample period used for its construction, where 
a high value means the risk in that dimension is high. Therefore, an increase in the value of the index in 
any particular dimension indicates an increase in risk in that dimension for that period as compared to other 
periods. For each ratio used for a dimension, a weighted average for the banking sectors is derived, where the 
weights are the ratio of individual bank asset to total banking system assets. Each index is normalized for the 
sample period as ‘Ratio-on-a-given-date minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period divided by maximum-value-in-
sample-period minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period’. A composite measure of each dimension is calculated 
as a weighted average of normalised ratios used for that dimension, where the weights are based on the marks 
assigned for assessment for CAMELS rating. Based on the individual composite indices for each dimension, the 
Banking Stability Indicator is constructed as a simple average of these five composite sub-indices.
For the current map and indicator, the sample period for assessment was taken from March 2001 to September 
2012.
Stress Testing of Derivatives Portfolio of Select Banks
The stress testing exercise focused on the derivatives portfolio of a representative sample set of banks. The 
top 26 banks in terms of notional value of derivatives portfolio as at end December 2011 were selected for 
the analysis. Each bank in the sample was asked to assess the impact of stress conditions on their respective 
derivatives portfolios as on September 30, 2012.
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In case of domestic banks, the derivatives portfolio of both domestic and overseas operations was included. In 
case of foreign banks, only the domestic (i.e. Indian) position was considered for the exercise. For derivatives 
trade where hedge effectiveness was established was exempted from the tests, while all other trades were 
included.
 The stress scenarios incorporated four sensitivity tests consisting of the spot USD/INR rate and domestic interest 
rates as parameters
Table: Shocks for Sensitivity Analysis
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 1
Overnight +250 bps
Upto 1yr +150 bps
Above 1yr +100 bps
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 2
Overnight -250 bps
Upto 1yr -150 bps
Above 1yr -100 bps
Exchange rates
Shock 3 USD/INR +20 per cent
Exchange Rates
Shock 4 USD/INR -20 per cent
Single Factor Sensitivity Analysis – Stress Testing
As a part of quarterly surveillance, stress tests are conducted covering credit risk, interest rate risk, equity price 
risk, foreign exchange risk, liquidity risk etc. Resilience of the commercial banks in response to these shocks is 
studied. The analysis covers all scheduled commercial banks. Single factor sensitivity analysis on credit risk of 
scheduled urban co-operative banks and non-banking financial companies are also conducted.
Credit Risk
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit portfolio was shocked by increasing NPA levels, for the entire 
portfolio as well as for select sectors, along with a simultaneous increase in provisioning requirements. For 
testing the credit concentration risk, default of the top individual borrowers and the largest group borrower is 
assumed. The estimated provisioning requirements so derived were adjusted from existing provisions and the 
residual provisioning requirements, if any, were deduced from banks’ capital.
The analysis was carried out both at the aggregate level as well as at the individual bank level, based on supervisory 
data as on September 30, 2012. The scenario assumed enhanced provisioning requirements of 1 per cent, 30 per 
cent and 100 per cent for standard, sub-standard and doubtful/loss advances, respectively. The assumed increase 
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in NPAs was distributed across sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing 
in the existing stock of NPAs. The additional provisioning requirement was applied to the altered composition 
of the credit portfolio.
Liquidity Risk
The aim of liquidity stress tests is to assess the ability of a bank to withstand unexpected liquidity drain without 
taking recourse to any outside liquidity support. The analysis is done as at end-September 2012. The scenario 
depicts different proportions (depending on the type of deposits) of unexpected deposit withdrawals on account 
of sudden loss of depositors’ confidence and assesses the adequacy of liquid assets available to fund them.
The definitions of liquid assets are taken as:
1 Cash + Inter Bank Deposits + SLR Investments
2 Cash + Inter Bank Deposits + Excess SLR Investments (only above the Statutory requirement of
23 per cent) 
 It is assumed that banks would meet stressed withdrawal of deposits through sale of liquid assets only.
 The sale of investments is done with a hair cut of 10 per cent of their market value.
 The stress test is done on a static mode.
Equity price risk, foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk
The fall in value of the portfolio or income losses due to change in equity prices, appreciation/ depreciation of 
INR, shifting of INR yield curve are accounted for the total loss of the banks because of the assumed shock. The 
estimated total losses so derived were reduced from the banks’ capital.
For interest rate risk in the banking Book, Duration Analysis approach was considered, for computation of 
the valuation impact (portfolio losses) on the investment portfolio. The portfolio losses on investments were 
calculated for each time bucket based on the applied shocks. The resultant losses/gains were used to derive the 
impacted CRAR. The valuation impact for the tests on banking book was calculated under the assumption that 
the HTM portfolio would be marked to market. In a separate exercise for interest rate shocks in trading book, 
the valuation losses were calculated for each time bucket on the interest bearing assets using duration approach.
Urban Co-operative Banks
Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their asset 
portfolio as at end-March 2012. The tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR 
was studied under two different scenarios. The assumed scenarios were as under:
Scenario I:
 Shock applied: 50 per cent increase in gross NPAs.
 Provisioning requirement is increased by 50 per cent.
 Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
Scenario II:
 Shock applied: 100 per cent increase in gross NPAs.
 Provisioning requirement is increased by 100 per cent.
 Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
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Liquidity Risk
Liquidity stress test based on cash flow basis in 1-28 days time bucket was also conducted, where mismatch 
[negative gap (cash inflow less than cash outflow)] exceeding 20 per cent of outflow in 1 to 28 days time bucket 
was considered stressful.
Scenario I: Cash out flows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 50 per cent (no change in cash inflows)
Scenario II: Cash out flows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 100 per cent (no change in cash inflows)
Non-Banking Financial Companies (ND-SI) – Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Non-Banking Financial Companies (Non-Deposit taking and 
Systemically Important) using their asset portfolio as at end-June 2012. The tests were based on single factor 
sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR was studied under two different scenarios. The scenario assumed 
increase in the existing stock of NPAs by 200 and 500 per cent. The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed 
across sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of 
NPAs. The additional provisioning requirement was adjusted from the current capital position. The stress were 
conducted at individual NBFCs as well as at an aggregate level.
Systemic Liquidity Index
The SLI uses the following four indicators representing various segments of the market:
Weighted Average Call Rate – RBI Repo Rate
3 month Commercial Paper (CP) Rate – 3 month Certificate of Deposits (CD) Rate
3 month CD Rate – 3 month Implied Deposit Rate
Weighted Average Call Rate - 3 Month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate
In order to create the Systemic Liquidity Index (SLI), the Standard normal or Variance-equal weighted method 
has been used.
Macro Stress Testing
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit risk was modeled as functions of macroeconomic variables. Credit 
risk stress tests have been computed using various econometric models that relate banking system aggregates to 
the macroeconomic variables, namely, (i) multivariate logit regression on aggregate systems’ NPA data; (ii) 
multivariate regression in terms of the slippage ratio (inflow of new NPAs); (iii) aggregate VAR using slippage 
ratio; (iv) quantile regression of slippage ratio, (v) multivariate panel regression on bank-group wise slippage 
ratio data; and (vi) multivariate regressions for aggregate sectoral NPAs. The banking system aggregates includes 
current and lagged values of aggregate NPAs (NPA ratio) and inflow of new NPAs (slippage ratio), while 
macroeconomic variables include GDP growth, short term interest rate (call rate), WPI inflation, exports-to-GDP 
ratio , gross fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio  and REER.
While the multivariate regressions allows evaluating the impact of selected macroeconomic variables on the 
banking system’s NPA and capital, the VAR model reflects the impact of the overall economic stress situation on 
the banks’ capital and NPA ratio, which also take into account feed-back effect. In these methods, conditional 
mean of NPA/slippage ratio is estimated and assumed that the impact of macro variables on credit quality will 
remain same irrespective of the level of the credit quality, which may not always be true. In order to relax this 
assumption, quantile regression has been adapted to project credit quality, in which, in place of conditional 
mean the conditional quantile has been estimated.
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The Modeling Framework
The following multivariate models were run to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the aggregate 
NPA (npa) / slippage ratio (SR): 1
 Aggregate banking system multivariate logit2 regression:
Where, 
 Aggregate banking system multivariate regression:
The analysis was carried out on slippage ratio at the aggregate level for the commercial banking system as 
a whole.
Where, 
 Vector AutoRegression (VAR):
In order to judge the resilience of banking on various macroeconomic shocks, Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
3 approach has been adopted. The advantage of VAR model is that, it allows to fully capture the interaction 
among macroeconomic variables and banks’ stability variable. It also captures the feedback effect.
In notational form, mean-adjusted VAR of order p (VAR(p)) can be written as
Where,   is a (K×1) vector of variables at time t, the  (i=1,2,…p) are fixed (K×K) 
coefficient matrices and  is a K-dimensional white noise or innovation process.
In order to estimate, VAR system, slippage ratio, call rate, inflation, growth and REER were selected. The 
appropriate order of VAR has been selected based on minimum information criteria as well as other 
diagnostics and suitable order was found to be two. Accordingly, VAR of order 2 (VAR(2)) was estimated 
and stability of the model was checked based on roots of AR characteristic polynomial. Since, all roots are 
found to be inside the unit circle, this selected model was found to be fulfilling the stability condition. The 
impact of various macroeconomic shocks was determined using impulse response function of the selected 
VAR.
1  Slippage ratio, exports/GDP, and the call rate are seasonally adjusted.
2  For detailed model specifications, please refer to FSR – December 2010. The logit transformation of NPA ratio is define as:
3  For detailed VAR model specifications, please refer to FSR – June 2011.
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 Quantile Regression:
In order to estimate slippage ratio at desired level of conditional quantile, following quantile regression at 
0.75 quantile (which is the present quantile the slippage ratio) was used:
Where, 
 Bank-group wise panel fixed-effect regression:
Bank-group wise panel regression was modeled where slippage ratio was considered as functions 
of macroeconomic variables. The bank-group effect were identified along with the overall model 
specifications.
where,  is the bank-group specific parameter and .
 Sectoral multivariate regression:
The impact of macroeconomic shocks on various sectors was assessed by employing multivariate regression 
models using aggregate NPA ratio for each sector separately. The dependent variables consisted of lagged 
NPAs, sectoral GDP growth, inflation, and short-term interest rate.
Derivation of the NPAs and CRAR from the slippage ratios, which were projected from the above mentioned 
credit risk econometric models, were based on the following assumptions: credit growth of 16 per cent; recovery 
rate of 5 per cent; write-offs at 2.5 per cent and risk weighted assets growth of 18 per cent, whereas, profit growth 
assumed to be at 15 per cent, 5 per cent and -5 per cent under baseline, medium risk and severe risk, respectively. 
The regulatory capital growth is assumed to remain at the minimum by assuming minimum mandated transfer 
of 25 per cent of the profit to the reserves account. The distribution of new NPAs in various sub-categories was 
done as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. Provisioning requirements for various categories of advances are 
0.4 per cent for standard advances, 20 per cent for sub-standard advances, 75 per cent for doubtful advances, and 
100 per cent for loss advances. The projected values of the ratio of the non-performing advances were translated 
into capital ratios using the “balance sheet approach”, by which capital in the balance sheet is affected via the 
provisions and net profits. It is assumed that the existing loan loss provisioning coverage ratios remain constant 
for the future impact.

